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ABSTRACT 
 
SAMANTHA MICHELE RILEY: Absurdist-Ethics and Radical Agency in AIDS Cinema:  
Erotic Genealogies, Absurd Laughter, and Grotesque Aesthetics 
 (Under the direction of Juan Carlos González Espitia) 
 
 
Absurdist-Ethics and Radical Agency in AIDS Cinema explores a queer theory of 
ethics based in a grotesque humor aesthetic. Trans-historical and trans-cultural in nature, this 
project focuses on key examples from cinema, literature, and popular culture, illustrating the 
ethical paradigm of a postmodern absurdist-ethics. Drawing on theories of the absurd as a 
form of metaphysical revolt and notions of ethical relativity, the dissertation argues that 
Absurdist AIDS Cinema imagines a postmodern ethics in which the representation of radical 
modes of behavior offers, however controversially, not nihilism but affirmation. The 
cathartic choice to live absurdly is embodied through radical engagements with HIV in 
filmmakers’ Rosa von Praunheim’s A Virus Knows No Morals (Germany, 1985), Laura 
Muscardin’s Days (Italy, 2001), and Samy’s Animal (India, 2007). The assessment of AIDS 
humor, barebacking, and the virus fashioned through an aesthetic akin with grotesque humor, 
shows that AIDS should not be read simply as a living death sentence void of agency and 
meaning, but as a reimagining of ethical discourses surrounding quality of life. Vis-à-vis a 
postmodern climate, this study proposes an absurdist-ethics signaling that humans who 
embrace the absurd may wield agency and yield harmony and catharsis. In essence, an 
absurdist-ethics offers readers an interdisciplinary tool through which to discover a positive 
and invigorating refiguring of aesthetics within a postmodern paradigm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SEEKING RADICAL AGENCY & AIDS 
 
 
The working title of this work was “AIDS is Absurd,” which should indicate that this 
study is not a typical one. In most contexts, reports on HIV/AIDS focus on how to quell, 
overcome, or move beyond the trauma of the epidemic. Countless studies aim to identify the 
nature of the virus and theorize how to control and, if possible, eradicate its presence in the 
body. There are also many narratives, rendered and recorded in all types of media, that relate 
the story of those who have succumbed to AIDS, as well as those who have survived. 
Narratives that lend perspective on certain subgroups are also to be found. Since the mid 
1980s, over two hundred contributions from all over the world to the genre of Global Queer 
AIDS Cinema have narrated stories about gay men infected with HIV. What makes Queer 
AIDS films particularly unique is the fact that a handful demonstrates the possibility for 
radical agency in the face of a deadly epidemic. In contrast, most fictional and non-fictional 
scholarly and popular renditions do not allow for such politically precarious gestures. 
A theory that promotes the negotiation of radical agency from HIV/AIDS is risky 
business. By agency, I do not mean activism or modes of survival. In theory, locating radical 
agency in HIV means the representation of politically potent and controversial images and 
ideas that engage with the aesthetics and ethics of death. Many people would surely find such 
depictions repulsive, politically dubious, and/or morally defunct. Indeed, the aesthetics of 
radical agency in and through death as I frame it here may be seen as equating to celebrating, 
indulging, and erotizing death. These may be extreme modes of engaging with the subject of 
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AIDS, and yet, I propose that there is precedence in their exhibition, specifically with regards 
to a theory of ethics concerning endgame engagements. I call this theory an absurdist-ethics, 
which I argue one may trace throughout time, exhibited in response to moments of greater 
cultural trauma, including during times of epidemics, war, and genocide, as well as a retort to 
even the most culturally minor moments of individual human engagement with death, and in 
particular as related to those who participate in high-risk behaviors as modes of community 
formation.  
As I theorize in this paper, an absurdist-ethics is a theory of risk management, which 
equation includes the possibility of yielding a model of life lived more intensely by indulging 
in the absurd, in the grotesque, and in death. This viewpoint challenges hegemonic codes of 
ethics represented by ideals associated with the philosophical tradition of Western 
Enlightenment, rationalism, and Humanism, which dictates that life is to be valued above all, 
and that sickness and death should be avoided, possibly at any cost. At the same time, an 
absurdist ethics demonstrates a pervasive skepticism towards any transcendent notion of 
good or evil. Instead, my model relies much upon an existential philosophical stance, insofar 
as it explains why an individual would find humor in pain, erotize decay, and seek death, if it 
equates to finding agency, and/or as a means to foster community, and/or perchance to 
increase her or his quality of life.  
A theory of an absurdist-ethics edicts that one risks one’s life in order to acquire a 
standpoint of agency that may in theory yield catharsis, pleasure, and possibly, a 
multiplication or increase of one’s quality of life for the price of intensity. Vouching 
allegiance to such a theory may mean that the individual risks being misunderstood, loosing 
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political standing, as well as social and familial support as a result of the exhibition of such a 
radically unorthodox stance on life.  
I contend that a theory of an absurdist-ethics is not, however, unique to the AIDS 
epidemic, and must be set as well in relation to larger historical contexts of tragedy and 
catastrophe, times during which I believe this same code of ethics has been exhibited, at the 
very least in various cultural aesthetic forms of art. My project and its starting point focus on 
a specific cultural-temporal point of reference, with the subgenre of AIDS film in the corpus 
of Queer Cinema from the last thirty years. While conducting research in trends to the genre 
over time, I discovered the presence of instances of radical modes of agency, evidenced from 
the start, and up until the most recent additions to AIDS Cinema. I discovered three key films, 
each of which depicts a specific yet different metaphor of agency concerning HIV. These 
films may be dismissed as anomalies, but as I began to reflect on the political charge of each 
film, I came to the conclusion that the ethical core of each narrative is the same. When 
situated side-by-side, these films and their singular offerings of a narrative as a metaphor of 
agency via HIV render a comprehensive model that points to my understanding of an 
absurdist-ethics. When applying this model to the context of HIV/AIDS, one can better 
understand how the trauma of HIV and AIDS, individually and as a collective human 
epidemic, may be turned into an active production of complex forms of agency, a head-on 
engagement with the pain of one’s inevitable death and the body’s decimation: how and why 
one might, in forms of art and in modes of the ‘real,’ laugh, coddle, and/or acquiesce sexually 
to austere engagements with politically contentious narrations of cultural trauma such as the 
AIDS epidemic.  
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More specifically, from a Global Queer AIDS Cinema, I draw upon three metaphors 
of agency in HIV. The three images engage with the topic of the epidemic through an 
aesthetics of humor and the grotesque, as well as the eroticization of the virus marked by 
high-risk behavior, and instantiate my theory of a radical absurdist-ethics. In Chapter one, I 
introduce the first queer film that strikes me as belonging to the unconventional ethical 
tradition of an absurdist-ethics, German director Rosa von Praunheim’s A Virus Knows No 
Morals [Ein Virus kennt keine Moral] (1985). Through the placement of campy, 
controversial vignettes—AIDS concentration camps and live enactments of burials, for 
example—the absurd as represented in Virus embodies an ethical stance, whereby one would 
in theory embrace the horrific through a gallows humor in order to yield agency and invoke 
systemic change necessary for social activism. In Virus, AIDS as visualized through the 
aesthetics of the absurd is depicted largely by means of humor. I argue that in this film, the 
model of an absurdist-ethics draws upon laughter as a form of engaging with the affect that 
permeates the absurd. This humorous, absurd AIDS film therefore expresses at once a 
disavowing laugh in face of trauma and tragedy, which I contextualize trans-historically in 
the larger tradition of the absurd. I contend that the absurd permeates the art forms of those 
artists responding to, and expressing an absurdist-ethics.  
Virus is one of the very first films produced about AIDS in the mid 1980s, and the 
message that may be gleaned from a reading of the absurdist-ethics of the film invokes a call 
to arms. In other words, I claim that von Praunheim made Virus in order to shock his 
intended spectators, largely of the gay community in Berlin in 1985, into reassessing their 
position vis-à-vis HIV. The absurdist scenarios surrounding the topic of the epidemic in the 
film suggest that von Praunheim felt that the German gay community he knew had not yet 
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fully understood the threat that the spread of HIV posed to them. By casting the most 
extreme circumstances in Virus, one may imagine that von Praunheim hoped that spectators, 
or better yet, a community of intended gay German spectators, would take heed and thereby 
situate themselves thereafter more proactively with regards to their safety and that of others. 
In turn, AIDS humor may induce community formation, which in theory, would be a 
community of AIDS activists.  
In order to demonstrate the larger implications and applications of my ethical model, 
in this same chapter I compare AIDS humor to Holocaust humor, which I also identify as 
participating in an absurdist-ethics. I build upon other scholars’ descriptions of how 
Holocaust humor has been employed historically in order to explain more clearly the 
dynamics at play, and the value in representing the unrepresentable in my ethical paradigm. 
These depictions have in common the fact that most people may reject them as counter-
enlightenment, and/or morally and politically defunct. Still, a topic such as the AIDS 
epidemic or the Holocaust may become so bogged down by the trauma of the event, that one 
may find no other possibility of engagement. An absurdist-ethics illustrates how one may, in 
theory, yield catharsis from the most extreme depictions of the unnamable by making use of 
the most radical aesthetic designs from which to step back, consider, and come to terms with 
that which may otherwise be inaccessible.  
In Chapter two, I familiarize readers with the aesthetics of the grotesque as the second 
key element of an absurdist-ethics. I discovered the image of the grotesque invoked by a 
Hindi film from the Global Queer AIDS Cinema. Filmmaker Samy elucidates in Animal 
[Mirugam] (2007) how it takes a radically grotesque and notably absurdist shock to reawaken 
spectators from their political apathy towards HIV, and this, in the guise of a serial-rapist-
	  	   6	  
turned-philanthropist. This film exemplifies why certain cultural art forms may depict 
controversially what most would render a victimized, vulnerable body, such as the HIV 
mythical body, alternatively as an eroticized, grotesque body, represented by the director as 
an object not solely of disgust, but also largely of the spectator’s desire.  
In terms of chronology, Animal is the most recent film produced, and the reading of 
the narrative via a model of an absurdist-ethics suggests the director chose to depict the 
disease through a radical, grotesque aesthetic in order to motivate spectators to think about 
how even and despite the dissemination of information and medications concerning the 
spread of HIV, there are still places in the world—and in this case, specifically those parts 
where AIDS is most rampant, i.e., India—where not much has changed as in comparison to 
North Atlantic countries in terms of controlling the spread of the virus. The film points at 
how the locus of the virus has relocated to the economically poorer Global South, while the 
Global North had the means to squelch the spread of the epidemic to a much larger extent. 
Animal is, in part, a critique of the ineffectiveness of the Global North in disseminating 
power and knowledge in order to halt the continued growth of the epidemic in the Global 
South. The narrative implies that an apathetic stance of governments and/or organizations 
operating specially from within larger cities in the Global South have overestimated the 
effectiveness of strategies they employ to educate persons living outside the center. The film 
shows how these policies are not able to account for the fact that transmitted knowledge may 
not be received as expected by those persons living in peripheral villages. As a result, minor 
communities suffer most of all from lack of information about protection from the spread of 
the virus.  
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Like in the previous chapter, I set the historical backdrop of the aesthetic tradition of 
the grotesque, calling upon similar cultural forms that also represent an absurdist-ethics. I 
begin by drawing upon the grotesque depictions of HIV in a German anti-AIDS campaign, 
which also notably summons up a comparison between Hitler and the virus. I glean from the 
paradigm of absurdist-ethics to show how this advertisement juxtaposes desire and the 
grotesque to prompt the viewer to challenge an assumed indifferent cultural stance towards 
the epidemic, in particular in Germany, where the rate of infection has slowed dramatically 
since the late 2000s in comparison to the ever-rising rate in the mid 1980s. Finally, I offer a 
comparison between the narrative in Animal and other depictions of the grotesque, which 
also employ the rationale of an absurdist-ethics. 
In Chapter three and four, I approach a third and last image of an absurdist-ethics as 
represented through a model of a high-risk sexual practice that in theory eroticizes and 
embraces the virus. Presented in a third film of a Queer AIDS Cinema, directed by Italian 
filmmaker Laura Muscardin, Days [Giorni] (2001), it delivers an intimate portrayal of 
barebacking, which refers to a high risk gay sexual cultural practice in which gay or bisexual 
men in theory have sex with other gay or bisexual men in spite of and because of the 
possibility that a partner may contract or infect another with the HIV virus. Just like the game 
of Russian roulette, the enticement of the mythology surrounding the practice of barebacking 
lies centrally in the risk, and in this case, in one’s vulnerability and/or contagious status. This 
instantiation of an absurdist-ethics is perhaps the most radical of the three presented in this 
study, and the image of barebacking serves as a radical representation of my model of an 
absurdist-ethics. I set barebacking, as a metaphor of radical agency, to the backdrop of a 
history of the policing of sexual mores and behaviors. I examine examples of other culturally 
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specific models, such as Socrates and Foucault’s discussions on strategic relationships, as 
points of comparison and contrast to show how artists and thinkers may have historically 
invoked a model of an absurdist-ethics as represented in the mythical guise of death as 
possessing transmutable powers of agency.  
While most people would only acknowledge the risk of having unprotected sex when 
HIV is in play, the model of barebacking in the film Days focuses instead more centrally on 
reward, which is crucial to my paradigm. I show how a theory of an absurdist-ethics explains 
how the reward in this scenario is that some gay men, through the act of barebacking, would 
feel a great amount of pleasure that goes beyond mere sex, whereby becoming infected with 
HIV equates to a form of initiation into a community of belonging. In the context of the film, 
and for the purposes of me elucidating on the model of an absurdist-ethics, this community 
may be understood as a mythical construction of the ‘gay community,’ and at the same time, 
a virtual community of barebackers in the Internet. Community in this vein would always be 
virtual and mythical. At the same time, the reward is coded as real, but so is the exposure 
from the risk, i.e., in this model, one may assume that most barebackers will eventually 
contract HIV, and likely die from AIDS.  
Days is situated between Virus and Animal in terms of chronology, whereby the 
director’s stance towards the virus comes out a moment in time a few years after the 
introduction of more effective medicine therapies in the late 1990s in the United States and in 
Western Europe, and in the case of the film, in Italy. My reading of Days through a lens of an 
absurdist-ethics first suggests that director Muscardin focuses thematically on what some 
may read as an unconcerned, and therefore riskier or irresponsible position towards the 
epidemic as a result of the introduction and effectiveness of those medications.  
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As a comparison, in Virus, von Praunheim invokes a model of an absurdist-ethics, 
seeking radical agency in absurdist aesthetic depictions of HIV charging spectators with a 
bolt of energy to push them to acquire knowledge concerning the virus and take heed. In 
Animal, Samy gleans agency from the grotesque and its rendition of HIV, in order to jolt 
spectators out of any possible delusion that the dissemination of knowledge has somehow 
proved effective with regards to the Global South. Finally, as it is done in Virus and Animal, 
in Days Muscardin also draws possible radical agency from the provocations of her model of 
barebacking, which she ascribes to an absurdist-grotesque aesthetics. In a way, the 
representation of HIV in Days is the pinnacle of the most extreme and fullest representation 
of an absurdist-ethical paradigm put into film. Muscardin gleans agency from the intended 
epistemic shock the film’s thematic introduces. Even if seemingly mythical, the film 
exemplifies how an absurdist-ethics may actually look like on the ground through an 
aesthetic representation of the absurdist-grotesque model of barebacking. While a director 
may seek agency in radical models that depend upon an absurdist-ethics, in order to provoke 
spectators to reevaluate their own positions toward the epidemic, Days goes one step further 
in providing a model that is based on a minor community that may in reality put into practice 
this radical form of ethics.  
Muscardin suggests in her film that even when knowledge, power, and medication are 
disseminated effectively in the portrayed society, the assumed or intended result of that 
distribution may still not take into account the choices of individual human agency. In other 
words, while one might expect that when individuals have the tools and knowledge to control 
the spread of the virus throughout the population as well as in the body, some will however 
still do the exact opposite. More exactly, while many people will participate in safer sex 
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practices and take medications to control the occurrence of opportunistic diseases, Muscardin 
offers the point of view of a model of a minor community, that of so-called barebackers, who 
react in an oppositional manner by continuing to spread the virus with purpose, in the name 
of the community, as well as in the name of rugged individualism. The director shows that 
barebackers choose to court death as a radical form of agency in the face of sickness, dying, 
and death.  
I contend that the model of barebacking in Days provides an instantiation of the 
aesthetics of an absurdist-ethics, whereby to give or to contract HIV when barebacking 
would be read as a form of radical absurdist revolt. This model suggests, however 
problematically, that the participation in an absurdist and self-annihilating activity like 
barebacking may be read not only as a form of interpersonal enlightenment, as other scholars 
suggest (cf. Bersani, Dean), but also and even more significantly, as an intellectual and 
aesthetic experience grounded in an ethical core. To illustrate Muscardin’s model, in Chapter 
four I approach testimonies from blogs, chat rooms, medical journals, and scholarly books 
and articles on the topic of barebacking in order to give readers a better idea of some, but 
certainly not all, real models of barebacking put into practice. Following the logic of the 
philosophical framework of absurdist-ethics, I thus read barebacking, as represented largely 
through Muscardin’s viewpoint, as representative of a prototypical form of absurdist revolt. 
My study shows that this is one of the few possible ethical forms of living within the realm of 
a despotic and politically antagonistic, if not defunct climate of catastrophe and trauma, 
present in the wake of the AIDS epidemic, a time I characterize as belonging to a postmodern 
mentality.  
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 In Chapter five, I identify and deepen my understanding of the nature of the particular 
aesthetic model that I argue goes hand-in-hand with the paradigm of an absurdist-ethics, 
which I denote as culminating in the aesthetic form of the esperpento, a term coined and 
illustrated in the works of early 20th century Galician writer Ramón del Valle-Inclán (1866-
1936). The esperpento may be understood broadly as the representation of  
society [as] reflected in a concave mirror that distorts physical reality 
grotesquely, which reflection becomes a metaphor for internal deformity. This 
is part of Valle-Inclán’s technique and the concave mirror one of the tools he 
employs. In this perspective, he is allied to the aesthetics of Expressionism 
and Futurism: “Men and objects will be stripped as clean as possible and 
looked at through a magnifying glass for great effect …The easiest way to do 
this is through the grotesque.” (Lima, 33; Lima quotes Valle-Inclán) 
 
I contend that works of art that engage with an absurdist-ethics deliver representations 
of traumatic events by drawing upon the tradition of both the absurd and the grotesque, 
oftentimes with the aim of provoking the viewer intellectually through laughter, disgust, or 
desire. In the context of HIV/AIDS, the affect of the esperpento as a politically charged form 
of an absurd-grotesque aesthetics, calls forth the deepest fears the epidemic invokes. Affect 
reveals itself visually as death, or more complexly in one’s psyche, as a schizophrenic 
multitude of affective forms. This paradigm opens channels, however controversial, for 
political agency and change in what may otherwise appear as a closed down postmodern 
space. In other words, change only occurs because the protagonist is physically and morally 
grotesque, and change is induced only when he is infected by HIV, dying, and ultimately, 
possibly only after he has succumbed to death. The visualization of the esperpento aesthetic, 
as configured in the absurdist-grotesque fashioning of the virus should, in theory, incite 
spectators to reassess their understanding of the epidemic.  
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 The esperpento represents a way of signifying and understanding the visual and/or 
situational representations of a mythical body infected with HIV as something that has other 
facets beyond physically and psychologically distressing individuals and communities. When 
read through a theory of absurdist-ethics, the mythical AIDS body, as a gestalt of the 
esperpento, may be read as a representation of agency. This agency is incarnated through an 
intentional humorous and repellant engagement with death and decay, and even through its 
eroticization. The esperpento makes a production of the role of the depersonalization of the 
individual, in lieu of the collective mass, which Valle-Inclán felt could be described and 
explained through  
Freudian evaluation of human behavior, disgust with the social and economic evils of 
industrialization, and the ravages of war [which Valle-Inclán depicted in a manner not 
dissimilar to the masks of Carnival players] in caricatures, stylizations, puppets or 
marionettes rather than psychologically developed characters. Such types are farcical 
rather than tragic, however, because the playwright’s desire is to satirize [as a] serious 
statement on the fallen nature of humanity, the resultant is no longer farcical. (Lima, 
32-33) 
 
From these cursory definitions of the esperpento, one may already visualize the role such an 
aesthetics plays in my aesthetic-ethical paradigm, in particular the reference to the use of 
mirrors that warp what is reflected in them—also an allusion to the carnivalesque, as a means 
of self-discovery and as a medium from which to glean enlightenment. This is the function of 
the lens of a model of absurdist-ethics as a philosophical tool. The warping mirror as a 
metaphor of my model is essentially a grotesque lens, signifying a doubling and a mirroring 
of reality, whereby the distorted images the spectator perceives are, in theory, a ‘truer’ 
representation of reality, which is distorted. Reality is distorted. Yet, the spectator is unable 
to make this connection until s/he looks into the mirror and then, looks back critically at 
herself or himself. I maintain that the warping mirror, as a lens in the tradition of esperpento 
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aesthetics, may be extended to other cultural moments of tragedy to understand the ethically 
complex possibility for agency, even though it may be considered by the status quo as 
counter-enlightenment, profane, immoral, and disgusting representations of death coded as 
forms of desire.  
I emphasize that in the space of this study, in the case of barebacking in particular, 
while I do discuss some realities of the phenomena, versus the mythology surrounding it, I do 
not aim to provide here any psychological, cultural-anthropological, or sociological rendition 
or conclusions about its ‘real’ practice. More importantly, it is not my intention to present 
here a defense à outrance of the practice of barebacking, nor a heroization or glorification of 
those involved in its practice. I understand that the issue of barebacking has produced deep 
controversy among many sectors of society, as well as in different communities affected by 
HIV, but my interpretation of barebacking is one that sees it as a cultural practice that may be 
assessed to gain a new, complex perspective of ethics today. This evaluation is not 
synonymous with an encouragement or an apologia of barebacking. Instead, what I intend is 
to consider how our culture is more and more structured around the inherited idea of freedom, 
and that there are spaces, like barebacking, that test its boundaries. My analysis should be 
read in terms of the philosophical and literary as a work of comparative literature and cultural 
studies. I am interested in the cultural manifestations of this model of absurdist-ethics in the 
aesthetics exhibited in certain art forms, chiefly in queer cinema. Similarly, I am only 
interested in the work being done in terms of aesthetics and not the actual work a spectator 
and/or even director or author may undergo in terms of trauma work or trauma theory, two 
very complex realms that cannot be properly addressed in this space.  
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In terms of the discussion of films, I focus more on the narrative, but not without a 
discussion of their visual aspects. While it might be argued that mainstream works of film 
studies should or do focus more on cinematic techniques than narrative, in truth, many 
scholars that engage with minor cinemas, Queer Cinema included, find the narrative equally, 
if not oftentimes more important than cinematography. For example, Michele Aaron suggests 
that many films of the New Queer Cinema sport poor aesthetic strategies (Aaron, 3). The 
reason for this seemingly unorthodox approach, in the case of minor cinema, is that many 
directors are novices to the practice, have small budgets, and focus more explicitly on getting 
a ‘minor’ story across. The object of the queer film theorist is not necessarily analyzing only 
those films with sophisticated film techniques, but instead even those films, however artless 
in terms of cinematography, which suggest a gay subtext. As Susie Bright points out in 
Celluloid Closet (1995), a documentary on history of queer cinema, “It’s amazing how if 
you’re a gay audience and you’re accustomed to crumbs, how you will watch an entire movie 
just to see somebody wear an outfit that you think means that they are homosexual. The 
whole movie can be a dud, but you’re just sitting there waiting for Joan Crawford to put on 
her black cowboy shirt again.”1 In other words, what defines queer cinema is not methods of 
cinematography but instead the queer narrative. Therefore, when I discuss queer films in this 
paper, I too focus actually more on the narrative, as that is central to my argument, but I will 
also highlight the cinematography when it impacts the narrative in compelling and 
sophisticated ways. Another caveat is that the characters depicted in the films, or the 
narratives that unfold around them, do not necessarily represent the real. In the particular 
Absurd sub-genre of a Global AIDS Cinema, these are not fully developed characters, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This quote comes from the documentary film Celluloid Closet (1995), listed in bibliography.  
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instead flatter ones, although in the complex guise of the comical, the absurd, and the 
grotesque. In fact, in the case of the minor cinemas, as I discuss more completely in the 
ensuing chapters, the mythical persona of persons with AIDS, particularly those represented 
in these three films, must be understood as fictional, mythical, and fantastical, and in any 
case, purely satirical.  
While my own research started in film, and my theory developed in response to the 
connections I made between the films Virus, Animal, and Days, I do not see this ethical 
model as being limited to queer content, nor just to the medium of cinema. Instead, I want 
my model of absurdist-ethics to be a wide-wielding interdisciplinary tool. My project is not 
just to divulge the impetus behind AIDS humor, grotesque representations of the 
eroticization of the virus, or barebacking, but also to display the wider historical legacies, 
implications, and evidence of the framework this model supports and produces. To bolster 
each chapter and to more sufficiently illustrate a comprehensive model of an absurdist-ethics, 
I provide evidence and examples chiefly from literature, painting, the theater, and the digital 
media of the Internet. In doing so, I want to demonstrate that an absurdist-ethics may be 
applied to many endgame historical topics and events, not just to the AIDS epidemic. By 
providing such exemplars as a work of comparative literature, this conglomeration should 
supply a necessary well-rounded, interdisciplinary approach of cultural studies, which helps 
readers grasp the widespread indications and implications of my model of absurdist-ethics.  
Finally, I also theorize how the exhibition of an absurdist-ethics emerges during 
periods of catastrophe or crisis, as part and parcel of a postmodern mentality, a time in which 
metaphors of endgame engagement are more common, sometimes including radical 
representations of sickness, decay, and death. These metaphors are controversially presented 
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as seductive, indulgingly disgusting, humorous, and even delightful. This course of action is 
set up in opposition to what some would read as the ideals of rationalism, humanism, and the 
enlightenment, which would dictate that fair and just representations of those affected by 
illness and catastrophe would and should only be read as victims, which oftentimes renders 
such subjects void of agency. Consistently, I argue that such moments of rupture express 
postmodern mentalities that arise in times of chaos and disillusion when hegemonic ideals go 
bankrupt. In such moments, I theorize, one can more clearly identify the simultaneous and 
non-coincidental emergence of an absurdist-ethics, which promises agency where it 
otherwise would not have been possible.  
When I use the term postmodernity, I understand it as Fredric Jameson formulated. 
He defined it by the fact that people today live in an age that  
has forgotten how to think historically in the first place. In that case, it either 
‘expresses’ some deeper irrepressible historical impulse (in however distorted a 
fashion) or effectively ‘represses’ and diverts it, depending on the side of ambiguity 
you happen to favor. Postmodernism, postmodern consciousness, may then amount to 
not much more than theorizing its own condition of possibility, which consists 
primarily in the sheer enumeration of changes and modifications. Modernism also 
thought compulsively about the New and tried to watch its coming into being 
(inventing for that purpose the registering and inscription devices akin to historical 
time-lapse photography), but the postmodern looks for breaks, for events rather than 
new worlds, for the telltale instant after which it is no longer the same […]. 
(Postmodernism, ix) 
 
The postmodern mentality or condition is not a new phenomenon, but an ahistorical event 
that can be traced along with the existence of the absurdist-ethical theory I am purposing, 
through the deliberations of a mode of what I would qualify more closely as existential 
philosophy. In the context of this study, I demonstrate most specifically how an absurdist-
ethics may be traced in cultural art forms produced in the wake of post-AIDS culture, which 
is indeed a moment of intensity and collective rupture.  
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What ultimately is at stake in this study is my offering of a tool to better understand 
the instantiation of certain representations of the human condition under duress, aesthetic 
forms that appear politically radical and abhorrent, and yet suggest evidence of the possibility 
of radical forms of agency, underpinned not by absolute nihilism or destruction, but instead, 
however controversially, by an ethical paradigm that promises a moment of reprisal in the 
face of death, whether that be an epidemic, a holocaust, or the thought of one’s own 
inevitable death and demise.  
While I argue that this model is not new, I am however the first to suggest this 
particular lineage of thought. I trace its origins through a path of thinking that philosophers 
have followed long before, including Kant’s theory of enlightenment, as well as Nietzsche 
and Camus’s conception of ethics. In order to expand the understanding of how the body is 
fashioned and erotized in death, read through the lens of the absurdist-ethical paradigm, I 
incorporate Deleuze’s ideas on the mythical configurations of the body as related to the 
aesthetics of the esperpento. More specifically, I insert my own rendition of a Kantian 
enlightenment, which I argue interconnects with my absurdist-ethics. When assessing 
absurdist AIDS films, and taking in absurd-grotesque representations of HIV, I propose that 
such art forms gesture towards and/or induce provocation, so that in theory a spectator might 
experience a moment of recognition and reevaluation in terms of her or his own position vis-
à-vis moments of cultural crisis, as well with regards to his or her own relationship to death.  
A more nuanced exploration of the key term of the absurd is required here, especially 
because I also draw my theory of an absurdist-ethics from specific considerations of Camus 
on the absurd, as a form of metaphysical and physical revolt, and its intersection with 
Nietzsche’s definition of ethics. I apply the concept of the absurd as an attitude that stakes its 
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claim on the belief that life has no moral value. But by taking into consideration questions of 
agency, I also develop a derivative of Camus’s theory of the absurd that is more politically 
potent. First, when I use the word absurd, I initially refer to what Camus insists on in The 
Myth of Sisyphus (1942): “I judge the notion of the absurd to be essential and consider that it 
can stand as the first of my truths,” which must be accepted in order to comprehend the 
phenomenological and intellectual experiences of one’s world, to ultimately lay bare the 
nature of consciousness and human existence (31).2 Engagement with the absurd takes place 
when the individual becomes aware of life itself through “Cartesian, solipsistic, existential 
encounters with truth, morality, ethics, and theology” (Sagi 20). The absurd is a central 
component to life but, as theorized by Camus, people do not or cannot come to this 
conclusion unless they have suffered and found a vehicle, an absurd one, through which they 
may navigate their state of suffering and discover its absurdist core. In Camus’ words: 
“Living is keeping the absurd alive. Keeping it alive is, above all, contemplating it” (Myth 
54). Camus continues that the absurd man is one who “assured of his temporally limited 
freedom, of his revolt devoid of future, and of his mortal consciousness, lives out his 
adventure within the span of his lifetime” (66). For the absurd man, “the absurd is his 
extreme tension, which he maintains constantly by solitary effort, for he knows that in that 
consciousness and in that day-to-day revolt he gives proof of his only truth, which is defiance” 
(55). Revolt, both metaphysical and physical, is the key form of action and agency in order to 
accomplish the goal of seizing and sustaining awareness. In contrast, suicide would be the 
negation of life and its value.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This quote has been widely translated as: “The absurd is the essential concept and the first truth.” However, in 
my research, not a single source actually cited the source of this translation. I have chosen to stay with Justin 
O’Brien’s translation from 1991.  
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To further my inquiry, I look to Nietzsche, who also provides a helpful illustration of 
ethics that complements Camus’ ideas. Nietzsche’s conception of an ethics of life relies on 
the master/slave dialectic—notably, a strategic relationship—whereby ethics or the “noble 
mode of valuation” is the will of the master according to his taste and preference 
(“Genealogy,” 10). The antithesis of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is dependent on a bureaucracy of 
power. Nietzsche turns this constellation on its head improbably, reversing the valuation. As 
reported by Nietzsche, ethics are wielded not by the master, but in truth by the slave. In his 
work “On the Genealogy of Morals” (1887), he clarifies:  
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and 
gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that 
of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble 
morality develops from triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the 
outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; and this No 
is its creative deed. (472)  
 
Forced to its furthest conclusion, Nietzsche provides a malleable code of ethics that does not 
hinge solely on ideals of good and evil, but instead on truculence or acts of revolt, crimes 
committed by the Untertanen or the disenfranchised minorities as represented by the masses. 
Their offenses are what Nietzsche deems the creative deeds of revolt. One therefore speaks 
of an ethics of difference; this exception circumscribes what is good and what is evil, and 
replaces it with the right to life that underpins the justification of the so-called enlightened, 
‘Western’ cultural conceptions of human rights.  
 Finally, I rely on Deleuze to help me further explain the dynamics of an ethics that 
embraces an absurdist-grotesque aesthetics. I identify this dynamic in radical forms of 
exhibition of the human, visualized or portrayed in art as the inhuman, the animal, or the 
unrepresentable. Two Deleuzian concepts are particularly relevant here: a narrowed form of a 
Deleuzian becoming and the expression body without organs. Relevant to the former, and 
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specifically as a becoming ethical, Deleuzian scholars Ian Buchanan and Adrian Parr deduce 
that: 
The qualitative leap through pain, across the mourning landscapes of nostalgia, is a 
gesture of active creation, one that affirms new ways of belonging. It is a fundamental 
reconfiguration of our way of belonging in the world that acknowledges the pain of 
loss whilst moving beyond this pain. This is the defining moment of becoming-
ethical: the movement across and beyond the pain, loss and negative passions. The 
real aim of the process is to overcome the stultifying effects of passivity that pain can 
produce. In this way, the internal disarray, fracture and pain provide the ethical 
conditions for transformation. (89-90; my emphasis) 
 
Becoming ethical, as I apply it in this study, is a becoming of an absurdist-ethics across the 
spectrum of human experience, including within the experience of those individuals and 
communities confronted historically with HIV/AIDS, such as the queer community. 
Becoming absurdist-ethical affects the course by which minor communities might 
metaphorically signify alternate allegiance. Becoming absurdist-ethical is also an expedient 
by which to visualize and reflect on the self as an individual and as a collective, and also as a 
minor subject, taking into account one’s body, tongue, and mind.  
 I rely on Deleuze and Guattari to extend my argument to humor, whereby humor is a 
mechanism through which a collective subject can be perceived through language, as a two-
dimensional object; as a surface, and as a body without organs, as pure affect. Absurdist 
humor may be perceived as an ethical form, not one that is easily identifiable, but instead one 
that follows rules applicable only to a minor level. The source of origin, in a sense, is always 
displaced; and upon closer inspection, only chaos is to be found. Only by following the 
greater gesture of the system, does the chaos, which is made up of what Deleuze calls 
‘nomadic singularities’ or ‘mad particles,’ also take shape in the form of signification, and 
thereby assumes real ethical value. Deleuze illustrates this point in his work on The Logic of 
Sense (1990):  
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The tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humor. For if irony is the 
coextensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is 
the coextensiveness of sense with nonsense. Humor is the art of the surfaces and of 
the doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is 
the art of the static genesis, the savoir-faire of the pure event, and the ‘fourth person 
singular’—with every signification, denotation, and manifestation suspended, all 
height and depth abolished. (159-160) 
 
In this case, one should not read the affect of humor, the grotesque, or the grotesquely erotic 
as nonsense, i.e., as that which is opposed to sense, but instead, as having one and the same 
makeup and structure as sense, in the same fashion as the warping mirror I mentioned when 
discussing Valle-Inclán’s esperpento. On the localized level, that which appears to be 
nonsense may be guilelessly recognized as only nonsense; but on the minor level, nonsense 
and sense together have a clear interdependent, dialectical relationship and purpose, whereby 
the product of that relationship is an absurdist-ethical stance towards enlightenment. They 
enact a mechanics by which the absurd expresses an ethical charge. Within an absurdist-
ethical paradigm, one relies on radical forms of humor, the grotesque, or the erotic, to exact a 
call to an unorthodox, counter-hegemonic, yet for some, in theory, a more intense, and 
controversially, perhaps even more valuable, existential state of being in a professedly 
senseless historical postmodern state, in particular after tragic events in world history.  
 Deleuze would nevertheless not agree entirely with my interpretation of humor, 
because he believes that the absurd is a dichotomous appellation, whereby nonsense is 
diametrically opposed to sense, instead of both terms being categorized as part and parcel of 
the same body. He proposes that  
for the philosophy of the absurd, nonsense is what is always opposed to sense in a 
simple relation with it, so that the absurd is always defined by a deficiency of sense 
and a lack (there is not enough of it …). From the point of view of structure, on the 
contrary, there is always too much sense: an excess produced and over-produced by 
nonsense as a lack of itself. (Logic of Sense, 82-83) 
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As I espy it, Deleuze reduces the complexities of the absurd in comparison to how many 
other philosophers, present and past, have applied it productively. In my opinion, in the 
excess that a dialectics between sense and nonsense produces, one identifies much queer 
potential and energy. As an illustration, Wim Tigges in An Anatomy of Literary Nonsense 
(1988) points out that: “In nonsense, language creates a reality, in the absurd, language 
represents a senseless reality” (128; emphasis in the original). This reality is not withal 
senseless itself. Put plainly, I do not read absurdist art as meaningless. I interpret those works 
as critical of greater social and political issues, but in a manner that is not immediately or 
easily recognizable. As it happens with any innovative art, one has to work oftentimes to 
unravel and decode the messages at hand. This intelligence is also often multiple and 
convoluted in its own right, but valuable, philosophically speaking, nonetheless.  
 Michael Holquist, in his essay on “What is a Boojum? Nonsense and Modernism,” 
also challenges Deleuze, putting his definition of the absurd on its head. He frames his 
argument as such: “The absurd points to a discrepancy between purely human values and 
purely logical values …The Absurd is a contrast between systems of human belief, which 
may lack all logic, and the extremes of logic unfettered by human disorder. Nonsense is play 
with order only” (129). The absurd reduces the human to an animal and demands that one ask 
fundamental questions about logic, reason, and above all the value of ethical assertions. In 
this configuration, one is looking for absolutes. What concerns me here again is the ethical 
that underlies the animal, even the non-living, the alien, the absent, the unthinkable, and the 
unrepresentable, all of which flourish only on a micro level.  
 Consequently, as Tigges invokes, “I think it is not so much the aim of the absurdists 
to free themselves from logic and conventions, as to describe a world that has lost its 
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meaning for man ‘(c)ut off from his religious, metaphysical, and transcendental roots’ (Esslin 
1968: 23, quoting Ionesco)” (129). This meaning makes more sense in light of what writers 
such as Samuel Beckett, Albert Camus, James Joyce, and Franz Kafka were doing, all of 
whom employed the absurd in their writing in one fashion or another, and which I reference 
and discuss further in ensuing chapters. These artists were not trying to tear down the world 
and make it nonsensical, nor depict it as void of sense, nor structure; but instead they 
endeavored to evince life’s complexities and paradoxes, its disappointments, and how this 
forever romanticized and oftentimes religiously-laden fate of death and dying is simply 
unavoidable and even, however bitter that sounds, candidly logical. Even if the world seems 
to have no meaning because signification is not to be found, and bodies appear beyond 
representation, humans will inevitably create structures of substance, and invent other modes 
of living to fill the psychological void, to disavow the meaninglessness. 
 In consequence, absurdist behavior can in part be described as a form of fatalism, 
whereby one tests the limits of the written or spoken word, the artist’s signature, or even the 
penetration and contamination of the flesh, as it happens in barebacking. As Stanford Lyman 
and Marvin Scott address in A Sociology of the Absurd (1989):  
One response to the anxious and frustrating awareness of being on a fatalistic time 
track is the attempt to gamble with fate by seeking to alter the seeming inevitable. 
[…] He or she can subjectively experience both personal freedom and active control 
over events. One manifestation of this phenomenon involves taking risks. Flaunting 
fate and history’s directive, a man or a woman may allow the free play of impulses to 
disorganize the predicted, frustrate the dictated, or wreak havoc in the ordered world. 
(36) 
 
At the same time, one must recognize the dynamic at work here with respect to gestures of 
fatalism and even realism as it applies to postmodernity, and in particular how it applies to 
my understanding of the absurd, which starts with Martin Esslin. Esslin coined the term the 
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absurd in his pivotal work on The Theater of the Absurd from 1961. In this essay, Esslin 
theorizes:  
For [the absurdist artist,] there is no contradiction between the desire for realism and 
the basic absurdity of the situations that inspire him. Like Ionesco he regards life in 
its absurdity as basically funny—up to a point. ‘Everything is funny; the greatest 
earnestness is funny; even tragedy is funny. [We try] to get to this recognizable 
reality of the absurdity of what we do and how we behave and how we speak.’ (206) 
 
One may think of absurdist art, therefore, as something that represents at once the inadequacy 
of language, the paradox of meaning and sense, as well as an alternate world that is tragic, 
grotesque, self-reflexive, and philosophical. This absurdist world must have at the same time 
its own logic and its own absurdist-ethics. This kind of ethics functions through a dialectics 
of living and death. That which pervades or fills up the body of this absurdist-ethics is the 
affect of laughter or humor, in the guise of the absurd and the grotesque, as well as that 
which shocks and scares, including high-risk acts of revolt.    
I aim to provide a comprehensive model of an absurdist-ethics modeled on examples 
of HIV as represented in Queer Cinema, but I also hope that this new lens of ethics might 
find further application as a philosophical tool. An absurdist-ethics should prove useful to 
scholars considering more sympathetically why certain individuals and/or sub-cultural 
groups might whole-heartedly and in good conscience participate in radical modes of living 
that the rest of the world might find abhorrent. Specifically, my model of an absurdist-ethics 
should provide a means to better understand how some may justify ethically doing that that 
which most people in the world would deem unthinkable, because in theory, and however 
risky, even the realm of the unthinkable may provide agency for some.  
In conclusion, I claim that an absurdist-ethics in essence proposes that within the 
vicissitudes of the postmodern, humans who embrace the absurd can attain self-acceptance 
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and harmony. Therefore, at its most radical conclusion, laughing at that which is taboo, 
eroticizing decay and death, and invocating high-risk models of behavior such as 
barebacking might be read as metaphors for postmodern, consensual living, dedicated to 
certain kind of quality of life. In this context, such endgame engagements would not 
represent delinquency, immorality, or evil, but instead in fact possibly virtuosity, health, and 
the good. Within the logic of the model of an absurdist-ethics, even such radical mythical 
configurations could be considered moral agents within the theoretical parameters of 
postmodernity, and capable perhaps even of inciting a political charge in spectators, which at 
the very least may compel the viewer to reassess their own philosophical position vis-à-vis 
their own ethical stance on quality of life.  
 	  
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
AIDS HUMOR: EIN VIRUS KENNT KEINE MORAL [A VIRUS KNOWS NO MORALS] 
1985 
 
 
Did you hear about the two Polack junkies? They were shooting up one day, and one 
of them took the needle and shot up. And then the second one took the needle from 
the first one and shot up with it. The first Polack said, “Are you crazy? Why did you 
shoot up with the same needle I used? Don’t you know I have AIDS?” And the 
second Polack said, “Oh, that’s OK. I’m wearing a condom.” (Goodwin, More Man 
Than You’ll Ever Be: Gay Folklore and Acculturation in Middle America, 84) 
   
The death of 30 million people is no laughing matter. It is tragic, and the epidemic’s impact 
on human civilization cannot be described adequately; but that does not stop people from 
trying to put their thoughts, experiences, and emotions about that event into words, 
principally through media or the arts. To laugh or make jokes about HIV and AIDS sounds 
perhaps just as “barbaric” as Theodor W. Adorno deemed art after Auschwitz.  
 In order to demonstrate the larger implications and applications of my ethical model, 
in this chapter I compare AIDS humor to Holocaust humor, which I also identify as 
participating in an absurdist-ethics. I build upon scholarly descriptions of how Holocaust 
humor has been employed historically in order to explain more clearly the dynamics at play 
and the value in representing the unrepresentable in my ethical paradigm. In a second 
instance, I introduce the first queer film that strikes me as belonging to the unconventional 
ethical tradition of an absurdist-ethics, German director Rosa von Praunheim’s A Virus 
Knows No Morals [Ein Virus kennt keine Moral] (1985). Through the placement of 
controversial vignettes—AIDS concentration camps and live enactments of burials, for 
	  	   27	  
example—the absurd, as represented in Virus, embodies an ethical stance whereby one would 
in theory embrace the horrific through a gallows humor, in order to yield agency and invoke 
the systemic change necessary for social activism. 
 Following this line of logic, one may better understand why Adorno suggested that 
there may be no other way to represent the aesthetics of a culture marked by atrocity or 
tragedy than besides through the lens of the barbaric. In his essay on “Cultural Criticism and 
Society, ” published in 1955, Adorno implied that one must recognize the grotesque nature of 
the act of poetry writing in Germany after World War II (WWII) in order to understand the 
nature of aesthetics in the post-Holocaust cultural landscape: 
Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and 
barbarism. To write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the 
knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. (Prisms, 34)  
 
In other words, after WWII, any creation of art in the name of culture can only reify the 
barbaric culture that produced the Holocaust. Calling art culture, instead of a product of 
barbarism, is an act of denial that is symptomatic and at the same time reinforces the 
knowledge-power paradigm that participates in perpetuating the lie that German culture 
could be anything but barbaric after the fact. If one applies this dictum to the AIDS epidemic, 
one might say that anyone who could conceive of a comedy about AIDS is disrespecting the 
lives of those who have fallen victim to the virus. Even more, one could accuse such 
directors of being homophobic. Following this logic, to call a comedic AIDS film a work of 
art is just as nonsensical as calling a poem after Auschwitz a work to be commended as high 
Kultur. Adorno did of course modify this dictum a year later in his Negative Dialectics:  
Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream: 
hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write 
poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question whether after Auschwitz 
you can go on living. (362-363).  
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Inevitably, from such catastrophic events arise questions about the ethics of life and death. In 
Adorno’s case, he exacts that “Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity and 
death” (Negative Dialectics, 362). The only viable solution to living after such a happening 
might oftentimes mean, in truth, behaving in absurd ways through habits that may discern 
themselves in cultural forms, more often than not, as something humorous; take the work of 
playwright Samuel Beckett for instance.  
 Many Beckett scholars, such as Lois Gordon, read his work as “a product of and 
testament to his times;” a time of devastation (5):  
Beckett witnessed, literally, extremes in human destruction hitherto inconceivable to 
the civilized mind. He lived through two terrible depressions […]; two world wars; 
and virtually two civil wars […]. He witnessed the power of totalitarianism as it 
swept through the modern world […]. Throughout, one must speculate, he could not 
help but observe the degrees of caring and indifference, of pettiness and megalomania 
that accompanied each event—the panoply of human behavior, from self-sacrifice to 
utter barbarism, that were the personal and national responses to each of these 
occurrences. (6) 
 
Gordon draws upon Beckett’s so-called “siege in the room,” a phrase he coined to describe 
his most creative period, after WWII. During this time, Beckett wrote his influential play, 
Waiting For Godot (1948-1949). One may reasonably accept Gordon’s hypothesis that one 
may trace “how the world from 1906 to 1946 formed the man who would create the 
definitive literary forms of our time” (6). Beckett was writing in a post-world war climate, 
which I would characterize as maintaining a postmodern mentality of political impassivity, in 
which people were trying to bespeak the atrocities of the Holocaust and the atomic bomb. It 
figures that Beckett does what I allege many AIDS films do; he uses humor as a means to 
express very serious issues of identity, life, and death in response to a time marked by 
incomprehensible absurdity, a time when the ideals of enlightenment seemed to have failed. 
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 Beckett’s play Endgame (1957) is a good example of his writing that expresses a 
process of an impossible Vergangenheitsbewältigung [dealing with the past]. This drama, 
which Beckett considered one his darkest and most absurd, is set to the backdrop of a 
wasteland, a reflection of the post-WWII political climate. The main protagonist Hamm is 
confined to a chair, while his servant Clov must forever wait upon his master, always on his 
feet, wanting to leave, but never mustering up the energy. Hamm’s legless parents live in 
trashcans and continually bicker about banal issues. Beckett describes how Endgame was 
“rather difficult and elliptic, mostly depending on the power of the text to claw, more 
inhuman than Godot” (qtd. in Oppenheim, 290, fn. 8). Clearly, the author was not striving to 
write a text that was sympathetic, overtly mournful or soothing, but one that “clawed” at the 
truth of the near impossibility of conceiving of a viable ethics by which to abide after WWII. 
The narrative should be read as an allegory of the impossibility of agency in the post-war 
political climate. The palpable absurdist-ethical paradigm therein expresses itself as an 
affective product of humor evinced by the absurdist strain of comedy.  
 Nell, Hamm’s legless mother, delivers the telling line in Endgame, which makes no 
mistake about the drama’s correlation between humor and the absurd: “Nothing is funnier 
than unhappiness […] Yes, yes, it’s the most comical thing in the world. And we laugh, we 
laugh, with a will, in the beginning. But it’s always the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny 
story we have heard too often, we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more” (19). 
From the perspective of an absurdist-ethics, Beckett was able to express the philosophical 
conundrum experienced by many after WWII, when people inquired how a god could allow 
such destruction, such suffering, and the death of an estimated 53.5 million lives. Beckett 
thereby interrogated the paradigms of the ideology of the Enlightenment incarnated by the 
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shaken human relationship to values, morality, and the notions of right and wrong, or good 
and evil. 
 The war forced people to experience an existential crisis, compelling them to question 
and reevaluate the nature of human existence and human society. I argue that if one were 
only to accept the hegemonic dogma at that time of crisis, be it that of the Church, 
rationalism, and/or humanism, without questioning its core, one may not achieve a 
meaningful degree of reflection or catharsis. Only through a model of ethics that provides an 
alternative means to distance oneself from the subject at hand, such as the controversial yet 
viable absurdist-ethics, can one possibly engage philosophically with subjects that are shut 
down by a paradigm of ethics that has failed to save millions of people from death and 
destruction.   
 Nevertheless, an absurdist-ethics is not precipitated only on notions of anguish or 
grief. In the case of Beckett, one may also discern sentiments of hope. Beckett’s pessimistic 
dramas depend on an ethical framework that allows for the possibility of testing viable ways 
to live. In Aesthetic History (1970), Adorno, who was a contemporary critic of Beckett’s, 
discovered ethical value in the author’s craft and especially in his application of the absurd:  
Beckett’s plays are absurd not because of the absence of meaning, for then they 
would be simply irrelevant, but because they put meaning on trial; they unfold its 
history. […] Today this is the capacity of art: Through the consistent negation of 
meaning of artworks. Works of the highest level of form that are meaningless or alien 
to meaning are therefore more than simply meaningless because they gain their 
content (Gehalt) through the negation of meaning. (201) 
 
Just as an absurdist-ethics appears at first to prescribe a negation of life through the 
embracing of death, absurdist comedic art forms like Beckett’s dramas are in truth invested 
in discovering a meaningful existence in the face of total destruction.  
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 Following Adorno’s lead, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari describe the existential 
transformation, which the Jewish people undertook as a devastating result of becoming 
exiled or becoming “nomadic:”3  
Let misfortune befall us: this formula punctuates Jewish history. It is we who must 
follow the most deterriotorialized line, the line of the scapegoat, but we will change 
its sign, we will turn it into the positive line of our subjectivity, our Passion, our 
proceeding or grievance. We will be our own scapegoat. We will be the lamb. (135) 
 
In a similar way, the mythical configuration of the ‘LGBTQ community’ may be read as 
deterriotorialized, a condition some have called a ‘queer diaspora,’ part of what some 
consider a minor cultural diaspora. Absurdist art represents a facet of such minor diasporic 
cultures which have been metaphorically lost and which yet may possibly be regained 
through the belonging and allegiances within that same minor community. Such art forms 
would express, complex moments of subjugation, dislocation, and even death, and at the 
same time a reunion, overcoming, survival, and betterment in the quality of life as a result of 
active engagement, intellectually and/or spiritually, in the cultural construction of the minor 
community.  
  To better understand the dynamics of absurdist art as part and parcel of minor 
cultures, I look to how Deleuze and Guattari assumed the term as descriptive of Franz 
Kafka’s writings. The authors see Kafka’s work as prototypical illustrations of that which is 
humorous and yet deeply serious, anarchic, and yet still very potent politically as a mode of 
agency. They argue that from Kafka’s own relationship to minor cultural engagements stems 
a serious form of existential laughter, specifically Kafka’s position as a Czech Jew writing in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The terms becoming-nomadic and nomadic singularities come from Deleuze and Guattari’s book A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. See respectively, pgs. 136 and 45. Also, while Deleuze and Guattari 
do not use the term becoming-ethical, Deleuzian scholars, such as Ian Buchanan and Adrian Parr, do when 
discussing these concepts. See Buchanan and Parr, pgs. 89-90. 
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German, and living in Christian Germany. But there is one more element that is relevant to 
my discussion of an absurdist ethic and its relation to death; Deleuze and Guattari do not 
mention that Kafka was terminally ill at the time when he wrote his most influential works of 
literature, and that he had started the only serious sexual relationship in his life during the last 
few months of his life. Despite the fact that Kafka was dying, and his fiancé’s family warned 
her against staying with a sick morose man, the two engaged in what was possibly Kafka’s 
most intense relationship at his weakest physical state, in the face of his own demise.  
 While some might glean a surface reading of Kafka’s works, which delivers 
renditions of sinister tales that defy meaning, what Deleuze and Guattari discover in Kafka is 
an ethics of enlightenment through the medium of absurdist laughter that is spawned by his 
own minoritarian position. Kafka could only have produced such an intense form of 
aesthetics because he was already always a part of the periphery, the Other, and the outside. 
He could never write from an insider’s perspective or from hegemony because he was a part 
of minor cultures. He was an outsider linguistically, religiously, and socially, and also 
because of his failing health; in Deleuze and Guattari’s words:  
There is a Kafka laughter, a very joyous laughter that people usually understand 
poorly. It is for stupid reasons that people have tried to seek a refuge far from life in 
Kafka’s literature, and also an agony, the mark of an impotence and a culpability, the 
sign of a sad interior tragedy. Only two principles are necessary to accord with Kafka. 
He is an author who laughs with a profound joy, a joie de vivre, in spite of, or because 
of, his clownish declarations that he offers like a trap or a circus. [It is an] enunciation 
[that] forms a unity with desire, beyond laws, states, regimes. Yet the enunciation is 
always historical, political, and social. A micropolitics, a politics of desire that 
questions all situations. Never has there been a more comic and joyous author from 
the point of view of desire; never has there been a more political and social author 
from the point of view of enunciation. Everything leads to laughter […]. (Kafka, 41-
42) 
 
The untrained reader of Kafka may, at first, be struck by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
interpretation. Kafka has produced some of the most sinister stories, depicting the most 
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obscure and disillusioning situations in world literature. Most have read or heard of his 
Metamorphosis (1915) and Gregor’s unanticipated transformation into a bug-like existence, 
or Kafka’s short story, A Hunger Artist (1922), in which a circus performer is literally 
starved for attention. The stories depict humans struggling with the auspices of a will to do 
that which is moral or ethical, and both wrestle with a need to persevere and survive before 
and in spite of the gaze of the Other. Both inevitably embody absurd-grotesque aesthetic 
forms and die early deaths. 
 At first glance, these stories do not appear to be humorous, but we are not talking 
about slapstick comedy. Absurdist laughter is an extreme form of psychic and bodily reaction, 
which one can gage in different hues, from the darkest hue of the Kafkaesque laugh to a kind 
of lighter Borgesian laugh. The latter sense of a Borgesian laugh I draw from Foucault’s The 
Order of Things (1966), where he investigates taxonomies and genealogies of meaning and 
sense. Foucault talks about confronting absurdist situations in his writing, from which the 
absurd gives rise to laughter, but it does not necessarily make the context funny. Foucault 
describes this type of laughter as essentially disorienting and reorienting because the absurd 
artist explores end-of-world—dystopic and utopic—possibilities, as well as alternate and 
fantastic realities. Foucault elucidates on Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges’ account of 
reading a reference on how animals are categorized in a certain Chinese encyclopedia. The 
thinking behind this ordering system is so radically different from the way Foucault thinks, 
from ‘Western’ thought, that he experiences a philosophical crisis and at the same time, this 
disorientation causes him to laugh:  
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I 
read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought 
that bears the stamp of our age and our geography—breaking up all the ordered 
surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion 
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of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with 
collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. (xvii) 
 
The passage Foucault references was taken from Borges’ “The Analytical Language of John 
Wilkins,” a piece of fiction on the idea of a universal language. In contemplating the 
absurdity of such an attempt, Borges crafts an encyclopedic entry: 
This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which it is written that 
‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, […] (m) having just broken 
the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.’ In the wonderment of 
this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of 
the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the 
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (qtd. in The Order of 
Things, xv) 
 
Borges defines the role of laughter as a mode of enlightenment sparked by humankind’s 
encounter and engagement with its limited philosophical capabilities to understand 
paradigms outside that which one might consider rationalist thought. To laugh an absurdist 
laugh signals the philosophical recognition of such paradigms, and through the medium of 
laughter, one may in theory gain a stance of agency in the face of emotional or political 
bankruptcy or a climate of postmodern physical and/or intellectual defeatism.  
 I locate this strain of absurdist humor in certain AIDS narratives in fictional film that 
fall within the spectrum of the extreme logical consequences signaled by Borges. This type 
of film expresses a disavowing laugh while coloring, expanding, and enriching an ethics of 
life that re-inscribes those affected by the epidemic with a reason to live, attempting to raise 
their morale, even if this intention is not an apparent or conscious wish. AIDS, like other 
cultural traumas and catastrophes, has generated much humor since the epidemic began, not 
only in AIDS films, but also in other art media in which absurdist humor appears to frame the 
virus in new and rehabilitating ways.  
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 For instance, gay magazines about AIDS in the tradition of ‘zines,’ oftentimes made 
by hand, and usually produced for a small group of readers, constituting the genre 
intrinsically as minor. Daniel Brouwer and Robert Asen explain how zines about AIDS, in 
particular, employ humor.  
Topics, tones, and attitudes vary within and between zines. But humor, often macabre, 
biting, and absurd, abounds in both. Consider, for example, Wayne Karr’s 
promisingly empowering ‘The AIDS Survival Guide: A Long-Termer Shares His 
Secrets,’ in which he dispenses the following advice: ‘BE WHITE! ...BE 
MALE! ...HAVE A GOOD INSURANCE POLICY! ... BE RICH or GET RICH 
QUICK.’ These suggestions are (to varying degrees) out of range of individuals’ 
agency: their ludicrousness dramatizes material advantages conferred through 
structures of race, sex, and class privilege in the United States. Regardless of its form, 
humor plays an important role in making sense of AIDS. Echoing Emma Goldman, 
Aunt Kaposi, one of DNP’s most eloquent writers, affirms the power of humor in the 
fight against AIDS: ‘A revolution without laughter is like a wedding without love.’ 
(Public Modalities, 224) 
 
Absurdist laughter in this case is not merely didactic; it is more perceptive and affective. 
When one first encounters such humor, the sense may evade detection, much as HIV does 
upon first entry into the cells of a body. But then, one surely is shook up, and in no medium 
does one perhaps enjoy doing this more than in film.  
 Absurdist humor has always played an important role in AIDS films. As early as the 
mid 1980s, when the first AIDS films were produced, German director and polemicist Rosa 
von Praunheim unleashed a shocking yet telling AIDS film, A Virus Knows No Morals [Ein 
Virus kennt keine Moral] (1985), which in no unclear terms demanded that gays start 
advocating for their own protection against attracting and transmitting the virus, as well as 
stand alert to the role governments and medical community were playing with their lives. 
This is one of the three films I attribute to an absurd sub-genre of an AIDS Cinema, the 
second film being again Animal and the third Days, which I present in later chapters.  
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 Other critics have not always found von Praunheim’s work as enlightening. When the 
gay filmmaker directed Virus, he had already made quite a jolting impression on the New 
German Cinema film industry with his previous work.4 Many critics warned that Virus was 
yet another revolting addition to his collection of controversial films, such as the satirical It is 
Not the Homosexual Who is Perverted, But the Situation in Which He Lives (1970), a movie 
which documents the gay coming-out experience, and Army of Lovers or Revolt of the 
Perverts (1979), which examines the gay rights movement in the United States. He also 
produced a documentary trilogy on AIDS.  
 Von Praunheim’s work is, in many ways, self-aggrandizing and perverse, but at the 
same time bold enough to tell the story of marginalized groups, such as queers, immigrants, 
and the poor. Alice Kuzniar sees a clear legacy between the New German Cinema and the 
New Queer Cinema: “By candidly addressing gay issues in his oeuvre, von Praunheim has 
performed a groundbreaking task in widely opening closet doors for gay cinema. […] 
Another way of refiguring this history of New Queer Cinema would be to claim Rosa von 
Praunheim as the bridge between it and its largely unrecognized predecessor, the New 
German Cinema” (90-91). 
 The pseudonym “Rosa von Praunheim” also indicates an investment in queer politics 
and engagement with the legacies of the political aftermath of WWII. Born Holger Bernhard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Von Praunheim’s work was considered part of The New German Cinema, a movement brought into force in 
part by the so-called Oberhausen Manifesto of February 28, 1962. This new generation of filmmakers wanted to 
differentiate themselves from the moral entrenchment of post-WWII conservatism out of which films like It’s a 
Wonderful Life (1946), Ben Hur (1959), and in Germany so-called Heimatfilms or homeland films were 
produced, all of which stressed the importance of one’s honor to country and family. Twenty-six filmmakers, 
mostly German, proclaimed in their Manifesto: “We declare our intention to create the New German feature 
film. This new film needs new freedoms. Freedom from the conventions of the established industry. Freedom 
from the outside influence of commercial partners. Freedom from the control of special interest groups. […] 
The old film is dead. We believe in a new one” (qtd. in Fowler, 73 ).  
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Bruno Mischwitzky, in the 1960s von Praunheim took on his new Künstlername “artist-
name,” which stands in part as a symbol of the pink “rosa Winkel” triangle patch that gay 
prisoners wore in German concentration camps in the Second World War. From the 
controversial reception received by his films and documentaries, it is clear von Praunheim 
himself, like his film Virus, has a radical, unapologetic queer agenda. His work has been 
largely misread as political corrupt or altogether offensive, self-indulgent, or meaningless, 
and as a result his position in the queer community has been precarious. Von Praunheim 
openly criticized the lack of self-criticism by the gay community in the late 1970s and early 
1980s in Germany, yet remained unabashed in the face of politically conservative resistance, 
and applied film as his medium of attack (Waugh, 267). His films were oftentimes rendered 
radically obscure due to audiences’ frequent inability to decode the ethical directives cloaked 
beneath their customarily absurdist shell. The German director is not only blunt and 
opinionated in his films, he is also known for his radical political opinions and his public 
‘outings’ of people and topics that urgently needed to be brought to the table.5 Alice Kuzniar, 
in her book on The German Queer Cinema (2000), throws light on von Praunheim’s 
contingent political existence in the gay community:  
The very best of Rosa von Praunheim’s work is engaged precisely in this queer 
visibility, where the gendered and sexually unconventional subject is placed center 
stage, such that his/her presence becomes an affront to the bourgeois status quo and 
an encouragement to all queers. When von Praunheim can capture the political edge 
to this histrionics his work excels; without it his movies run the danger of seeping 
into self-indulgence and silliness […]. (111)  
 
Virus is also one such demonstration of his problematic works, for it too is an ‘outing’ of 
AIDS. Classified best as a mockumentary, Virus is fashioned around a montage of absurd 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Von Praunheim revealed the homosexual orientation of several German celebrities on German television, 
including Hape Kerkeling and Alfred Biolek. For more details, see: Groebel, pg. 321. 
	  	   38	  
vignettes. Each touches upon various facets of HIV/AIDS, addressing statistics, but more 
often contesting popular rumor, misnomers, and stereotypes about the at-that-time 
germinating epidemic. Von Praunheim’s camera leads spectators into different contamination 
zones, including the hospital and laboratory, a psychologist’s office, a gay bathhouse, the 
park at night, a drag party, and even deep into the jungles of Africa to the inner walls of an 
AIDS concentration camp.  
 Highly absurd and satirical, each sketch exposes contemporary prejudice and the 
ignorance surrounding the early stages of the epidemic in Germany. The sketches are woven 
together asynchronously, drawing spectators in and out of the different wards. The star of the 
film, at least as it is advanced by the credits—for the film is too disjointed to have a real 
protagonist—is gay bathhouse owner Rüdiger Kackinski, played by Praunheim himself.6 In 
various scenes in the film, Rüdiger hides safe sex posters and condom machines from 
customers, afraid the propaganda might be bad for business. Von Praunheim is addressing 
the problem of politicians trying to advise gay men on how to have sex. In one critique, 
entitled “‘Life is Very Precious, Even Right Now’: (Un)Happy Camping in the New German 
Cinema,” Bruce Williams illustrates how:  
[One scene is] intercut with a ‘scholarly paper’ by Dr. Blut in which she demonstrates 
the importance of safer sex by dipping two dildos, one covered with a condom, into a 
vinaigrette of blood, urine, semen, and saliva. Dr. Blut’s plea stands in stark 
confrontation to the freedom and defiance of the sauna, of a discourse prior to the 
‘encondomed’ rhetoric of the 80s. (54) 
 
This situation mimics the fear generated around the topic of AIDS, whereby bathhouses were 
thought to be one of the main loci of infectious transmission. Panic spread, starting in San 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The name Kackinski is surely a play on his own last name Mischwitzky, and a word for feces in German 
(Kacke).  
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Francisco and New York in the early 1980s, and soon after in other major liberal cities like 
London and Berlin.7  
 In responding to attitudes prevalent in Germany in the mid 1980s, von Praunheim 
hints about the hesitation within the gay community towards being educated about safer sex. 
In his opinion, gay Germans, at least as he satirizes them, would rather engage in risky sexual 
behavior at their own peril They did not want anyone coming and lecturing them on how to 
use a condom properly, especially within the sanctity of their own stomping grounds. 
Ultimately, the initial momentum within the gay community to help crack down on unsafe 
behavior in the bathhouses failed in many urban settings. As Raymond Smith writes in the 
case of the United States: 
The drive toward bathhouse closure was led by a private ad hoc committee from 
within the lesbian and gay community, which called for inspections and self-
regulation of bathhouses and sex clubs, to be overseen by lesbian and gay 
professionals. Although many managers did agree to such policies, volunteer 
inspectors organized by a committee on safer sex found disappointing results. As time 
went on, the resistance or indifference of some bathhouse owners regulating the 
behavior of their clients led to a more forceful position by the [government]. (125) 
 
In Virus, such issues are raised indirectly through the foil of absurdist humor, in which the 
gay community does react with apathy, indubitably mimicking von Praunheim’s own 
experience in the Berlin queer community in the early 1980s.  
 In a side-sketch, for example, Professor Dr. Blut (meaning “Dr. Blood” in German), 
who works for the “Institute for Pestilence, Plague and Death,” (which is a spoof of the name 
of the CDC—Centers for Disease Control) cracks jokes about his seropositive patients, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For specifics on the disputes around bathhouses in the United States, see Jason Hendrickson’s “Conflicts at the 
Tubs: Bathhouses and Gay Culture and Politics in the United States,” in which he elucidates the logic 
politicians purported to support such actions of policing and closing businesses of this kind.  
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reducing the malady to a psychosomatic symptom.8 He reasons, “Shame is the best defense!” 
In the next skit, a gaggle of nurses in drag, bored as they no longer are able to have 
uninhibited sex time with their dying patients, play instead a game of dice to decide which of 
their AIDS patients will die next.  
 As a means to make emphatic the absurdity of fatalism, the camera also enters the 
enclave of the psychiatrist’s office, where a doctor convinces a patient that he should enact 
his own death by encasing himself in a coffin. Through such means, the patient is meant to 
combat the immediacy of his inevitable demise. Finally, a rogue band of revolutionaries, who 
call themselves “the Army of the Sick and Impotent” reenact ACT UP-type demonstrations 
for political activism and action, which testifies to the procedure by which von Praunheim 
straddles both absurdist, and oftentimes offensive and distasteful humor as trashy camp at its 
best with political ambition. These vignettes are not meant merely to disgust, but to shock his 
intended gay spectators back into their senses, as if to say: “Rise up and do something about 
this damn epidemic!”  
 When the film premiered in the mid 1980s, the nature of the virus was still under 
scrutiny by health officials, governments, and the public at large worldwide. Yet, von 
Praunheim already foresaw danger in the systematic way in which people strove to control 
the lives of gay and lesbians as a means of quarantining the virus. Lawrence Mass gives the 
details of an interview, in which von Praunheim provides some background to his 
motivations for the film in this respect:  
When AIDS started, I wanted to go back to Berlin [from New York]. I was really 
scared and somehow I felt safer there. Then, when AIDS came to Berlin, I realized I 
couldn’t keep ignoring it and that’s when I really began to get politically active (with 
regards to AIDS). I got involved with fundraising and benefits, and attempting to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The CDC has notably been officially renamed Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
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explore AIDS issues on film. Now, I feel safer here in New York, because in Berlin 
people are still living with the illusion that nothing has changed. For example, the 
baths are all still open and very, very crowded. They don’t monitor for safer sex 
practices, but they do sometimes give out condoms. […] The timid, let’s cooperate 
approach just isn’t going to work. (In A Virus Knows No Morals, a radical group of 
persons with AIDS presses its demands at gunpoint.) There have to be radical actions 
because just saying how bad things are isn’t enough. (35) 
 
In Virus, von Praunheim also conveys the message that gay men are being used as scapegoats 
for the epidemic, and not necessarily in the manner depicted in the absurd humorous 
situational vignettes he portrays. He also submits spectators to an onslaught of real, current 
newspaper articles and their headlines, juxtaposed against a fictional radiocast, which 
foretells all too accurately the surrender of a larger portion of the gay population to an AIDS-
related death.  
 Although rejected by their form of presentation, von Praunheim’s sometimes 
questionable contributions do oftentimes hit the mark. In one interview from the 1980s, he 
offers clairvoyant words of caution, “[it’s] not just this [situation, like sending gays away for 
quarantine], but many of the satirical situations are already real. And it is scary and 
happening now” (Mass, 26; emphasis in original). The director was able to accurately 
forecast the virus’s pandemic potential, as well as the formation of radical direct action 
advocacy groups such as ACT UP. Virus is von Praunheim’s own contribution as an activist; 
his viable and valuable message is made clear at the end of the film in the form of a chant, 
albeit one sung by a group of gay men, dressed in drag as nurses: “You have your fate in 
your own hands,” which is set ever satirically to the tune of American spiritual ballad “He’s 
got the whole world in his hands.” Von Praunheim’s goal is that spectators should interrogate 
what is real and what is fiction in order to usurp their apathetic stance toward the epidemic. It 
is true that von Praunheim presses spectators in politically questionable ways, pushing them 
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from the limits of satire into the realm of the grotesque to make his point, including drawing 
parallels between the methods employed by the Nazis to detain and eradicate the Jews, 
homosexuals, the disabled, and others.  
 In another politically questionable scene, the bathhouse owner taunts the spectators 
with his admission that “this disease makes me horny,” which one could read as the 
foreshadowing of the heated polemic around the practice of barebacking because it goes 
against the accepted idea that one must always participate in so-called safer sex practices. 
But more importantly, the portrayal of Kakinsky getting aroused by the terrible disease 
signals to the element of the grotesque that I develop with more detail in the following 
chapter. Through the mouthpiece of his actors, von Praunheim clarifies that horniness should 
not be equated with an unbridled urge to participate in self-deprecating behaviors such as 
barebacking at all costs. Instead, horniness is understood as a lust for life. Von Praunheim 
makes this clear when Kakinsky proclaims in the film “Sex is life and I believe in life.” In 
other words, von Praunheim is emphasizing how issues of gay sex and the politics of 
HIV/AIDS, and in particular in terms of barebacking, are more complex than meets the eye. 
Gay sex in the post-AIDS era is instead bound up not only in questions of queer sexuality, 
but also in those of identity, selfhood, and above all, are entrenched in an ethics of life and 
death—with the scales tipped toward life. He criticizes those who would suggest otherwise, 
those who would argue, and specifically those that interpret barebacking porn sites as places 
aimed at making people horny enough to have unprotected sex for the sake of horniness. 
Instead, I read von Praunheim’s proclamation of “sex is life” as a means to reimagine such 
loci of gay sex, whether it be gay bathhouses or porn sites, as places where one may in fact 
liberate their mere sexual horniness, and instead celebrate a lust for life. In this equation, 
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such places function to empower a deep connection to the Other and to the community as an 
iteration of identity. A reckoning with the philosophical groundwork of the absurd, an 
absurdist-ethics, and the aesthetics of absurdist humorous narratives may resolve this ethical 
quagmire, however complex.9  
 Even if a spectator cannot pinpoint the impetus behind the film’s panoply of absurdist 
images and dialogue, such as in the case of Virus, many still appear cautiously amused and 
struck by the depth they sense nonetheless. Although the use of absurdist humor may be 
misread, I interpret it in Virus as a call to arms and not as a tool to humiliate or disrespect 
victims of the epidemic. I do not, for example, rely on a theory of humor, such as that of 
Henri Bergson, who claims that humor as a tool may be used “above all, [as] a corrective. 
Being intended to humiliate, it must make a painful impression on the person against whom it 
is directed. By laughter, society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it” (92). In the case 
of an absurdist-ethics, the affective manifestation of humor does not have necessarily a rude 
and vengeful nature in the Bergsonian sense; its humor aims to be productive, and it is meant 
to provoke insight, in this case into the topic of the value of life during the epidemic. My 
interpretation of humor is therefore more in lines with a theory thereof held by film scholar 
Noël Carroll, who conjectures how comedies can be smart and productive. Carroll also 
dismisses Bergson’s theory:  
The Bergsonian idea, that laughter serves to humiliate the character in order to correct 
his behavior, is completely untenable because the [joke] is far ahead of the audience’s. 
Rather the audience laughs at these [jokes] with a variety of laughter akin to the 
laughter one indulges in when a particularly brilliant checkmate is executed or when a 
tricky mathematical puzzle is ingeniously solved. Sometimes we laugh at engines and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Portions of the above section on A Virus Knows No Morals were previously published. See Riley, “Review: A 
Virus Knows No Morals,” in bibliography. 
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at puzzle solutions. That is, there is a category of laughter that is evoked when things 
‘fall into place.’ (54) 
 
I follow Carroll’s lead in matters of humor and therefore read laughter in the absurdist works 
in the genre of an absurd AIDS Cinema, not as distasteful, unethical, or nonsensical. I argue 
that von Praunheim’s intentions should be assessed as carnivalesque and certainly sometimes 
sadomasochistic, but nevertheless sincere. The film’s montage of sketches, together with the 
song and dance routines qualify it not as trash, but as the progeny of a kind of avant-garde 
musical. I read absurdist humor as part of the philosophical tool of an absurdist-ethics that 
may be read instead as an enabling force with which to reckon.  
 Many critics and spectators register Virus’s potential, in particular his intention to 
entertain and inform the public. For instance, in 1987, a writer of The New York Times 
stresses that Praunheim is resourcefully dealing “in doom:”  
[Von Praunheim is] as caustic about AIDS victims who don’t hesitate to pass it on as 
he is about measures intended to comfort victims and to limit the spread of the 
disease. Mr. von Praunheim’s films look cheaply made and more or less pasted 
together, which works in their favor and is very much part of their conscious style. 
Technical niceties would only dilute the savagery of his social satire. […] Among 
agitprop film makers, Mr. von Praunheim is very rare. He doesn’t traffic in false 
hopes or positive images. He deals in doom. “A Virus Knows No Morals” has been 
called a black comedy, but it’s much rougher than that. […] [The film] is armed camp. 
(Canby, par. 4; 6) 10 
 
Even as damning as the prognosis of “doom” might sound, Vincent Canby admits that von 
Praunheim delivers truths about HIV and AIDS. What is more, Canby bestows the film with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Canby’s comment on the budget of the film signals the fact that most films of early queer cinema were low-
budget, oftentimes paid out of the director’s pocket. Even von Praunheim’s most bitter opponents, such as 
Bryan Bruce, commend the filmmaker on his camera style. He writes: “His camera style, for example, has 
clearly evolved out of a sense of avant-garde film language (the obsessive use of the zoom, the hand-held 
camera, a preference for compositional imbalance, and non-sequential montage), but is also strongly grounded 
in a narrative tradition and an appeal to theatrical and comedic convention (particularly cabaret and burlesque) 
which automatically makes his films more accessible and playful, less impeded by the weight of avant-garde 
seriousness” (Bruce, 27).  
 
	  	   45	  
the high honor of being “armed camp,” alluding to a much more complex narrative than his 
initial response portends. Canby is obliquely referring to the absurdist humor that pervades 
the film, which he connects with camp, one of the clear aesthetic styles prevalent in queer 
narratives. 
Camp is not new to queer cinema, with or without the subject of AIDS. Scholars have 
long identified camp’s dominating role in queer cinema, but also in the queer lifestyle—one 
may think of drag queens and gay pride parades, which can be described as festive, colorful, 
and over-the-top. Bruce Williams helps understand the history and meaning of the label camp 
as a style or stylized mode of language that performs a primary function as a gay or queer use 
of humor, as in humor used by gay men or other LGBTQ persons:  
[The] phenomenon had its origins as a ‘masonic gesture whereby homosexuals could 
make themselves known to each other during periods in which homosexuality was not 
avowable’(9). […] [Even] today, camp remains not only a signal, but a ‘way in which 
homosexuals and other people who live double lives can find a lingua franca.’ […] 
‘There are only two things essential to camp; a secret within the personality which 
one ironically wishes to conceal and to exploit, and a particular way of seeing things, 
affected by spiritual isolation, but strong enough to impose itself on others through 
acts or creations; (9). (52) 
 
Camp functions therefore like an organizing principle, a lingua franca, as a kind of queer 
code or secret language used between gay men to discuss and celebrate issues pertaining to 
gay sexuality and in the case of Virus, as a means to discuss emotionally contentious issues 
like HIV/AIDS.  
Camp is veritably that which cannot be held in bounds. It is by very definition 
excessive, or that which exceeds the norm, and therefore cannot be logically normative either. 
This fact has always been central to definitions of camp in the history of scholarship tracing 
back to the most transitional pieces such as Susan Sontag’s “Notes on Camp” (1964), an 
essay that contains fifty-eight theses on the make-up of camp. Many scholars charge that this 
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essay helped establish the term camp within the academy, and some of her theses prove 
relevant to the topic of absurdist humor: 
10. Camp sees everything in quotation marks. It’s not a lamp, but a ‘lamp’; not a 
woman, but a ‘woman.’ To perceive Camp in objects and persons is to understand 
Being-as-Playing-a-Role. It is the farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of 
life as theater. 
41. The whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious. Camp is playful, anti-serious. 
More precisely, Camp involves a new, more complex relation to ‘the serious.’ One 
can be serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious. 
44. Camp proposes a comic vision of the world. But not a bitter or polemical comedy. 
If tragedy is an experience of hyperinvolvement, comedy is an experience of 
underinvolvement, of detachment. 
 
Following Sontag’s lead, one becomes more aware how camp performs alongside absurdist 
humor. Succinctly, camp is the mechanism that tenderizes the meat of those issues one 
cannot easily stomach, such as death and an epidemic. The affect of humor is the aftertaste 
that makes one aware of the true nature of one’s diet. In other words, to depict AIDS as 
simply campy would be unjustifiable and petty; but to use absurdist humor to remit truth-
values is an ethical gesture.  
Other definitions of camp also help the understanding of the role it plays in cinema. 
In Camp Grounds: Style and Homosexuality (1993), David Bergman offers his readers a 
multilayered definition, addressing camp with respect to style, pop culture, and minoritarian 
and (homo-) sexual politics: 
First, everyone agrees that camp is a style (whether of objects or of the way objects 
are perceived is debated) that favors ‘exaggeration,’ ‘artifice,’ and ‘extremity.’ 
Second, camp exists in tension with popular culture, commercial culture, or 
consumerist culture. Third, the person who can recognize camp, who sees things as 
campy, or who can camp is a person outside the cultural mainstream. Fourth, camp is 
affiliated with homosexual culture, or at least with a self-conscious eroticism that 
throws into question the naturalization of desire. (4-5) 
 
Following this definition, one can understand easily how films like von Praunheim’s Virus 
fall under the category of camp. The film’s style is exaggerated, artificial, and extreme. Virus 
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depicts the characters and their lifestyles in a way that exceeds boundaries of gender and 
sexuality normalcy, even within the realm of realistic possibility. Additionally, queer 
spectators who identify camp when watching such films implicate themselves—consciously 
or not—with camp; and in doing so, they place themselves outside mainstream culture as 
well. Consequently, they are arguably locating themselves, in a positive way, within the 
queer community affected by the epidemic.  
As a result, a relationship between camp and a philosophy of ethics arises. Michael 
Hattersley explains that: 
Camp encouraged a sense of play, in contrast to the humorless semiotics of the 
academy […]. Camp by contrast, preserved the possibility that works of art, including 
personalities, could have at least an ‘as if’ relationship to truth. […] Camp [mocks] 
something you take seriously, and herein lies its genius: Camp allows the thoroughly 
disabused and ironized individual to in fact take something painful or absurd 
seriously by engaging it in serious play […]. (165-166).  
 
Along these lines, camp is a product of minor cultures and cinemas, especially queer cinema, 
whereby the cultural paradigms presented in a film like Virus may never be entirely 
assimilated into mainstream culture, and/or in the hetero-normative status quo. Camp cannot 
be entirely commoditized because it is, by definition, that which overspends its assets, an 
excess. 
In the case of an absurd AIDS Cinema, the individual and collective pain and grief of 
an epidemic are turned into the absurd, in a way transforming pain into something bearable. 
This mode of agency, which would not have been possible through forms of cultural 
hegemony, is however realized through the paragon of an absurdist-ethics. In reference to 
von Praunheim’s Virus, Bruce Williams entitles his critique of the film with equal campiness 
and absurdity: “One Must Have a Heart of Stone to Confront the AIDS Epidemic Without 
Laughing,” where he declares that:  
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Praunheim’s camp celebrates marginality with political style and humor. AIDS is not 
elevated to the level of an unimpeachable icon; rather it is demystified through 
travesty and lampoon. Were AIDS to be treated with reverence, it would be rendered 
sacrosanct and would hence remain incurable (One cannot heal the divine). […] As 
do homosexuals themselves, AIDS refuses to obey the conventional morality imposed 
by Dr. Blut and other reactionary characters. (54) 
 
Williams also diagnoses humor in association with camp as the force that demands a 
reconceptualization of ethics around the issue of the epidemic. Through the mechanism of an 
absurdist-ethics at play, the affect of humor is able to divest AIDS of its threat. Similarly, 
Bryan Bruce, a writer for the long-running Canadian film journal CineAction!, puts his finger 
on humor as a tool for rendering the consequences of the virus more evident to spectators:  
In the face of the sensationalized and alarmist rendering of AIDS by the media, it is, 
of course, important for someone to look at the whole phenomenon with a sense of 
humor. [In this and other films, von Praunheim tends] to use comedy very 
consciously as an entry to dealing with the most severe and unpleasant aspects of 
membership in marginalized and oppressed subcultures. (29-31)11 
 
In an article written in 1995 titled “AIDS in Film and Theater” [Aids im Film und Theater], 
one anonymous author writes of the early skepticism of the film, calling von Praunheim a 
man who wields a decidedly complex sense of humor before his time: 
Von Praunheim is irritating and cracks jokes in A Virus Knows No Morals. He 
overdoes it shamelessly and perceptively, but he arrived some years too soon with his 
sarcasm and black humor. In 1985, people in this country [Germany] were still struck 
by the first wave of panic and news of catastrophe. It was a time filled with the 
greatest sense of consternation and helplessness. No one had yet to confront the 
sickness with jokes, satire, and irony. (37. My translation) 
 
With a sentiment akin to pity, the critic grapples with the difficulties faced by von Praunheim 
before the tough crowd of queer spectators. Although film scholars like Kuzniar and Mass 
dedicate time to researching von Praunheim, not much has changed in terms of popular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bruce does condemn von Praunheim for his supposed misogynistic depictions of women as “monsters” in 
Virus. At a screening of the film in Toronto, von Praunheim responded to such claims, saying “‘gay men have 
the right to portray women this way,’ particularly their mothers, whose sons try so hard to please them, ‘…and 
all you get is shit’” (Bruce, 29). In Virus, an example of this would be the mother who dresses up as a gay man 
wearing a strap-on dildo, so that she may peek in on her son having sex in the bathhouse. 
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responses to the film in the last twenty-five years. Recently posted on Rottentomatoes.com, 
one anonymous reviewer complained, “A joyfully bizarre hodgepodge of surreal ‘WTF’ 
[“What the Fuck”] histrionics, but as a satire, I don’t see how purposely putting off about 
98% of your audience accomplishes anything.”12 Another anonymous reviewer at Imdb.com 
commented: 
Comedy about AIDS. That’s right—a comedy. Nowadays this probably wouldn’t 
bother anyone, seeing as AIDS is no longer the death sentence it was, but in 1985 this 
was considered sick and tasteless. I caught it at a small art theatre in Boston back in 
1986. The audience was wall to wall gay guys. Nobody laughed during it but nobody 
seemed real upset by it either. It was just too…strange. There are some incredibly 
depressing scenes involving a gay couple where one discovers he has AIDS and then 
we cut to a bunch of guys in drag singing songs! It was an uneasy mix of drama and 
comedy with the accent on comedy. The only good thing I got out of the movie was 
information about AIDS. There was a local AIDS activist group right outside the 
theatre. They supported the film and were handing out pamphlets to people that 
explained what HIV and AIDS were. Remember—the government ignored it 
completely back then until it became an epidemic. So it attempted something in 1985 
that was unthinkable. Sadly I don’t think it succeeded. (My emphasis)13  
 
The spectator admits that despite his initial repugnance, or more exactly, his experience of 
cognitive dissonance at the outwardly absurdist-grotesque scenarios in the film, “nobody 
seemed real upset by it either.” It would appear that some gay audience members might 
respond in a manner of doubling; at first, they are shocked by the presentation of the subject 
matter; then, they are intrigued, but at a loss to explain why.  
This particular spectator admits that the film drew in large numbers of gay men, he 
received vital information about HIV/AIDS from AIDS activists stationed there, and the film 
was memorable his life long. To assert that the film did not succeed, as he argues, is simply 
not accurate. This spectator, like others that day, were possibly not able to identify the reason 
behind von Praunheim’s use of blunt, absurdist humor; and yet, the director did succeed in so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See: < http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/ein-virus-kennt-keine-moral-a-virus-knows-no-morals/>. 
13 See: <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090266/>. 
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far as bothering spectators to the core, enough to make them question why almost thirty years 
later. This is, in essence, the process of de-normalizing or reframing that is at the very core of 
art, as observed by Adorno after WWII. In this case, Virus forced many spectators to 
reevaluate their conception of the epidemic and gay sex, and re-view it through an absurdist-
ethical paradigm.  
Not all spectators were oblivious to von Praunheim’s intentions. In illustration, 
another reviewer at Imdb.com commended the filmmaker for his efforts, clearly 
understanding what was at stake: 
This, at the time, was a pioneering film. The always innovative and irreverent Rosa 
von Praunheim broke the ice on satirizing AIDS. This was later done by several other 
independent directors from Canada and the USA, also imitating the parody musical 
format which von Praunheim created. […] Von Praunheim was severely ostracized 
for poking fun at such a subject. But he insisted that given how the world had ignored 
AIDS up to then (1985; it took the Rock Hudson death to shake the US then), satire 
was necessary. He was right. Whatever would cause the most raucous would bring 
the most attention to AIDS. And it worked. So, don’t expect a landmark film. But it is 
a film that perhaps highlights von Praunheim’s career as a gay activist, not as a film 
maker.14 
 
It is also important to note the difference here between what I call absurdist humor and satire, 
for spectators and critics alike use the word satire in cases I call absurd. In this regard, John 
Shillington in his work on Grappling with Atrocity (2002) makes a good distinction between 
the two concepts. Satire “presents an irrational world rationally in terms of a linear plot, 
understandable (albeit exaggerated) behavior, and ideas. The spectator is in on the joke. 
[While the absurd emphasizes] metaphysical anguish, puzzling images, and devaluation of 
language. The audience is often in a combative relationship with the concepts of the play 
where the darkness threatens to overshadow the humor” (157). One cannot therefore simply 
equate satire with the absurd; and if there is any indication that the legacy of absurdist AIDS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See: <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090266/_ajax/iframe?component=footer>. 
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films belong to this category of the absurd, it is indeed the spectators contested and 
oftentimes love-hate relationship and response to those films that invoke the affect of humor.  
Thomas Waugh, in The Fruit Machine: Twenty Years of Writings on Queer Cinema 
(2000), claims that those who willingly watch and enjoy von Praunheim’s films must have an 
“acquired taste,” and that taste is no doubt for an absurdist gallows humor (165). Waugh 
wonders why the film has not received real notoriety outside of Germany (231), and I answer 
that it is clearly because of von Praunheim’s indulgence in an aesthetic of the “absurdist 
gourmet,” a delighting in the delectable affect of a gallows-type humor, but one which 
characteristically can only be appreciated through intellectual rigor. Von Praunheim 
acknowledges this intention in an interview in 1986:  
Mass: In A Virus Knows No Morals you’ve got plenty of political consciousness, and 
there isn’t a hint of sentimentality, but to the point that I begin to wonder, where’s the 
compassion? You know, I had lunch with Felice Picano recently, and I mentioned to 
him that I had just seen the film, which I characterized as a kind of black comedy 
about AIDS. Not having seen it himself and in view of the staggering pain and losses 
and raw nerves we all share here in New York, where the epidemic is so much worse 
than most Berliners—even now—you can imagine, he could only observe that maybe 
comedies about AIDS need to wait a few years. But I should add that his tone of 
understatement made us both giggle.  
 
Von Praunheim: I think humor, especially black humor in a time of crisis, is vital to 
survival. As a doctor, you, especially, must know this. In medicine, I think, having a 
sense of humor often helps you develop the coolness, the distance you need to 
approach things logically and realistically. As a gay man, you also feel this, I’m sure. 
Humor is often a means of survival for minorities in times of crisis. I have Jewish 
friends who survived the concentration camps. They’ve told me how, in the most 
extreme and cruel situations, they would burst out laughing. It was the only way they 
knew to endure to survive.  
 
Mass: That’s fascinating. Jews are well known for their sense of humor, but I had 
never heard much about Jewish humor under the Nazis or in the camps. (That would 
be a good subject for research, for a book, if one doesn’t already exist.) (Dialogues, 
Mass, 25-26) 
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And indeed, such books on humor and the Holocaust do exist. For instance, David Danow 
talks about laughter in the concentration camps in his book The Spirit of Carnival: Magical 
Realism and the Grotesque (1995):  
Curiously, a fine sense of what is meant by laughter in [the context of a concentration 
camp] is provided by an unlikely source, Eli Wiesel’s classic work of Holocaust 
literature, The Gates of the Forest, in which the twin manifestations of madness and 
laughter are treated poetically and philosophically. ‘Behind every tree and within 
every shred of cloud someone was laughing. It was not the laughter of one man but of 
a hundred, of seven times seven hundred’ (1967:17) True to the carnivalesque 
tradition, this depiction of laughter is collective at the core, belonging not to a single 
individual but to the world’s inhabitants at large. It is rendered not in response to 
what is funny but in answer to what might otherwise (without its healing power) be 
frightening.  
 
This sentiment, and in particular as it relates to WWII and the Holocaust, is further expressed 
in a number of cinematic productions. The specimen that immediately comes to mind is, of 
course, Roberto Benigni’s romantic comedy Life is Beautiful [La Vita è Bella] (1997), winner 
of three Oscar awards in 1999 and which expresses humor as a mode of survival.15 Life is 
Beautiful calls to mind Danow’s invocation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the therapeutic 
power of laughter, approached on Rabelais and His World: Carnival and Grotesque (1965). 
Bakhtin relates how he reads François Rabelais’s theories on laughter, as based off of 
postulates of antiquity, namely from Hippocrates and Aristotle, who claimed that humor is a 
universal, philosophical form. Bakhtin theorizes that “ [Hippocrates’s] prestige [was] 
founded on the comments contained in his medical treatise concerning the importance of a 
gay and cheerful mood on the part of the physician and patient fighting disease” (67). For 
Bakhtin, “laughter [is] a whole philosophy, a certain spiritual premise of the awakened man 
who has attained virility” (67). Similarly, he invokes Aristotle’s aphorism that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For further analysis of the film and criticism on the use of humor as risking having the simple effect of a 
cathartic, see: Riley, “Fantastical Cinematic Disavowals of War.”  
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 “Of all living creatures only man is endowed with laughter.” This formula enjoyed 
immense popularity and was given a broader interpretation: laughter was seen as 
man’s highest spiritual privilege, inaccessible to other creatures. As we know, it 
concludes Rabelais’ introductory poem to Gargantua.  
Mieux est le ris que de larmes escrire  
Par ce que rire est le proper de l’homme. (68)16  
 
In this vein of thought, I identify humor in the context of an absurdist-ethics as a way to 
engage the spectator (or reader, or viewer), via a thinking, philosophical, ethical point of 
view and as a psychological means to deliberately deal with issues of death and destruction—
in other words, as an unavoidable push to get one’s hands and face dirty in the mud of it all.  
Many of the visual and/or situational comical scenarios in Virus may be identified as 
belonging to the genre of a gallows humor, the understanding of which takes us closer to 
conceptualizing the way absurdist humor is fashioned through the aesthetics of the absurd. In 
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), Freud helps to explain the dynamic at 
play in a gallows humor, as it would apply to absurdist humor: 
To the classes of tendentious jokes that we have considered so far—exposing or 
obscene jokes, aggressive (hostile) jokes, cynical (critical, blasphemous) jokes—I 
should like to add another, the fourth and rarest, the nature of which can be illustrated 
by a good example: ‘Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galacia. 
“Where are you going?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the answer. “What a liar you 
are!” broke out the other. “If you say you’re going to Cracow, you want me to believe 
you’re going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you’re going to Cracow. So why are 
you lying to me”?’ (137).  
 
For Freud, the key to the joke is the revelation of a truth through the concealment of such. 
Important for me is the way Freud ties this double entendre in with the absurd: 
This excellent [joke], which gives an impression of oversubtlety, evidently works by 
the technique of absurdity. [...] [The] serious substance of the joke is the questions 
about the condition of truth [die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Wahrheit]. […] 
What they are attacking is not a person or an institution but the certainty of our 
knowledge itself, one of our speculative possessions. (Jokes, 138) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Better a laugh to write of than a tear; For it is laughter that becomes man best.” The Complete Works of 
François Rabelais, 2.  
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In Freud’s opinion, such jokes are made to disavow or repress a traumatic event; yet, at the 
same time, one yearns to flush out its truth and the logic behind it, even if there is not one. 
Therefore, an absurdist joke appears in a form that one also recognizes as repulsive or 
disrespectful; and those who are trained to look for trauma, like the psychoanalyst or the 
literary theorist, will discover its shadow. While those who do not know how to unearth 
subversive meaning may simply imagine the joke in poor taste.  
Yet, more importantly, those that partake in humor in the face of trauma are doing so, 
according to Freud, as a means to obtain “pleasure in spite of the distressing affects that 
disturb it; it acts as a substitute for this emergence of affect, it takes its place” (220). 
Therefore, instead of someone responding to a traumatic situation through crying or 
screaming, which would further deepen one’s pain, responding through laughter enables one 
to experience pleasure instead. For Freud, “the pleasure of comedy arises—there is no other 
way of putting this—at the cost of this release of affect that did not happen. It comes from an 
expenditure of affect saved” (220-221).What one suppresses, of course, is one’s knowledge 
of death, thereby entailing the meaning behind the classification gallows humor.17  
The absurd is, in essence, a shaggy-dog story meets gallows humor, a story that goes 
on and on and ends without a punch line, except in this instance one knows that death can be 
the only final pun. For Samuel Weber, who appears not to get the joke, Freud is “ensnared in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Another of Freud’s jokes to help illustrate this point: 
The most crass instance of humour—known as gallow-humour—may be instructive. The rogue who is 
being led to execution on a Monday exclaims: “Well, that’s a good start to the week.” That is actually 
a joke, for the observation in itself hits the mark, though it is absurdly misplaced, for there is not going 
to be anything further happening for him this week. But it takes humour to make a joke like that […] I 
must say, there is something like greatness of spirit hiding in this “blague,” in clinging so fast to 
normal nature and disregarding everything that was meant to cast him down and drive him to despair. 
This kind of grandeur in humour makes an unmistakable appearance in instances where our admiration 
is not inhibited by the circumstances of the humorous figure. (220-221) 
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this shaggy-dog story which he cannot bring to a satisfactory conclusion’” (qtd. in Cornwell, 
15). Such readers do not espy the value of gallows humor. Similarly, such readers might miss 
the agency and value to be gained from reading absurdist AIDS films like Virus through the 
lens of an absurdist-ethics. But others do unpeel the layers of the joke to pluck at the valuable 
meaning at its core. Maurice Charney suggests that the traumatic event with which one deals 
in such jokes is in fact modernity itself. He asserts: “In order to deal with modernity, 
literature has to deal with the faces of determinism, absurdity, and death. Coping, in a literary 
sense, with modernity while maintaining the hopeful outlook of comedy requires an exquisite 
balance of humor and pathos, comedy and tragedy” (177). Nevertheless, Charney’s 
proposition is too optimistic and idealistic to be extended to a gallows humor and certainly 
not to AIDS films. Instead, one should understand that one is dealing with a postmodern 
mentality when accessing gallows humor, and above all an absurdist-ethics.  
Post-modernity may be understood as Fredric Jameson formulated it in his pivotal 
book on Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1993): 
Postmodernism, postmodern consciousness, may then amount to not much more than 
theorizing its own condition of possibility, which consists primarily in the sheer 
enumeration of changes and modifications. […] [The] postmodern looks for breaks, 
for events rather than new worlds, for the telltale instant after which it is no longer the 
same […]. (ix) 
 
This approach helps to understand absurdist humor today in general, and in particular the 
radical depictions I draw from cinema, as narratives of disruption from which one may glean 
agency, when experienced through a reading with the lens of an absurdist-ethics as a 
philosophical tool of enlightenment. In early cinema, one encounters Charlie Chaplin’s 
ability to shock the spectator into laughter and contemplation in his allegorical role as Hitler 
in The Great Dictator (1940). Peter Conrad explains how for Chaplin, “Comedy is 
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aggression by other means. There is something funny as well as menacing [in his humorous 
use of] absurdity” (qtd. in Cornwell, 17). In her book Slackonomics: Generation X in the Age 
of Creative Destruction (2008), cinema scholar Lisa Chamberlain has termed this kind of 
humor a “comedy of discomfort” (71). Many AIDS films, starting from Rosa von 
Praunheim’s Virus, follow this tradition of transmitting a kind of comedy of discomfort. The 
epidemic is the event, and the historical repercussions therefrom is that which one is trying to 
repress; and yet, it is exactly this trauma that compels one, through absurdist humor, to 
theorize the conditions of possibility vis-à-vis an ethical life.  
 As a conduit to my next chapter on the aesthetic of the grotesque as it applies to an 
absurdist-ethics, I explore how Kierkegaard, like Freud, also appeals to a form of gallows 
humor, which displays the interdependency of the affect of humor and the grotesque. Thomas 
Oden depicts Kierkegaard’s absurdist sense of humor through the analysis of a passage by 
the Danish philosopher:  
Kierkegaard tells the story of a horsefly that ‘sat on a man’s nose the very moment he 
made his last running leap to throw himself into the Thames’ […]. The extreme 
seriousness of suicide is here utterly incongruous with the entirely accidental landing 
of the fly. […] Kierkegaard does not hesitate to push his comic analogies to gross 
extremes: he imagines a man who pretends to let ‘himself be skinned alive in order to 
show how the humorous smile is produced by the contraction of a particular 
muscle—and thereupon follows this with a lecture on humor’ […]. (10) 
 
Kierkegaard’s jokes validate how an indulgence in morbid, grotesque formations (that which 
is almost unbearable to represent) demand a questioning of basic assumptions and ideologies 
in order to reorient oneself to acquire a more viable mode of living ethically. As a result, one 
needs to also embrace the comical in order to defuse this tension and make the absurdity of a 
postmodern life not only bearable, but also something to celebrate and from which to reap 
pleasure and joy. Kierkegaard’s theory on humor emphasizes its ethical foundation as well as 
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the possibility for it to be a philosophical tool, in instances of so-called “cerebral 
philosophical humor” (Oden, 24). For Kierkegaard, that which is philosophical in the 
comedic, “is always a sign of maturity, and then the essential thing is only that a new shoot 
emerges in his maturity that vis comica [comic force] does not suffocate pathos but merely 
indicates that a new pathos is beginning” (281). Humor in Kierkegaard has a transcendent 
quality that is required of those who strive and most nearly obtain an ethical and virtuous 
lifestyle.  
Engaging with politically contentious topics, such as the AIDS epidemic, is a 
philosophical struggle, because it relates to experiences closely related to suffering. Yet, this 
kind of engagement offers the opportunity of becoming aware and coming to terms with 
one’s own philosophical and political positioning vis-à-vis traumatic historical and/or 
personal events—which ultimately may only be endured through the comical, and which 
ends in one’s acceptance of the absurd. Indeed, Oden writes specifically how Kierkegaard’s 
conception of humor may be used as a philosophical tool to work through trauma:  
Humor offers [a] salve even while aware that there is no way out of the inexorable 
contradiction which constitutes selfhood. […] Tragic consciousness remains fixated 
on the pain. But comic consciousness focuses on the contradiction, the absurdity, and 
the incongruity to which pain points. In this way it transmutes pain into jest. (Oden, 
30-31).  
 
For Kierkegaard specifically, spiritual and philosophical suffering enabled him to think in 
such sophisticated ways about selfhood, and this through the lens of humor and the absurd. 
Kierkegaard’s illustration highlights for me the fact that, through such cerebral philosophical 
means, not just those infected by a deadly virus, but humankind stuck in a postmodern 
moment, can meet with peace through recognition of their suffering and transcending it 
through an absurdist humor. Following Kierkegaard’s lead, one may truly discover the 
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meaning of an absurdist-ethics, put into practice by some through radical actions of revolt 
such as barebacking, but also through engagement with aesthetics in line with an absurdist 
gallows humor and the grotesque. Such a philosophical investigation, which ultimately 
revokes suffering in the form of jest, is at the very core of Virus, the film I studied in this 
chapter. That dynamic is also clearly reframed, this time in the form of the grotesque, in 
Animal, an AIDS film I explore in the following chapter.  
 	  
 
 
CHAPTER II 
GROTESQUE AESTHETIC: MIRUGAM [ANIMAL] 2007 
 
 
 In 2009, coinciding with World AIDS Day, Regenbogen e.V., a German non-profit 
organization, introduced their new AIDS campaign. The promotion depicted posters and a 
video with images of scantily clad, attractive women sleeping with none other than some of 
world history’s mass murderers: Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Saddam Hussein (fig. 1). The 
organization also bought a radio spot that reworked a famous speech made by Joseph 
Goebbels, the well-known Nazi propagandist. The campaign was provocative and, for many 
critics, tasteless. Supporters of the campaign argued nevertheless that “up until now 28 
million people have died. And every day there are 5,000 new cases. Which is why AIDS is 
one of the most effective mass murderers in history. We wanted to give the virus a face, not 
the victims of the virus” (qtd. in Hans, par. 6). Dirk Silz of Das Comitee explained to Spiegel 
Online, “we expected that the campaign might overstate the case somewhat—we wanted it to 
attract attention” (pars. 6-7).18 Silz explains how the advertisements were made in response to 
the ineffectiveness of previous campaigns, including one with condoms on cucumbers and 
the slogan “Fits onto Every Cucumber: Don’t Give Aids A Chance” (par. 7) (fig. 2).  
 Overall, the media has been very critical of Regenbogen’s efforts, calling the 
campaign barbaric. A spokeswoman from the National AIDS Trust, which organizes World 
AIDS Days, commented: “I think the advert is incredibly stigmatizing to people living with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The campaign was sponsored by Regenbogen e.V in cooperation with Hamburg-based advertisement agency 
Das Comitee.  
	  	   60	  
HIV who already face much stigma and discrimination due to ignorance about the virus” (qtd. 
in M. Moore, par. 5).  
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Figure 1: AIDS is a Mass Murderer Poster 
This poster, reading “AIDS is A Mass Murderer: Protect Yourself,” was part of a German anti-AIDS campaign 
in 2009. Posters like this one were put up on billboards all over cities in Germany.  
 
 
Figure 2: Fits on every cucumber! 
Funded by the German Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung (BZgA) [Federal Center for Health 
Education (FCHE)], this poster was part of an Anti-AIDS campaign that goes back to 1987. At that time, the 
slogan was “Gib AIDS keine Chance” [“Don’t Give AIDS a Chance”]. In 1994, the campaign added the slogan 
“mach’s mit” [“Join Us”]. The FCHE supplements this slogan with many comical additions, including the one 
shown here: a picture of cucumbers with condoms on them and a jingle to match, which says “Passt auf jede 
Gurke!” [Fits on every cucumber!] This slogan implies that condoms fit every size of phallus, i.e., no one has a 
reason NOT to wear a condom.19  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “Kondome für jede Gurke,” 1.  
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 Carolina Vierneisel, spokesperson for Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe [German AIDS-Help], 
Germany’s biggest AIDS organization, judged the video as “disgusting,” beseeching the 
organization to pull the ads. Time.com reports:  
‘The video ridicules all victims of the Nazi regime, and it equates HIV-positive 
people with mass murderers,’ says spokeswoman Carolina Vierneisel. ‘The 
advertising campaign just relies on provoking anxiety among people. That’s the 
wrong approach. Successful HIV prevention is based on factual information about the 
risks of HIV transmission and encourages people to use condoms.’ (qtd. in T. Moore, 
par. 3) 
 
In response, Hans Weishäupl, the creative director of the new AIDS campaign, remarked in 
an interview that 
‘We need to warn young people about the dangers of AIDS and the risks of 
unprotected sex,’ […] ‘AIDS is the mass murderer of the 21st century, and we have 
to show people how awful it is.’ He adds that he’s received a lot of positive feedback 
on the commercials from young people and their parents. Weishäupl agrees that his 
agency’s methods are controversial but insists that the end justifies the means. ‘It’s 
the message that counts, and of course it was provocative to use the picture of Hitler,’ 
he says. ‘But how would you visualize a terrible virus?’ (qtd. in T. Moore, pars. 5-6) 
 
Jan Schwertner, the press officer for Regenbogen, also commented: “We are not the first who 
have linked the topics of AIDS and dictators. […] We are working with the shock effect. The 
sensory overload through the media means that many things fall under the radar. […] The 
strategies for HIV/AIDS prevention have to be reassessed” (qtd. in Hans, par. 7).  
 While representatives of non-profits appear to judge the advertisements as overall 
distasteful and ineffective, opinion on the streets was more positive, as Weishäupl suggests. 
In a poll in the online newspaper The Telegraph, for example, readers were asked what they 
thought of the campaign. Surprisingly, a majority of the voters, 60.47% percent, checked the 
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option: “I like the video, it’s not offensive to me, and it makes the right statement.”20 
Apparently, drawing a parallel between Hitler and HIV is obnoxious, but effective.  
 To equate the epidemic with the atrocities and genocide that occurred in WWII is 
nothing new. I have already drawn comparisons on several occasions between the epidemic 
and the Holocaust as a way to ask how an event, as traumatic and deadly as the AIDS 
epidemic, can be visualized and processed through the medium of the cinema and humor. 
Each person has her or his own idea of how one might best represent a virus or an epidemic, 
especially on an AIDS campaign poster. Yet, however politically incorrect or objectionable 
the idea might appear, few would deny that the AIDS pandemic has acted in some ways like 
a ruthless dictator with a taste for genocide.  
In Chapter one, I suggested that an absurd AIDS Cinema was created 
symptomatically as a way to cope with the trauma associated with the AIDS epidemic. The 
coping mechanism is made possible through what I have christened an absurdist-ethics. I also 
introduced a representation of AIDS, invested in the affect of a gallows humor, with the 
example of German director Rosa von Praunheim’s A Virus Knows No Morals, a film that 
provides evidence that an absurdist-ethics may invoke philosophical reflection from the 
epistemic encounter with sensitive topics colored by an absurdist aesthetics. In this chapter, 
however, I move specifically to that which lies at the furthest edge of humor, its flipside and 
companion, the aesthetic of the grotesque, which I present chiefly through the narrative from 
Indian filmmaker Samy’s Animal [Mirugam] (2007). This film exemplifies why certain 
cultural art forms may depict controversially what most would render a victimized, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This poll was posted, as of August 2011, on the website: 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/6138037/Adolf-Hitler-sex-video-condemned-
by-Aids-charities.html>. As of June 2012, the poll is no longer there.  
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vulnerable body, such as the HIV mythical body, alternatively as an eroticized, grotesque 
body, represented by the director as an object not solely of disgust, but also largely of the 
spectator’s desire. Like in the previous chapter, I set forth the historical backdrop of the 
aesthetic tradition of the grotesque, calling upon similar cultural forms that also represent an 
absurdist-ethics.  
 Animal’s narrative logic works in a similar fashion as Virus, as it depends upon the 
affect of a gallows humor, but even more through the aesthetic paradigm of the grotesque. 
Here, one confronts the more melancholic and fearful margins of one’s contemplations over 
an absurdist-ethics with respect to a mythical body infected with HIV. I begin this discussion 
by first evaluating the place where humor and the grotesque collide. Martin Esslin’s seminal 
essay The Theater of the Absurd (1960) explains how, in the realm of the absurd, humor and 
the grotesque go best hand in hand when trying to express the human condition:  
Everything is funny until the horror of the human situation rises to the surface: ‘The 
point about tragedy is that it is no longer funny. It is funny and then it becomes no 
longer funny.’ Life is funny because it is arbitrary, based on illusions and self-
deceptions, … because it is built out of pretense and the grotesque overestimation 
each individual makes of himself. But in our present-day world, everything is 
uncertain and relative. There is no fixed point; we are surrounded by the unknown. 
And ‘the fact that it is verging on the unknown leads us to the next step […]. There is 
a kind of horror … and I think that this horror and absurdity go together.’ (Esslin, 
242) 
 
Similarly, Vivian Mercier states that “it is true that life is cruel and ugly, but the macabre and 
the grotesque do not become humorous until they have portrayed life as even more cruel and 
ugly than it is; we laugh at their Absurd exaggeration, simultaneously expressing our relief 
that life is, after all, not quite so unpleasant as it might be” (i; emphasis in original). 
Following this logic, in order to represent something more terrible than HIV/AIDS, the 
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images one conjures up must truly be grotesque and unbearable such as a picture of Hitler in 
sexually compromising positions.  
 It is not uncommon for a sense of absurdity to surface when trying to represent a 
traumatic event such as an epidemic or the Holocaust. In his book Selling the Holocaust: 
From Auschwitz to Schindler: How History is Bought, Packaged, and Sold (1999), Tim Cole 
wants to know what tourists are thinking when they walk through the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, or what he calls “Auschwitz-Land” (112). He looks for 
answers in James Young, who wrote The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and 
Meaning (1993):  
What has the viewer learned about a group of artifacts, about the history they 
represent? On exiting the museum, how do visitors grasp their own lives and 
surrounding anew in the light of a memorialized past? […] What precisely does the 
sight of concentration-camp artifacts awaken in viewers? Historical knowledge? A 
sense of evidence? Revulsion, grief, pity, fear? That visitors respond more directly to 
objects than to verbalized concepts is clear. But beyond affect, what does our 
knowledge of these objects—a bent spoon, children’s shoes, crusty old striped 
uniforms—have to do with our knowledge of historical events. (128-129; 132) 
 
One may ask similar questions about absurdist AIDS films in terms of what spectators might 
draw from such extreme and unsettling examples of persons with HIV/AIDS. I argue that 
what happens in the examples of a radical AIDS Cinema I analyze is not the same as the 
process of memorialization of traumatic events, such as that of the Holocaust Museum. 
However, I want to defend that the paradigm of an absurdist-ethics, through the fashioning of 
the topic of AIDS and in the shape of a grotesque aesthetic, does in fact help to break the 
spectator and the thematic of AIDS out of this otherwise reifying shell. Esslin suggests that 
the grotesque is an annexation of humor in the crux of the absurd, and I concurrently contend 
that the affect of the grotesque, in addition to humor, builds the heart of the absurdist-ethics I 
propose. In order to construct my case, I must first lay the groundwork of that which has 
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traditionally been called the grotesque with relation to the designation of the absurd, humor, 
and ethics.  
 The denomination of the grotesque originated from a discovery made in 1480 by 
Renaissance excavators, of what appeared to be caves and underground passages in Rome. It 
turned out that those grottos—the word for caves in Italian—were actually ruins of the palace 
of Roman Emperor Nero (54 to 68 BCE). Nero had the decadent palace built after he 
declared he was in fact a Sun-God (Harpham, 28). As Geoffrey Harpham documents, the 
Renaissant antiquarians who found the caves initially did not know what they had discovered, 
and therefore did not know how to interpret their findings. His description is comical and 
telling: 
In these ruins, scholars and artists beheld the ancient past suddenly revealed in the 
form of an awesome enigma, a vast labyrinth of passageways, rooms, and supporting 
pillars to structures that no longer existed, and a great mass of utter junk. (27)  
 
To Quattrocento eyes, many parts showed every effect of nearly 1500 years of 
subterranean decay; other parts—wall designs, for example—were almost perfectly 
preserved. What a sight this must have been, a circus of formidable but uncertain 
significance. At the time of its disinterment the very palace was an architectural 
palimpsest, an optical jumble much like objects we have learned to call the grotesque. 
(29)  
 
It was not, however, the junk in the grottos that became famous, but the artwork. Scholars 
deduced that Nero’s Domus Aurea [Golden Palace] had been adorned with frescos and 
stucco art, decorated with images of humans, animals, and other mythological creatures of 
ambivalent genus. After the discovery of the grotto, the moniker grottesche emerged to 
describe the anomalous artistic style: 
[The grotesque style is convincing] evidence of the artist’s liberty, his unconstrained 
possession of the space, which confounds the view […] of art as a model of 
systematic order and piety. […] This art is a boundless reservoir of humor, spirited 
play, and untamed vitality. The ape is everywhere, inviting the viewer to recognize 
the animal core of human behavior in the easy translation of all the higher forms of 
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social life—learning, religion, law—into simian games […] No other art in history 
offers so abundant an imagery of the naked and clothed as a physical engine. Free 
from classic norms, the artist experiments with the human frame as the most flexible, 
ductile, indefatigably protean, self-deforming system in nature. (qtd. in Harpham, 41)  
 
The legacy of the grotesque as a style recycled in the classical visual and plastic arts can be 
traced from the Renaissance up until present day, from the decoration of the Vatican Loggias 
by Giovanni da Udine under the masterful hand of Raphael, to the architecture of medieval 
Gothic cathedrals, early opera, images in Gothic manuscripts, Romantic artwork, and many 
derivatives of ornamentation through the years, in Modern art, and even in that of 
postmodernism. The style has grown and developed over the last half of a millennium, and 
one could claim that human beings are simply intrigued by excess, which is a key 
characteristic of the grotesque.  
 Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) addresses relevant aspects of the grotesque 
aesthetics and his contributions to the style of the grotesque later apply to my discussion of 
the esperpento. Specifically, in his essay on “Of a Monstrous Child” (1603), Montaigne 
describes a grotesque scenario, ripe with meaning:  
I saw a child which two men and a nurse, who called themselves the father, the uncle, 
and the aunt of it, carried about to get money by showing it, by reason it was so 
strange a creature. It was, as to all the rest, a common form […]. Under the breast it 
was joined to another child, but with a head and that had the spine of the back without 
motion, the rest entire; […]. This double body, and several limbs belonging to one 
head, might be interpreted a favorable prognostic to the king, or maintaining the 
various part of our state […]. (330). 
 
Not only does Montaigne describe the child as being grotesque, but he himself participates, 
along with the guardians in the tale, in their grotesque scheme of shocking others through the 
spectacle of the child—an action one might deem equally grotesque. The shock of the story is 
meant as an absurdist-ethics dictate, to evoke a philosophical re-positioning towards the 
subject of parenthood and by extension greed, selfishness, and child abuse. 
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 Harpham describes how Montaigne did not actually believe in the grotesque as a sign 
of a true monstrosity or an abomination of nature that should be destroyed and shunned, on 
the contrary, “for Montaigne, there was no true grotesque […]. And this is the final paradox: 
really to understand the grotesque is to cease to regard it as grotesque” (104). Montaigne tries 
to redeem his gluttonous descriptions of the unfortunate individuals, by stating that “those 
that we call monsters are not so to God, who sees in the immensity of his work the infinite 
forms that he has comprehended therein” (330). Through this clarification Montaigne, like 
Freud, attests to how the abnormal is part and parcel of the spectrum of that which is normal 
or rather that which is human. In the same way, one may better fathom how a discussion of 
traumatic events, which also invites the notion of an absurd and comical-grotesque, is not 
necessarily meant to humiliate or further demean the victims of such an event. Instead, the 
grotesque opens the possibly of addressing trauma in a light-hearted way, whereby such 
discussions might have been impossible, bogged down otherwise by the affect of fear, 
sadness, and anger.  
 Following Montaigne’s normalization of apparently repulsive ideas, I incorporate the 
contributions of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) in order to gain an understanding of the 
grotesque through his treatment of the uncanny, an idea that has been dubbed a model within 
which scholars read the grotesque (Greenberg, 10). In his study on “The ‘Uncanny’” (1919), 
Freud defines the concept as belonging “to all that is terrible—to all that arouses dread and 
creeping horror” (368). An important aspect of the uncanny, which also coincides with the 
grotesque, is the individual’s sense and fear of doubling. Freud likens the notion of the 
uncanny to the idea of a man seeing himself in a mirror; when he fails to recognize himself, 
he considers the reflection repugnant—not because the man is unattractive, but instead 
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because the misrecognition itself triggers a sense of revulsion (402). Freud spends much time 
focusing on E.T.A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman (1816), and his description fits into the genre 
of the grotesque as a narrative of doubling and misrecognition.21 While Freud never gives a 
bold definition of the word grotesque in any of his writings, he does employ the appellative 
when describing conditions of abnormal psychology and sexuality in ways analogous to how 
he describes the uncanny. In particular, he uses the word to describe monstrous figures that 
stand in as a double for another, and especially the father figure.22  
 Like Montaigne and Freud, Thomas Mann (1875-1955) helped in defining the 
grotesque style and employed it in his own writing. In his essay “From Grotesque 
Disharmony to the Vision of an Abstract Weltbild,” he defines the grotesque within a social 
context: 
 For, if I may say so, the grotesque is the genuine anti-bourgeois style; and however  
bourgeois Anglo-Saxondom may otherwise be or appear, it is a fact that in art the 
comic-grotesque has always been its strong point. Modern man no longer accepts the 
meaningful, moral universe of tragedy; he derides the rational social order inherent in 
comedy. The logical blend, then, yields a meaningless, chaotic existence abounding 
in the incongruous, often irrational actions and devices of comedy. Man, however, 
attempts to cope with the diverse alien forces, which confront him, and despite his 
absurdity, he may attain a measure of nobility. (713) 
 
Mann’s definition marks another key characteristic of the grotesque, the focus on dystopic 
narratives that expose the obsessive and self-consuming behavior of the hero, who ultimately 
revolts against the norms and forms of bourgeois society. At the same time, Mann 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In the story of The Sandman, the protagonist Nathanael falls in love with a mechanical doll, which is 
introduced to him as the neighbor’s real daughter. Nathanael fails to recognize that the doll, named Olympia, is 
not human, but in her empty gaze, he sees his own ego reflected. Through this process, Olympia becomes real 
to him. The narrative is obsessed with other doublings, all attributed to trauma in Nathanael’s childhood, an 
event that Freud uses as another analogy to describe his theory of the Oedipus complex. 
22 In “Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession” (1923), Freud writes that “to be sure, it is by no means easy to 
demonstrate in the mental life of the individual traces of this satanic conception of the father. When a boy takes 
to drawing caricatures and grotesque figures, it may be possible to prove that he is making a mock of his 
father…” (279).  
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emphasizes that this position of revolt may still hold a measure of “nobility,” that is, that the 
grotesque act can still be an ethically viable mode of expression.  
 A good example of the ethical viability of the grotesque in Mann’s own work is his 
book Death in Venice (1912). Mann describes the adventures of an older man, Gustav von 
Aschenbach, who while vacationing during an outbreak of cholera in Venice, indulges in the 
decadent world of the drowning, dying city, and his own insatiable desire for a poor, young 
village boy named Tadzio. By means parallel to those in barebacking, Aschenbach decides to 
remain in Venice, although he knows that staying ensures his own death at the hands of 
cholera. Faithful to the style of the grotesque, Aschenbach comes to the realization, upon 
hearing that Venice is suffering from an epidemic, that he cannot leave, and remains 
captivated by the grotesqueness of a carnivalesque troupe of musicians, as well as by his own 
obsession with Tadzio, who he realizes will probably not live long. 
Aschenbach was no longer reclining in his chair; he sat upright as if to ward off an 
attack or take flight. But the laughter, the hospital odor wafting up to him, and the 
proximity of the beautiful boy coalesced in a trancelike spell that, indissoluble and 
inexorable, held his head, his mind in thrall. […] ‘He is sickly and has probably not 
long to live,’ he thought with the objectivity that strangely enough breaks free on 
occasion from intoxication and longing, and his heart swelled with pure concern and a 
concomitant profligate satisfaction. (116-117) 
 
This passage demonstrates many of the dichotomies relevant to the grotesque style, including 
flight/flee, sickness/health, and sympathy/selfishness. There are also elements of the 
intoxicating lure of the carnivalesque of the musicians, the gaze of the Other represented by 
Tadzio’s look that is never equally returned, and even the sick body of the boy (and 
Aschenbach’s own), which Aschenbach interprets not with disgust, but with empathy and a 
sense of solidarity. The relationship between Aschenbach and Tadzio, although one sustained 
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in Aschenbach’s imagination, may be described as a strategic relationship, comparable in 
part to the relationship between barebackers, in which sickness plays a seductive role.  
  While Montaigne and Freud offer an interpretation that normalizes and naturalizes the 
grotesque, and Mann narrates its ethical viability, I deem Bakhtin’s definition and 
discussions of the grotesque the most productive and fruitful. In Rabelais and His World 
(1965), Bakhtin conceptualizes the grotesque in the context of his study of Rabelais, and in 
particular his novels Gargantua and Pantagruel, as well as the study of medieval folk 
traditions and carnivals, which I referenced earlier in Chapter one as it applied to humor. 
Bakhtin stresses how the grotesque body is an “unfinished and open body (dying, bringing 
forth and being born) […] blended with the world, with animals, with objects” (27). This 
definition summons the mythical body infected with HIV, and sheds light into the 
genealogical and procreative lingo characteristic of communities of barebackers (cf. Dean, 
Bersani). The notion of the body being unfinished and open recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the body without organs, which refers to a way of thinking about the subject, the 
normal human body, and how human consciousness is made up of fragments of stimuli and 
virtual affects on “planes of consistency or the field of immanence desire” (Thousand 
Plateaus, 183). In terms of the absurd-ethics I am developing, Bakhtin’s open body idea 
means that humans can and are both singular and part of a collective, whereby the plane of 
desire that encodes barebacking as a model, for example, is more tactile and real than the 
dying human body itself. Such a bundle of virtual affects would be fashioned through the 
stylization of an aesthetics of the grotesque and the absurd.  
 Bakhtin explains that “the material bodily principle in grotesque realism is offered in 
its all-popular festive and utopian aspect. The cosmic, social, and bodily elements are given 
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here as an indivisible whole. And this whole is gay and gracious” (19). This definition runs 
along with an absurdist-ethics, in particular as it applies to the mythical cultural construction 
of the gay community, which harbors both utopic and dystopic notions of life and death after 
the epidemic. Since then, but even before, gay men have been seen by society at large as not 
wholly human, because to the cultural eye they are always lacking. It is in this avenue that 
Bakhtin’s understanding of the grotesque style is so productive; at its philosophical core, it 
supports ideas of “community, freedom, equality, and abundance,” even if, and in spite of the 
fact, that that community is made up of minor individuals (Makaryk, 88). The language in 
which this grotesque style is expressed may be abusive, but for Bakhtin, the language is 
important because 
[The] grotesque concept of the body forms the basis of abuses, oaths, and curses. The 
importance of abusive language is essential to the understanding of the literature of 
the grotesque. Abuse exercises a direct influence on the language and the images of 
this literature and is closely related to all other forms of ‘degradation’ and ‘down to 
earth”’[…]. Modern indecent abuse and cursing have retained dead and purely 
negative remnants of the grotesque concept of the body. (27-28) 
 
This abuse also acts as a way to counteract the damage individuals or communities have 
received at the hands of the powers that be. On this point, Bakhtin brings up the importance 
of laughter, for “no grotesque [style], even the most timid, is conceivable in the atmosphere 
of absolute seriousness” (38). To illustrate his point, Bakhtin introduces E.A.F. 
Klingemann’s “Nachtwachen” [Night Watches] (1804) in which a night watchman, believing 
himself to be the son of the devil, asks himself: “Is there upon earth a more potent means 
than laughter to resist the mockeries of the world and of fate? The most powerful enemy 
experiences terror at the sight of this satirical mask, and misfortunate itself retreats before me, 
if I dare laugh at it!” (38). This is the same scenario of someone facing the terror of 
becoming or being infected by HIV. In situations in which fear of HIV may overpower one’s 
	  	   73	  
facility to think or act other than out of fear, i.e., fear of becoming infected, of infecting 
another, or even the fear of the likelihood that one may die eventually once one is infected, 
laughter may be the key to the dissolution of this fear. What remains after anxiety and dread, 
“the mockeries of the world and of fate,” are removed is the possibility of discovering 
pleasure and joy in the face of death—the most powerful enemy—, as well as the prospect of 
accepting one’s fate more gracefully. In this regard, a mixing of the affect and aesthetics of 
humor and the grotesque is a necessary tool of an absurdist-ethical paradigm, functioning as 
a defense mechanism against fear, and as an agent of and a means to catharsis and 
enlightenment. 
 I summarize the characteristics that can be garnered from the previous tracing of the 
grotesque style because they are relevant to the discussion of an absurdist-ethics and will aid 
in my ulterior study of AIDS film Animal. The grotesque is an aesthetic style, composed of 
affect in the rawest form, derived from an excess of fear and pleasure. The reading of 
Montaigne points out that the grotesque is related to what is out of proportion or excessive, 
and is expressed by qualifiers that signify that which is terrible, monstrous, wondrous, 
marvelous, comical, carnivalesque, repulsive, burlesque, dystopic, insane, deformed, chaotic, 
humorous, ornate, decadent, or hysterical. Freud signals to the fact that the grotesque 
becomes problematic because, although it is a natural part of the human being that looks at 
himself in the mirror, it is perceived as sinful, sharing the qualities of the ignoble, playful, 
sexual, sensual, lustful, ecstatic, destructive, vulgar, campy, trashy, of kitsch, demonic, 
disgusting, deadly, or intoxicating. In relation to the origin of the term as the strange artistic 
creation found in an interred place, a grotto, the grotesque style is linked to the unknowable 
or unidentifiable, that is, the exotic, mysterious, fantastical, mythical, spiritual, supernatural, 
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ambiguous, that which evades representation or detectability, the irregular, the Other, the 
cryptic, the secret, or the obscure. From Freud’s discussion of the topic in “The Uncanny” 
and Thomas Mann’s use of the grotesque in his literary work, we understand that the 
grotesque style frames duality (the masked, the doppelgänger, the hybrid, or fragmented), but 
through a mirroring that shows reality as artificial, plastic, inanimate, mechanical, 
caricaturesque, or affected. Bakhtin’s theorizations and Beckett’s more radical and aspiring 
theater show the power of the grotesque when representing nature at its rawest form, showing 
the animalism of the human being, assessing critically the complicated balances of 
generation and degeneration, and not shying away from engaging with topics such as death, 
birth, blood, sweat, tears, semen, bile, phlegm, or scat.  
 My second example of an Absurd AIDS film in this study focuses on Animal 
[Mirugam] (2007) by Indian director Samy [R. Saminathan]. Animal fulfills all the conditions 
of an absurd AIDS cinema: it is queer; the main character contracts HIV; and it educates its 
spectators about HIV. Animal also follows in the footsteps of von Praunheim’s humor and 
grotesqueness in Virus, and tweaks the grotesque to an extreme degree. Animal exposes a 
rich engagement with an absurdist-ethics, plausibly just as much as the film Days I study in 
the next chapter does in deliberating the ethical considerations of barebacking. 
Animal relates the story of a misogynist, violent man named Ayyanar, who acts like 
an animal, eating like a pig, raping the women of the town, and beating up anyone who gets 
in his way. The rural town in which he lives in India does not do much to curtail his behavior, 
and even in a way condones his overt masculinity. Only after he is infected with the HIV-
virus does a change occur. Society suddenly shames his new identity as HIV-positive, and in 
particular as his body begins to fall apart and he starts to die. In turn, Ayyanar begins to 
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finally act more civil, learning to behave endearingly and selflessly towards his wife, child, 
and mother.23 He even facilitates the building of a well for the town. Yet, nothing elicits the 
sympathy of the townspeople, who are too caught up in their own fear of the virus. At the end 
of the film, the crowd converges on Ayyanar’s sick body and spears him like an animal.  
Animal incorporates a grotesque aesthetic on multiple levels, including the depiction 
of the protagonist’s sexuality in a way that even queers queer sexuality by incorporating the 
disquieting desire for and/or desire of an animal. When dying of AIDS, the body of the 
protagonist is portrayed as so visually repulsive and deformed by illness, that he remains 
largely cloaked in order to prod the spectators to imagine that which cannot be shown or 
represented visually. The role of the doppelgänger is also invoked insofar as a second actor is 
used to represent the actor’s sick body after he is infected with HIV in order to illustrate the 
physical and emotional transitions of the protagonist. Initially, he is a man portrayed 
excessively in terms of his physical attractiveness, sexuality, violent behavior towards others, 
animalistic nature, and selfish qualities that reduce him to a predator. Thereafter, Ayyanar is 
depicted as having morphed into a man characterized as physically excessive in terms of his 
illness and the destruction of his body. At the same time, his nature is recuperated in this 
grotesque body with the emergence of a saint-like disposition. Even this new mental 
constitution is excessive in terms of Ayyanar’s overt generosity to help the people of his 
village, who will eventually mistreat him. Ultimately, he delivers himself willingly into their 
lethal hands, and Ayyanar is martyred in the name of the village people’s own unmasking as 
a mass ignorant of the nature of the virus and of their own hypocrisy; they reveal themselves 
to be just as monstrous as Ayyanar in the way they murder him. The village’s grotesque 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ayyanar’s mother in the film is actually his adopted mother. His biological mother, who was a prostitute, was 
killed by the brothel owner when Ayyanar was a child.  
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naiveté mirrors the city’s own in its thinking that simple knowledge and injunctions might 
control sexuality and sexual nature of human beings, and by extension the spread of the virus. 
In this constellation, the people of the village, as well as the peripheral, minor humans who 
live in the neighboring towns, represent metaphorically the grotesque excessiveness of 
sexuality and disease. The will to live equates, as it does in Virus, to the will to have sex in 
ways that cannot be controlled, and sexual desire is instead coded as a means to self-
actualization. Consequently, the spectator must come to realize that the virus cannot be 
effectively quarantined in this way either.  
Animal is a queer film and, by comparison, challenges the notion of queer more so 
than the other two queer AIDS films I examine in this paper, Virus or Days. In Animal, 
sexuality is both queer and grotesque, and yet, neither denotation is tabulated as explicitly 
negative or simple. Ayyanar’s grotesque sexuality should be read instead as complex and 
indicative of a more nuanced and truer nature of sexuality, i.e., polymorphous, exceeding the 
bounds of normative classification. In contrast, in Virus and Days, the male protagonists are 
individuals who are outwardly and simply, openly gay. In other words, the characters make 
their gay sexual orientation known in the space of the narrative, and this fact comes as no 
surprise to the spectator.  
Ayyanar, in opposition, challenges the spectator to continually reassess the nature of 
his sexuality. First, he has a wife, and at first sight, one might allege that Ayyanar is straight 
but, while he is not overtly gay, he does express unbound desire that ultimately challenges 
and redefines the boundaries of hetero-normative sexuality. This blurring of his sexuality 
makes his character more potent, grotesque, and relevant for an absurd example of AIDS film, 
and even more importantly within the corpus of Queer Cinema. The inclusion of this film as 
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queer expands and enriches the critical understanding of what is deemed as queer. As a 
consequence of this reframing, the definition of Queer Cinema should categorically showcase 
minor narratives about individuals whose sexuality evades heteronormativity, even if that 
move challenges traditional classifications of what one might consider to be queer or gay.  
Animal belongs to the reframing of such a queer categorization in the realm of the 
grotesque as animalistic. For instance, when Ayyanar sees a woman, he snorts like a bull, and 
the film delivers a superimposed caricaturesque sound to stress that exaggeration of his 
masculine sexual desire. Ayyanar flares his nostril and attacks. In general, he is attracted to 
women, of all shapes and sizes, prostitutes, healthy and sick, young and old. He also has sex 
with men, as is revealed through the course of the narrative. His possibly first experience 
with a man is in jail, where he has sex with another male prisoner while drugged out on 
heroin. From a first impression, one may imagine that Samy is sending the message that HIV 
is transmitted through male sex in prison, and that Ayyanar has had sex with a man only 
because he was on drugs. But later in the film, after Ayyanar has contracted HIV, he goes in 
his mind through a list of all the individuals with whom he has slept. This includes not only 
images of women, but also several images of men. At this point, spectators come to the 
realization that Ayyanar’s encounter with the man in jail was either not his first or his last. In 
other words, Ayyanar’s desire is indeed unbound by heteronormative notions of straight 
sexuality that dictate that a man may only desire a woman. It is also worth observing that one 
never detects exactly from whom Ayyanar contracted HIV, making it clear that the director 
found this detail unimportant, while what is important is his voracious, raw, untamed sexual 
desire. In this vein, there is an additional condition of Ayyanar’s desire worth noting. By 
trade, Ayyanar is a bull breeder. In an establishing scene, he is called in to help the animals 
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breed. He smacks the (male) bull on the ass and it appears as his touch sexually stimulates 
the bull, like a doubling of the protagonist, and responds by mounting the (female) cow. This 
specular representation may be interpreted as that not only does Ayyanar act like a bull when 
he is sexually aroused, but that his desire can be felt not only by humans, but also by animals 
as well. This does not necessarily mean that Ayyanar has participated in acts of bestiality, but 
the cinematic suture suggests that this possibly cannot be excluded either.  
In comparison, in Virus, gay sexuality is presented in a clichéd way. One encounters 
gay men, straight couples, and a mother who desires to watch her son have sex. These 
presentations do not challenge stereotypical notions of desire. Animal does per contra take on 
a new connotation because Ayyanar becomes a new kind of ‘breeder.’ He breeds the virus. 
He contracts it and continues having sex after he is infected. He is a breeder whose desire is 
so queer it may extend to the animal kingdom. Nevertheless, Ayyanar’s queer desire is not 
depicted in a negative way throughout the film, even in his relationship to men and/or 
animals. Instead, his desire is normalized or naturalized simply matter of fact. In this way, 
the film suggests that queer desire unbound is the natural state of human desire, which must 
also be understood as grotesque excess. The critic cannot simply dismiss Ayyanar’s desire as 
animalistic in a simple or underdeveloped fashion. Instead Ayyanar is to be interpreted as a 
powerful man, who commits unforgivable acts of rape, but whose desire to touch and be 
touched by other living beings, his unbridled desire, is reflective of his ethically viable 
potential as an aesthetic representation and product of a paradigm of absurdist-ethics. Only 
the hero exhibits this type of queer desire, which ultimately proves to be the vehicle through 
which he chooses to seek pleasure in life. Through his sexual relations, he also courts death 
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and attracts and continues to infect others with HIV. Through such endgame engagements, 
Ayyanar also eventually gleans intellectual and emotional enlightenment.  
The role of HIV and the modes of conveyance of information from the city to the 
periphery also draw on the grotesque to make a point about the ineffectiveness of trying to 
control human sexuality in order to halt the transmission of the virus. In Animal, doctors 
come from the city to test the rural people for HIV, and later Ayyanar and his wife learn 
more about the virus by going to the city to visit the doctors. Ayyanar and his village 
represent the ignorant masses. They do not just exemplify a small village next to the city that 
tries to copy urbanite ways. This village is architectonically ‘primitive,’ made out of simple 
huts, and with no well for water. They are also presented as a culturally backward, grotesque 
people, in so far as they employ for example a shaman, instead of the doctors accepted by a 
Western scientific system. Most obviously, Ayyanar represents the ignorant man, who in turn 
is the most enlightened of all the characters by the end of the film. He is able to negotiate the 
well for the village, and comes to understand the nature of the human being as grotesque in a 
higher degree than anyone depicted in the film.  
This village represents a minor people. One can deduce from the Tamil language and 
customs of the people that the village acts in the ways of the peripheral groups of India. The 
town is situated in the southern most part of the Indian peninsula in the coastal state of Tamil 
Nadu, near the city of Ramanathapuram. As Samy reveals, he chose the town because it 
reminded him of the conditions of AIDS. In an interview, he said: “I chose this village with 
the barren, parched landscape because when I visited an AIDS patient at an AIDS hospital, 
he was malnourished and had nothing but skin and bones, and I felt the setting for the film 
should reflect this desola
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necessarily any more sophisticated than the rural village. When the city doctors explain what 
HIV and some of its symptoms are, or when they announce that Ayyanar will inevitably die, 
it appears as if their lessons do nothing in terms of educating the people of the village. In 
spite of this top-down handing of information, Ayyanar still contracts HIV and continues 
transmitting it. The townspeople are afraid of being near Ayyanar for fear of catching the 
disease. Even when he is dead, the townspeople refuse to help bury his body, denying him 
one of the most important, solemn, and human moments of a person’s existence. They too are 
reconfigured in the end as grotesque, turning inwards to the most animalistic instincts for 
survival: eliminating the threat, and learning nothing from the city doctors. And yet, order is 
reestablished. In other words, the grotesque must be read as part of the natural balance of this 
community.  
Enlightenment and change stems not from following the advice of the doctors in the 
city, but instead from an alternative source of information: through phenomenological 
experience, which may also be read as grotesque. The protagonist is a sensitive man, not only 
as concerns his boundless desire, but also in the fact that he can acutely feel the development 
of the virus in his body. The film provides a digital animation of the virus infecting 
Ayyanar’s body, and the public witnesses how the virus attaches to his lungs, moves into his 
blood stream and takes command of his body. Because they are stylistically pasted, the 
technological capabilities of computer animation work as a strong contrast, and provide 
perspective to expose both parts of the human body that would otherwise never been seen, 
that which is unrepresentable visually, but also that the problem of education is epistemic. 
One of the critical questions raised by the film is that if the city is incapable of understanding 
how to educate effectively, then how are the minor populations supposed to know any better. 
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The issue of education runs along many absurdist HIV films. In the previously 
analyzed Virus, which depicts Germany in the early to mid 1980s, von Praunheim shows how 
official attempts at pedagogy in the form of condom machines and literature fail, similarly as 
in Animal, because the message is not attuned to the reality of the intended population. Those 
affected refuse to listen when approached in a top-down, imposing manner that is supposed 
to work by means of controlling human sexuality and desire. As I will show in Chapter three, 
in the film Days, the best information and the best medications may be readily provided but, 
ironically, all HIV-positive persons in the film still question the authority and reliability of 
the doctors. In fact, one of the main characters in the film refuses to ingest any medication at 
all. As an act of revolt against that system that wants to extend life in a way that he deems 
inauthentic, he clearly manifests that he will not heed the input of doctors. 
The three films demonstrate a progression of the availability of education and 
medicines, yet, the effect it has on the protagonists remains relatively the same, which can be 
understood best within the framework of an absurdist-ethics, namely that what is valuable in 
the films is the condition of the body and mind after infection and not before it. In all cases, 
the hard lessons are learned and an intense life is experienced at the edge of death; agency is 
yielded from the lessons learned through infection. I would still debate that none of the 
directors would openly admit to such an agenda, as it would be costly to their careers, but I 
find this sentiment present and palpable in the films nonetheless.  
Animal also relies on the vehicle of camp to convey a sense of the absurd through 
grotesque humor. There are two ways that camp is commissioned, first through the use of a 
grotesque gallows-humor, and second, through performance. In observation of humor, the 
narrative never takes itself seriously. The film follows the features of comedy from start to 
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finish, and even Ayyanar’s violence is portrayed as humorous and grotesque. In a kind of 
whirlwind, Ayyanar dances through the town, snorting like a bull, raping women, which for 
all intents and purposes makes rape look like something droll. His best friend follows him 
like a loyal dog, only to be beaten up by Ayyanar in every other scene. All of the fight 
scenes—and there are many—are choreographed like in a Kung Fu movie, including a 
soundscape full of grunts and groans, whereby Ayyanar takes on literally every man in the 
town. He throws men with unrealistic force onto rooftops and they bounce off of walls. The 
film is packed with such fight and chase scenes, and if Ayyanar is not fighting, then he is 
employed in Bollywood-style dances and clichéd love scenes with his wife. Even at the 
dramatic end of the film, when Ayyanar has died, the wife manages to comically and 
however grotesquely throw this great man over her shoulder to take him to his burial pyre. 
Similarly, Virus is crafted as a string of black humor and jokes. There is no serious scene in 
that entire film, coming even to jokingly include dipping condoms in blood, nurses rolling 
dice to guess who will die next, or radical activists stealing the jewelry from drag queens. As 
I will show, Days may prove the exception to the three films in terms of humor, but there are 
some jokes about death and dying of HIV exchanged between the main protagonist Claudio 
and his HIV-positive friend, Giuseppe. But, camp is employed in another way, namely 
through performance.  
In all three films, death becomes a performance itself, and even a celebrated 
performance. In the scenes evoking death, Animal incorporates music and Bollywood-style 
dancing.24 Virus also includes many elements of camp performance, including glittery parties 
with dozens of men dressed in drag wearing gaudy jewelry at funerals. In Animal, Ayyanar’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bollywood is however generally understood as a Hindi-language popular cinema coming out of the city of 
Mumbai (Gopal and Moorti, 4). 
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body is a vital part of the visual expression and performance of his unbound queer desire, 
which is depicted as grotesque from start to finish. In the beginning of the film, his body is 
shown as overtly muscular, exhibiting super strength and a viral healthy glow. In fact, 
Ayyanar looks healthier than any other man in the village, or even more so than the doctors 
in the city. Towards the end of the film, the director chooses to have another actor play 
Ayyanar in his last days to emphasize the physical and emotional changes the protagonist has 
undergone—a play on the doppelgänger motif I already mentioned discussing the idea of the 
grotesque. With this move, Samy dramatizes the grotesque, emaciated body, giving the 
protagonist a black-face, presumably covered entirely with lesions, and a constitution that 
resembles representations of Jesus in his last moments. The cloaked actor demands that 
spectators use their imaginations to visualize that which remains unrepresentable in illness, 
especially in an epidemic, in the demise of the human body. Samy clearly wanted to 
showcase a dramatic change. The Indian actor named Adhi, who played Ayyanar earlier, is a 
robust, large man, and his replacement is just as tall, but half his weight. Their faces are also 
radically different, and the new Ayyanar is notably also blind, a feature that further propels 
the representation of the all-seeing blind holy man. In turn, the masking of the visual reveals 
the unveiling of Ayyanar’s emotion strength. In Virus, as I mentioned earlier, a psychiatrist 
helps his gay patient go through the motions of the infected’s death, even enclosing him in a 
coffin. This performance is both comical and deeply grotesque. In Days, the performance of 
death is not physically grotesque, but it is instead the sentiment that eats away at Claudio in 
imaging and learning of his lover Andrea’s death. All three films nevertheless make death a 
spectacle to shock and to educate.  
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Animal, like Virus and Days, also engages with an absurdist-ethical framework, 
meaning that the narrative offers a vision of the future of the epidemic and introduces some 
element of agency or change. The objective of this element in an absurdist AIDS film is that 
the spectator may be incited to produce change after the show, especially because the 
framework must be gleaned through a critical engagement with the film. The possible failure 
of this constellation is that, on average, spectators tend not to understand the underlying 
message of the film, but instead find it revolting and politically offensive. Samy, the director 
of Animal, has been criticized, for example, of pounding spectators over the head with his 
over-the-top message, which makes it clear in a shocking, grotesque, and actually comical 
way, that people are still in general ignorant, unenlightened and brutal about the virus.25  
Read more critically, the film does have the goal of persuading spectators to believe 
in a politics of tolerance, but a tolerance for the virus and not necessarily for people. While 
the virus may elicit sympathy from the audience, Ayyanar never really does, even after he is 
infected with HIV. Yet, the virus in this case acts as the catalyst to turn Ayyanar’s life around. 
The virus is in truth the benevolent addition and agent of change in Ayyanar’s life, and by 
extension in his family’s life, because the familial unit is solidified through the virus. His 
wife learns to stand up for herself, Ayyanar learns to act like a father to his child, and as 
kindly son to his mother. His mother’s untimely death—she dies of thirst—is the reason he 
travels to the city, although he is very sick and dying of AIDS, to convince city developers to 
come to his village to build a well. The shifting of the role of the disease into something 
positive may be seen as an absurd and grotesque scenario, but when read through the lens of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Kumar’s article and “Mirugam—Powerful Portrayal,” in bibliography for negative reviews of Animal. 
There are no scholarly reviews of Animal published thus far, save a dissertation from 2010, which discusses the 
film in a formal perspective that follows the prescriptions of a method developed by Russian formalist Vladimir 
Propp. See Sreenivas in bibliography.  
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an absurdist-ethics, becoming infected ends up being the only real ethical change having 
taken place in the film.  
Spectators generally do not recognize such complex readings of the film—certainly 
not in terms of ethics pertaining to the HIV virus. The average spectator might simply not 
want to acquiesce that a grotesque figure like Ayyanar, who acts like a wild, animal-like 
rapist, could actually turn out to be a moral figure. One reviewer complained that “[while] we 
do sympathize for the man for the agony he undergoes, we cannot identify with him, as he 
shows no sign of humanness in his behavior” (“Mirugam—Powerful Portrayal,” par. 3). 
Spectators may admit that Ayyanar attempts to turn his life around, after he realizes he is 
dying and would like the help of others, but the damage Ayyanar ultimately causes 
throughout the film is truly hard to reconcile in the end with his last good deeds. Still, when 
the film is read critically through the lens of an absurdist-ethics, a more positive message 
may be gleaned, revealing that the director is trying to make his spectators understand that 
the HIV/AIDS virus has become a banal subject. Samy uses rural townspeople to provide a 
contrast to the mythical ‘civilized’ person, who should know better how to act and how to 
protect her or himself against infection. The doctors from the city do not represent these 
civilized people either, for they also do not know how to properly educate a significant 
portion of the population. Jailers from the city prove just as brutal as Ayyanar, even if they 
are supposed to represent law and order. After so many official, condescending information 
campaigns about HIV/AIDS, Samy demonstrates how many people still do not know the 
nature of the virus, or refuse to liberate their behavior from ingrained misconceptions: they 
are still afraid, even when they learn that there is no reason to be afraid. Samy punctuates the 
grotesque nature of human beings who, simply put, are brutal and ignorant, but still enjoy 
	  	   86	  
life and seek pleasure in and through an indulgence in many forms of sexual desire 
nonetheless, even in the face of danger, disease, and death; it takes the absurd and the 
grotesque through humor to make that point. It takes such a radical and grotesque figure as 
Ayyanar to jolt spectators out of their comfort zone, to force them to ask why they tolerate 
certain behaviors and not others, and to ask about how people are being educated about the 
virus, in particular in places where the epidemic is so rampant, such as in India and the 
Global South.  
In comparison, von Praunheim’s Virus received many similar scathing reviews, and 
in general his work has been widely misread and underappreciated. Still, at another level, 
beyond scholarly or academically informed criticism, Virus is a film that pushes the spectator 
not only to question her or his own position vis-à-vis HIV and AIDS, but to examine the 
limits of acceptability in engaging with these issues. Days, the film studied in the following 
chapter, is also underappreciated by critics because of the intense, open, and controversial 
nature of its discussion of barebacking, whereby Andrea’s character is willing to accept an 
early death versus taking AIDS medications to prolong his life. This type of film asks if you, 
the spectator, find certain grotesque and comical scenarios in the film unreasonable, and will 
revolt against seeing this irreal situation on the screen, why would you tolerate or turn a 
blind eye to the horrors of the reality before you. This type of film also demands that one ask 
what quality of life means and what role desire and sexuality, and even risk plays in the mix. 
In the chapters that follow, I will describe how this scenario acts as a radical instantiation of 
an absurdist-ethics.  
 	  
 
 
CHAPTER III 
BAREBACKING IN CINEMA: GIORNI [DAYS] 2001 
 
 With the goal of concentrating my critical effort on the analysis of content and 
message of the films treated so far, I have purposefully avoided tracing a filmic genealogy by 
movements, waves and sub-genres in Queer Cinematic history. But the main features 
gathered from my assessment of Virus and Animal, in conjunction with the subsequent work 
on Days [Giorni] (2001), make it appropriate now to outline how all three films belong to a 
sub-genre of Queer Cinema I name as a Global Queer AIDS Cinema. After tracing that 
genealogy, I approach Italian filmmaker Laura Muscardin’s Days as a last cinematic image 
of an absurdist-ethics that illustrates a model of a high-risk sexual practice that in theory 
eroticizes and embraces the virus. This instantiation of an absurdist-ethics is perhaps the most 
radical of the three presented in this study, and serves as a radical representation of my model 
of an absurdist-ethics.  
Film scholars have established the connection between the New Queer Cinema and 
AIDS (cf. Aaron; Arroyo). Although not all films included in the New Queer Cinema deal 
with the subject matter of AIDS, the introduction of the epidemic into the lives of queer 
culture altered that culture systemically, and scholars contend that the New Queer Cinema 
begot an AIDS Cinema. An AIDS Cinema proper would include all films from around the 
globe that deal with the topic of HIV and AIDS as it affects all persons, regardless of 
sexuality, gender, and/or classifications of identity. In this sense, even if barebacking is a 
highly controversial and generally taboo topic in the queer community, Queer Cinema and by 
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extension AIDS Cinema, like all minor cinemas, have provided a venue for directors to 
explore even the most minor practices, represented oftentimes in fantastical and mythical 
formations. Minor cinema is an expression Tom Gunning adopted from Deleuze and Guattari 
and their use of a minor literature with respect to Kafka. Correspondingly, Deleuze and 
Guattari frame a minor literature as: 
that which a minority constructs with a major language. […] The first characteristic 
[…] is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization. In 
this sense, Kafka marks the impasse that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague 
and turns their literature into something impossible—the impossibility of not writing, 
the impossibility of writing in German, the impossibility of writing otherwise. […] In 
short, Prague German is a deterriotorialized language, appropriate for strange and 
minor uses. (Kafka, 16) 
 
Queer cinema may be read as a minor cinematic language for queer directors. Gunning 
extends the term minor to cinema explaining that  
Minor literature remains aware of, and celebrates, its marginal identity, fashioning 
from it a revolutionary consciousness. […] A minor cinema reshapes our image of the 
avant-garde, moving away from its image of shock troop battalions. […] Much 
alternative filmmaking and theory of the past decade declared its intention to break 
down the ghetto of avant-garde film. The recent films that I find exciting proudly 
wear the badge of the ghetto. This is a dangerous statement, of course. (“Towards a 
Minor Cinema,” 2-3) 
 
The crux of Gunning’s argument is that minor cinemas and their films represent marginal 
identities that “maintain a position outside the major cinematic languages;” and even more 
significantly because for Gunning the cinema is parasitic of itself:  
Minor cinema recognizes—cannot ignore—the existence of another cinema. Its 
attitude is both creatively parasitic (e.g. the use of found footage) and insistently 
oppositional (none of these filmmakers dream of a commercial breakthrough film—
breakthrough to what?). But these filmmakers also manifest no desire to supplant 
dominant cinema. (3)  
 
Film is a citational medium that is ever changing and adapting to new cultural forms just as 
culture and identity mutates along with it, dynamically and simultaneously. It may also be 
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said that cinema is parasitic of popular culture, of minor cultural instantiations, or of the 
human subconscious and identities.  
This dynamic may be better understood by using the appellation viral, an adjective 
that illustrates the function of queer cinema insofar as it is a minor, yet significant form of 
expression. The appellation of viral also points to the distribution of many of these films via 
the Internet. Filmmakers of minor films oftentimes do not have the budgets to market their 
films for a mainstream venue and theaters, and the Internet oftentimes proves a better means 
of distribution of their work than local theaters in big cities. Via the Internet, minor 
filmmakers can also reach a wider number of spectators, especially those who may not or 
cannot watch such films otherwise due to issues of social stigma or for monetary reasons.  
Queer Cinema as a minor cinema can be defined as films made typically by and for 
queers, at least symbolically speaking, because film productions are made up of dozens to 
thousands of people, the sexual identities of which one cannot possibly quantify. Following 
Gunning’s use of the word, Queer Cinema as a minor cinema also has a ghetto of its own, 
even if that ghetto is illusive and imaginary. What this amounts to, in terms of a minor 
cinema, is that the cinema of minoritarian groups, whether Jewish, gay, black, Latina/Latino, 
or otherwise, are invested in more than just notions of the real but also in particular abstract 
representations, myths, and fantasies, even if they may be deemed as absurd or grotesque by 
some sectors of the status quo. Minor cinemas, like queer cinema, participate simultaneously 
and ever dynamically in constructing and deconstructing identity and cultural meaning—
collective and personal—for a particular group, and even for other groups. Cinema is not just 
some detached source, which one may tap at will. Instead, when literally placed face-to-face 
with a minor cinema, and in particular, those with which an individual may partially identify, 
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such as a gay man may do when watching a queer film, the film invades the consciousness of 
the individual and even the individual’s physiognomy, in many ways analogously to the way 
pornography does. In this respect, when Deleuze posits that the cinema produces reality, one 
may take this to mean that cinema functions in the same mode as pornography does to induce 
real reactions. This same mechanism would apply to spectators watching any and all films, 
because films can induce blushing, tears, and goose bumps, as well as erections and orgasms, 
sometimes working with and sometimes against the individual’s own conscious will.  
In the case of queer cinema, directors entice spectators with the promise of scenes of 
gay, lesbian, and/or queer desire and sexuality. As copious films do, queer cinema frames 
sexual imagery, consonantly to pornography—admittedly many queer films could be and in 
fact are categorized by some as both porn and queer cinema. All queer films, and I say this 
with caution, cater to certain kinds of sexual situations, whereby audio and visual stimuli 
invade the spectator’s senses to provoke cognitive and oftentimes bodily reactions, be it 
pleasure or disgust. This source of stimuli is not exclusively an isolated, individual 
experience either. Feona Attwood’s Porn.com: Making Sense of Online Pornography (2010), 
while appealing to other queer scholars such as Richard Dyer, outlines how pornographic 
images play a defining role in the make-up of queer culture, as well as the queer aesthetics 
that circumscribe that culture:  
Dyer has argued that gay porn is ‘analogous … to aspects of gay male sexual 
practice…’ […] for example, where porn viewing and public sex are combined in 
visits to gay porn movie houses, but in its visual embodiment of a utopian view of a 
gay sexual lifestyle which combines romanticism with promiscuity […]. (161)26 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Attwood cites Richard Dyer’s Only Entertainment (2002). See bibliography.  
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Not only is porn important to the way some gay men define themselves, or others define 
them with respect to visibility, but also porn is arguably part and parcel of queer cinema at its 
basic core: 
[Gay] male porn must be understood, not only in terms of its textual conventions, but 
its place within the context of gay men’s cultural and social practices […] Gay porn 
has been culturally important for gay men, working to make them visible; as Cante 
and Restivo note, ‘gayness is unquestionably much, much more commonly 
represented than in any other category of U.S. moving-image product’ […].27  
(161, emphasis in the original) 
 
Richard Cante and Angelo Restivo make a good point in reminding readers that the New 
Queer Cinema, even if a minoritarian cinema, is not an isolated form, but a part of that which 
is thematized and represented in the cinema as a mediated form in general.  
 Queer Cinema really made its claim in cinematic history with the introduction of the 
genre of the New Queer Cinema. The phrase “New Queer Cinema” was coined in 1992 by 
feminist scholar B. Ruby Rich to describe what she witnessed as an influx of new queer films 
on the international film festival circuit. Just as the traditions of the New German Cinema in 
Germany and the Nouvelle Vague in France were spawned in response to a time of post-
political upheaval—as in after WWII, the New Queer Cinema matured out of the impetus of 
HIV/AIDS activism. 28 Furthermore, the New Queer Cinema’s pro-genesis was dependent on 
the legacies of other budding minor cinemas, including the avant-garde, independent, and 
race-based film traditions. Additionally, the inheritance of the Third Cinema was crucial to 
the New Queer Cinema in so much as this Latin American film movement of the 1960s and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Attwood references Cante and Restivo’s article “The cultural-aesthetic specificities of all-male moving image 
pornography.” See bibliography.  
28 This section of the dissertation on the New Queer Cinema and the Global Queer Cinema is adapted from a 
previously published article. See Riley, “A Transnational Queer AIDS Cinema.”  
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1970s stood as an exemplar of a viable political and theoretical framework within which 
queer filmmakers could generate their own messages.  
 Queer films, or at least films with queer subtexts, have however notably always 
existed in film since its start; yet, the New Queer Cinema was the first film movement that 
presented a united front to the cinematic world. It also revolutionized the modes of 
production and psychology of queer spectatorship. Rich was an eyewitness to the New Queer 
Cinema’s birth: 
The queer film phenomenon was introduced a year ago at Toronto’s Festival of 
Festivals, the best spot in North America for tracking new cinematic trends. There, 
suddenly, was a flock of films that were doing something new, renegotiating 
subjectivities, annexing whole genres, revising histories in their image. […] Check 
out the international circuit, from Park City to Berlin to London. Awards have been 
won, parties held. At Sundance, in the heart of Mormon country, there was even a 
panel dedicated to the queer subject, hosted by yours truly. (15)  
 
Many directors of the New Queer Cinema endeavored to depict positive and affirming 
images of gays, lesbians, transgendered persons, queer for short, as main protagonists on the 
silver screen. These films sought to challenge the stereotypes that bound gays and lesbians to 
the roles in film, for instance, of the sissy, serial killer, or child molester.29 Films of the New 
Queer Cinema appeared in many forms, including feature films, shorts, and creative 
performance pieces. 
 Queer characters that are HIV positive were also introduced for the first time in film 
history, and HIV and AIDS played a key role in the development of this new minor cinema. 
In Out in Culture: Gay, Lesbian, and Queer Essays on Popular Culture (1995), Cory K. 
Creekmur and Alexander Doty explain that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A solid documentary about the representation of gays and lesbians in cinema is the film The Celluloid Closet 
(1995).  
	  	   93	  
For many members of a generation coming into political consciousness haunted by 
AIDS but collectively strengthened by AIDS activism, queer has become an attractive 
and oppositional self-label that acknowledges a new cultural context for politics, 
criticism, reception-consumption, and production. (6; emphasis in the original)  
  
The queer activism of which Creekmur and Doty speak includes activities by politically 
queer groups like ACT UP (the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), Queer Nation, Lesbian 
Avengers, and Outrage. The energy and passion of such groups compelled filmmakers, actors 
and spectators to produce, act in, and watch films that became the New Queer Cinema, 
making visible cinematically their political goals, as well as the realities of the epidemic in 
the early 1990s at home and on the streets. 
 While films of the New Queer Cinema are most solidly attributed to the timeframe of 
barely two years between 1991 and 1992, film scholars have incorporated other films made 
before and since that time into the movement.30 Almost fifteen years since the introduction of 
the New Queer Cinema, room has been made for the next major wave—the Global Queer 
Cinema, appearing arguably for the first time in 2005 in the context of an international LGBT 
art exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Fifty-six films were shown, 
including nonfictional, fictional, experimental shorts and feature films from filmmakers 
around the globe. In a press release, the exhibitors outlined their goals, including their aim to 
address and reconsider the Anglo- and Euro-centrism in queer cinema:  
North America and Western Europe are often recognized for their prolific output of 
gay, lesbian, and transgender film and media. Yet over the past 20 years a wide range 
of works falling into the sub-genre of New Queer Cinema has emanated from sub-
Saharan Africa, India, New Zealand, Thailand, Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Israel, 
and China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Those films produced in the first wave, around and during this critical period of the early 1990s include Paris 
is Burning (1990), Tongues Untied (1990), The Making of Monsters (1991), The Meeting of Two Queens (1991), 
My Own Private Idaho (1991), Young Soul Rebels (1991), Swoon (1992), Edward II (1992), and Flaming Ears 
(1992).   
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Queer filmmakers have traditionally tested the possibilities and boundaries of film 
and media aesthetics. Some of the boldest experimentation in narrative and visual 
form has been made by filmmakers whose films have used gay themes, narrative, or 
imagery to bolster or subvert existing conventions in cinema. The new wave of Queer 
Filmmakers presented in this exhibition investigates cinematic form in relation to the 
complexities of their sexual identities and the world in which they live.31 
 
AIDS made its appearance in the wave of the Global Queer Cinema as well. For instance, 
Chinese director Cui Zi’en’s feature-length film The Old Testament (2002) was screened at 
the Museum of Modern Art in New York. This is possibly China’s first openly gay, 
underground film to delve into the topic of AIDS, sexuality, and homophobia. Also exhibited 
was Argentinean director Anahi Berneri’s A Year without Love (2005), which relates the 
quest of an AIDS-stricken artist, searching for love and comfort, and chancing in the world 
of sadomasochism.  
In the same year that the Museum of Modern Art had their exhibition, the University 
of Iowa sponsored a film series and a seminar around the subject of the Global Queer Cinema. 
Like in New York, organizers of the Iowa film series sought to expand the spatial parameters 
of the New Queer Cinema. One sponsor, Rosalind Galt, clarifies: “Queer cinema has become 
a contemporary global phenomenon, reflecting the increasing visibility of gay, lesbian and 
transgendered people around the world.”32 Corey Creekmur, Director of the Institute for 
Cinema and Culture, defined their efforts:  
This series should fully demonstrate that the relation between non-normative sexual 
identities and cinema has a long and truly international history: in many countries 
films representing gay or lesbian life in specific cultural contexts have played a key 
role in the political liberation of queer people in those locations. […] This series 
offers a rare opportunity for students and the local community to compare and 
contrast representations of queer people in different eras and societies. At the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See pg. 1 in “Another Wave: Global Queer Cinema.” 19 Apr. 2009 
<http://www.actupny.org/divatv/moma_cinema06.pdf>. 
32 See: The University of Iowa News Services. “UI Seminar Includes Free Film Screenings With ‘Global Queer 
Cinema' Theme. 29 Aug. 2005 <http://www.news-releases.uiowa.edu/2005/august/082905queer_cinema.html>. 
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time, these films do not simply function as propaganda for the acceptance of a 
minority lifestyle: they are complex works of art and cultural significance as well.33 
 
The Global Queer Cinema recognizes and brings together queer communities worldwide, 
uniting them in as a collective political, intellectual, and artistic force.  
Films promoted in the Iowa film series included fictional feature length films, shorts, 
and documentaries as well. As with the New Queer Cinema, not all films in this collection 
dealt indicatively with AIDS. In fact, the only film in the Iowa collection that broached the 
topic of AIDS openly was Indian film director Sridhar Ragnayan’s The Pink Mirror (2003). 
This campy film explores non-traditional kinship relationships and other issues including 
AIDS in the Indian queer community. Notably, the fact that few films in the Global Queer 
Cinema engage with AIDS may testify to a trend indicating that fewer such films are being 
made worldwide. However, the most recent additions to AIDS films are being produced in or 
pertain to developing nations. This is not surprising, given that over 95% of people infected 
with HIV today live in developing countries.34  
At the same time, the study of the Global Queer Cinema, and with that, minor 
appearances of AIDS, has extended beyond exhibitions and into the academy as well. For 
instance, film scholar Alice Kuzniar has offered a film series and several courses on the 
Global Queer Cinema at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and at the 
University of Waterloo. Those films in her series/courses depicting queer AIDS include 
American filmmaker John Scagliotti’s documentary Dangerous Living: Coming Out in the 
Developing World (2003), as well as French filmmakers Olivier Ducastel and Jacques 
Martineau’s The Adventures of Felix (2001). The latter film relates the story of an HIV-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid. 
34 Source: <http://www.nowfoundation.org/issues/health/whp/whp_fact5.html>. 
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positive young man, who takes to the road in France to discover catharsis, community, and 
hope.  
Consequently, the Global Queer AIDS Cinema combines, builds upon, expands, and 
also narrows the project of the New Queer Cinema. First, it takes the energy, attitude, and 
defiance of the 1990s that filmmakers invested in films about AIDS. Admittedly, films of the 
Global Queer Cinema also mimic those of the New Queer Cinema in terms of submitting to 
low budgetary constraints, as well as sporting poor narrative and aesthetic strategies (Aaron, 
3). Michele Aaron outlines the characteristics of the New Queer Cinema, as a point of 
comparison: 
First, despite the fast rules of acceptable subjects dictated by western popular cultures, 
these films give voice to the marginalized not simply in terms of focusing on the 
lesbian and gay community, but on the sub-groups contained within it. Second, the 
films are unapologetic about their characters’ faults or, rather, crimes: they eschew 
positive imagery. […] Third, the films defy the sanctity of the past, especially the 
homophobic past. […] Fourth, the films frequently defy cinematic convention in 
terms of form, content and genre. […] Finally, the films in many ways defy death. 
[…] [T]he key way in which death is defied is in terms of AIDS. Death is defied as 
the life-sentence passed by the disease: the HIV+ leads of The Living End instead find 
the ‘time-bomb’ to be ‘totally’ liberating. […] It is not simply that a sense of defiance 
characterizes these films, but that it marks them as queer. (3-5) 
 
Aaron emphasizes three central points in her definition of Queer Cinema. First, in the new 
millennium, scholars like Alice Kuzniar recognize the limitations of the New Queer Cinema, 
including its deeper Western ethnocentrism. Scholars of the Global Queer Cinema, having 
taken corrective measures, lifted queer cinema to a new level, emphasizing the local and 
global implications of this project. Second, as I explained in the introduction, what is at stake 
in queer cinema is not necessarily cinematography but the narrative. There are, of course, 
some queer films that demonstrate sophisticated cinematography, but oftentimes directors of 
queer cinema are novice to the practice, have small budgets, and focus more explicitly on 
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getting a ‘queer’ story across. Third, many queer films “eschew positive imagery.” All three 
films I discuss in this paper, Virus, Animal, and Days, follow suit. They are unapologetic 
representations of situations that most audiences find distasteful, repellent, if not morally 
reprehensible. As the present study deals with the focused area of queer theory, it appeals to 
the most minor, that which is oftentimes ignored or obscured, especially those topics usually 
eschewed because of their political contentious nature. There are other films that may be 
tangentially related to these three, such as A Year Without Love in which sadomasochism is 
presented as an outlet for pain.35 However, even this film tows an ethical line that would 
never condone a celebration of life or hope through infection such as in Days, or support 
grotesque representations of AIDS that treat the subject as comical, such as it is done in Virus 
and Animal.  
Days is the only narrative fictional film produced thus far that explicitly brings into 
dialogue issues of gay sex, barebacking, and HIV as a utopist/dystopic alternative in a 
scheme that unsettles the viewer’s understanding of safety, livable life, humanity, death, and 
pleasure. Italian director Laura Muscardin explores the world of homosexual men who 
engage in barebacking to intentionally contract HIV with the objective of feeling a part of a 
mythical, HIV-positive, gay community. In Days, barebacking constitutes free, queer love, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In this Argentinean film, A Year without Love [Un año sin amor] (2005), director Anahi Berneri relates the 
tale of an HIV-positive poet named Pablo who seeks love and companionship in the world of BDSM (i.e., 
bondage, discipline, sadism, and masochism). Given Pablo’s relative good health, he is able to test the limits of 
his body through this erotic means, and particularly through blood play, when he allows his S&M partner to cut 
his flesh. Within this context, HIV takes on a fetish identity, and through the practice of S&M, Pablo is able to 
experience a cathartic release from the trauma and pain associated with having HIV—Pablo even pens a book to 
document his journey. The world of S&M becomes a safe shelter for Pablo from the tyranny and prejudice of 
his family, as well as alienation of his friends. I do not, however, think this film adheres to an absurdist-
aesthetics in that the blood play is not presented as a means of possible transmission. In other words, S&M is 
only used as a safe means of release, which in all actuality replaces the option for Pablo to have sex. Therefore, 
it appears Pablo becomes celibate to be safe, and S&M is depicted, as it has been often portrayed and studied, as 
a form of pain management (as in pleasurable pain), for the psyche and the body. (See Chefetz in bibliography, 
for one such study). It just happens that Pablo’s pain is related to HIV. 
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which comes with a surprisingly acceptable price of infection and inevitable death. This 
political precarious scenario is framed controversially as a welcomed, serendipitous, life-
altering encounter between gay men, with a message that makes evident that a life worth 
living excludes one with safer sex. While safety is a key factor in the logic of the narrative, 
the protagonists appear to feel somehow safe enough to contract or transmit the virus, and for 
one at least, safe enough to die.  
Days has comical moments, and includes some humor and AIDS jokes, but it was 
marketed, remarkably and controversially, as a romantic melodrama. The cover of the DVD 
version of the film advertises it almost as a comedy, asking “Are these guys completely nuts, 
or just hopelessly in love?” The story is about two men, seropositive Claudio, who is wooed 
by young seronegative Andrea. Claudio betrays and ultimately abandons his long-term, 
monogamous relationship with another man, in which safety had played a central role. 
Although Claudio is reluctant at first, Andrea convinces him to continue to bareback (after 
they already barebacked in their first sexual encounter), so they can experience sex and love 
more deeply. When Andrea receives notice of his HIV-positive status, he surprisingly refuses 
medication, pronouncing that he wants to live life exclusive of medication. Upon Andrea’s 
early death, Claudio reflects back on his own predicament as a powerless one. He regrets his 
choice to take medication and live. Instead, he seems more convinced that one may be better 
living life to the fullest, as Andrea had done being HIV-positive without medication.  
The title of the film “Days” implies that Claudio had only a few good days, and not 
namely years in his relationship with his lover, Andrea. The film poses the question of the 
quality and value of those “days,” as well as the value of Andrea’s last days. The film puts 
what would generally be conceived as a dominant ideology of ethics, or at least a model 
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therefore, into question, arguing that one should challenge a theory of living that values 
extending life at all costs, one that venerates the search for more days and more years of 
living, even when one’s quality of life may suffer through safer living practices, through 
practicing safer sex, or even from being on HIV-medication with possible side-effects. 
Alternatively, the narrative supports a radical ethics that values the individual reaping the 
benefits of a heightened sense of pleasure and love, all the while embracing death as it 
approaches.  
It is clear that this kind of ethics, as it is represented in Days, largely if not entirely 
disregards the history of the epidemic, the millions of lives that have been lost, and the 
possibility that the practice of barebacking continues to spread the virus to others. It could be 
understandably argued that a model of a postmodern absurdist-ethics as I read it is selfish and 
focuses solely on the individual’s pleasure and the individual’s value of life; and by 
extension, that it only values life for the individuals collectively in that community. This line 
of argumentation is important, but in order to approach the film more systematically I will 
defer to its discussion in a broader cultural context in the chapter to follow. Still, the idea that 
the virus could eventually be spread to someone not seeking the transmission is not discussed 
in Days nor in this paper. That does not mean that this topic is irrelevant. I acknowledge and 
agree that it is vitally important to human society at large to rid the world of HIV. But within 
the space of this paper, safer sex and the eradication of HIV is controversially secondary 
because what is relevant to the argument is not the actual practice of barebacking, nor the 
representation of the real. I am not talking about anyone’s real experience with HIV. Instead, 
I am only interested here in the possibility and logic that barebacking and grotesque-absurdist 
aesthetics may suggest metaphorically. Indeed, I argue that a model of barebacking is a 
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radical instantiation of an absurdist-ethics from which, in theory, one might glean radical 
agency.  
This revolutionary and controversial model of ethics is clearly present in Days. While 
the protagonist Claudio chooses a life that values the quantity of time, Andrea prefers the 
opposite, an existence that values quality at the price of death. What makes this argument 
even more potent and controversial is that both avenues of choice are mediated through a 
discussion that follows the course of the narrative, debating whether taking medication 
equates to submitting oneself to the powers that be, and to an ethics of dying. In other words, 
even while barebacking and ascribing to an absurd-ethics until the moment of contagion, if 
the individual takes medication, this would constitute a submission to the system. By this 
logic, the choice is a forfeiting of an ethical position in order to gain access to medications, 
and by extension a longer life. I start by discussing the argument on medicine first, as is it 
enriches my deliberations of the possibility of living by a code of absurdist-ethics.  
Medicine acts as a leitmotiv throughout the film, and symbolizes the ethical position 
of the powers that be as represented by the medical community and judicial law, that is, 
institutions that prescribe a proper code of conduct for living because the individual must 
follow the health regime the doctor prescribes. Related to the practice of barebacking, the 
film proposes a discussion of whether or not the medical regimes doctors prescribe are 
always in the best interest of the patient. When not, the option to revolt against the system is 
open for debate.  
At the beginning of Days, Claudio refers to his own HIV-positive status as “an 
unexpected event” which he had until now kept “under control.” His voice narrates this 
impression while on screen he swallows a number of pills from three bottles, which one 
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assumes are his HIV-medications. The three bottles suggest Claudio is taking the standard 
so-called triple therapy, the ‘gold standard’ for AIDS treatment.36 Viewers are privileged to a 
medium shot of Claudio naked from the chest up after showering. On screen, the camera 
zooms in to reveal that Claudio’s body is strong, muscular, and healthy looking, albeit a little 
thin. Notably, both Claudio and his HIV-positive friend Giuseppe are shown as healthy men, 
who exercise regularly. Claudio runs, the two friends lift weights together, and Giuseppe 
even works as a high-energy aerobics instructor at the gym. Overall, neither person’s body 
bears the typical signs of sickness one might associate with AIDS, like Kaposi’s sarcoma 
lesions, Candida, pneumonia, or facial-wasting. 
Throughout the movie, the high-pitched chime of Claudio’s watch alarm acts as an 
ever-present reminder that Claudio is HIV-positive. Typically, when the alarm sounds, 
Claudio takes out a silver pillbox, removes several pills, and swallows. During these scenes, 
Claudio displays no real emotion, as if taking these pills has become an almost unconscious 
habit, requiring no reflection. Claudio always takes his pills, on screen, with water from a 
plastic, disposable cup. The pill-taking routine is not represented as an aesthetic act, and such 
a portrayal is relevant to how Claudio’s life is depicted contrastively after he stops taking 
medication. The film presents life with HIV as if one were dealing with other typical bodily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “The mono-drug regimen of AZT (the first effective HIV-medication to go on the market, FDA-approved in 
1987) has evolved to HAART therapy (highly active antiretroviral therapy, also known as the triple cocktail 
therapy), which was approved in the late 1990s/early 2000s. “The treatment of HIV/AIDS has evolved in the 
last 20 years since the beginning of the epidemic from no treatment to treatment with a single drug (AZT) to 
dual-drug therapy and, now, to highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART). HAART is defined as treatment 
with at least three active anti-retroviral medications (ARV’s), typically two nucleoside or nucleotide reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors (NRTI’s) plus a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) or a protease 
inhibitor (PI) or another NRTI called abacavir (Ziagen). HAART is often called the drug ‘cocktail’ or triple-
therapy. HAART affords us a potent way of suppressing viral replication in the blood while attempting to 
prevent the virus from rapidly developing resistance to the individual ARV’s. Suppressing viral replication with 
HAART allows the body time to rebuild its immune system and replenish the destroyed CD4 or T cells. 
HAART has been clearly shown to delay progression to AIDS and prolong life. Note that a curative treatment 
of HIV/AIDS is not possible at the present time, or in the near future, and when HAART is stopped, HIV 
becomes detectable in the blood once again” (“HIV Treatment Options,” par. 1).  
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functions. Taking pills keeps the person regular, while they certainly provide no pleasure. 
One could suggest that the film implies that Claudio’s life is just as disposable and dreary as 
the cup from which he takes his medicine.  
 At the start of the film, Claudio admits to having felt “comfortable,” before he met 
Andrea. He felt he had “tamed life” and it “obeyed him.” He compared his situation to 
someone sitting in a car, living without awareness of the dangers that mode of transportation 
portends, such as those who fool themselves into thinking that flying is more dangerous than 
driving. Barebacking is presented as offering Claudio an alternative to the set and planned 
life he leads with Dario, his long time lover. After the initial encounter with his new lover 
Andrea (which he keeps to himself), Claudio begins to complain to Dario that he does not 
appreciate always having his life planned ahead. Claudio clearly yearns for a life that is less 
predictable, more spontaneous. Dario, on the other hand, expresses his wish to simply and 
effectively plan their time together as a couple, and even strategize ahead for the time when 
Claudio is no longer alive. Dario is under the assumption that Claudio will eventually die of 
AIDS, long before he will die, and as a result, Dario expresses his desire to move in with 
other gay men before that time to help make the process of Claudio passing more bearable.  
To further contrast Claudio and Dario’s divided positions, Claudio’s sister Laura is 
introduced. Laura is unable or rather unwilling to maintain any long-term relationships with 
men. She tells Claudio over dinner that she leaves her relationships most often because she 
loves her lovers too much, and yet, there is still something missing. After a discussion of 
Laura’s situation, Claudio delivers some sarcastic remarks, making it clear that he does not 
care one way or the other. Dario remarks “If I did not love you anymore, I could not be with 
you. What about you?” Claudio scoffs bewildered and looks in the other direction, signaling 
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to his personal predicament at having a secret lover. The scene cuts to the next, leaving the 
question unanswered. The spectator is reminded that Dario could leave Claudio at any 
moment, were his love to wane, even and despite the fact that Claudio is HIV-positive.  
Laura’s choice to leave her lovers also foreshadows Claudio leaving, not Dario, but 
Andrea, also due to the reason that he loves him too much, or rather loves too much the idea 
that barebacking offers him. The discussion around relationships invokes and mirrors the 
Socratic fear that the lover indeed will leave the beloved when his love wanes. This notion is 
reflected in Claudio’s second encounter with Andrea, when Claudio backs out in the end for 
reasons revealed only through the image. Claudio looks critically at his face in the mirror, as 
if he were looking for signs of disease and age, although there is none clearly apparent to the 
viewer. In other words, Claudio is afraid Andrea might reject him because of his HIV-
positive status.  
 His fears are not confirmed in his own relationship with either Dario or Andrea, but 
they do manifest in his best friend Giuseppe’s relationship. Giuseppe, who is also HIV-
positive, is courting a man who has supposedly never been with another man “aside from the 
priest when he was little.” Giuseppe does not want to reveal his status to his new lover Piero, 
but instead lies when Piero happens upon him wearing a Band-Aid after getting his blood 
tested. Giuseppe argues: “It’s too early to tell him.” Claudio: “Then it will be too late.”  
G: “Meanwhile, I will enjoy it!” Ironically, Claudio calls Giuseppe crazy and asks in a 
manner to scold, if Giuseppe was “careful.” Giuseppe replies: “I can’t even give a blow job 
without a condom.” This opens a conversation to the topic of barebacking, although the word 
is never mentioned. Claudio asks: “Did you ever screw up?” Giuseppe replies despondently: 
“I already did and I don’t want to repeat it.” Of course, Claudio wants to gather Giuseppe’s 
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opinion on barebacking, and ultimately his approval, but the topic is clearly too taboo, even 
amongst friends. In a later conversation between the two, Giuseppe reveals that he still has 
not told his new boyfriend about his status. He admits that he is still afraid, and although he 
has gotten to know this other man, he believes his lover will certainly leave if he discovers 
the truth. Claudio suggests that maybe the lover will stay. To this assertion, Giuseppe 
responds: “Nobody gives a shit about how you feel.” Here, he means, no one cares about 
people who are HIV-positive. C: “That’s not true.” Claudio is of course referring to his new 
lover, Andrea, of whom he has not told Giuseppe, but it’s clear that Giuseppe knows 
something is up. Giuseppe insinuates as much, reminding Claudio that he [Claudio] is lucky 
to be with someone who has the so-called “good Samaritan syndrome.” Giuseppe is referring 
to men like Dario, who are willing to be with someone who is HIV-positive. After all, the 
narration makes clear that this kind of relationship exhibits sentiments of self-sacrifice on the 
side of the HIV-negative person, whereby the positive person may feel resentment towards 
his lover, never knowing if he is with him only because he is trying to be that “good 
Samaritan” rather than because he loves him “genuinely.” 
Dario reveals later that indeed he is a “good Samaritan” lover, when, after Claudio 
admits to barebacking, he is angry with Claudio, and complains. Dario: “All that effort. 
Being afraid to feel good.” Dario makes it clear to Claudio that he feels he has had to 
sacrifice pleasure in order to be with Claudio, because of his HIV-positive state. On a certain 
level, Dario is unhappy that Claudio is able to find more pleasure than he has felt during their 
relationship, although Dario is HIV-negative. In this configuration, the film suggests, again 
controversially, that as long as the HIV-positive lover suffers more, the HIV-negative “good 
Samaritan” lover is satisfied. But, once the HIV-positive lover discovers ways to experience 
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pleasure again, all bets are off. The “good Samaritan” needs to search for someone else to 
save because the HIV-positive lover no longer needs saving, that is, once he becomes a 
barebacker. Finally, Claudio is enlightened by barebacking when he discovers ways to enjoy 
life and sex again. Dario is equally enlightened about the kind of person Claudio is and what 
his own position is/was in their relationship, a bond that depended on desexualizing his lover, 
and on his lover’s HIV-positive status. Ultimately, their relationship is coded as one of 
simple codependence.  
 Meanwhile, Giuseppe’s situation finally resolves. In a dramatic scene, he confesses 
his HIV status, not to his lover, but to a group of strangers at the gym. As they stare blankly 
at Giuseppe, waiting for him to begin their aerobic routine, he makes his proclamation: “I’ve 
been gay for 20 years. For 10 years I’ve had short flings and for 3 years I’ve been HIV 
positive.” The crowd does not respond, not knowing what he wants them to respond, having 
shared this private information with strangers. Giuseppe gets up frustrated and leaves in a 
huff. He later tells Claudio that he had revealed his status to his lover Piero and that the lover 
found some random excuse to leave the scene of the discussion. While Giuseppe is not 
certain Piero has left him, Giuseppe decides to instead leave Piero, choosing not to seek him 
out again, but instead to accept a fate of being essentially a celibate male, who will die 
eventually of AIDS, alone, without a partner. Instead of getting mad at himself or Piero, 
Giuseppe takes his anger out on Claudio. Giuseppe suggests that he knows that Claudio has 
been barebacking. He says: “You think you’re superior, different? Maybe just because 
nobody ever told you to go to hell.” C: “Stop it.” G: “[Andrea] isn’t afraid because he has 
nothing to lose.” C: “How do you know that? At least he never backed away, saying a load of 
bullshit.” G: “You are ridiculous. Both of you are! Both of you!” Claudio gets up and leaves 
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in anger. In so doing, Giuseppe demonstrates his own hypocrisy by the fact that he is a man 
who claims to follow the rules, and yet, he too enacts an ethical breach in having sex with 
Piero without revealing his status, even if he used a condom. Through this contrast, the film 
depicts barebacking as a consensual behavior, whereby not revealing their status to a partner 
is the unethical alternative.  
Claudio and Andrea’s relationship is presented as the most intensely pleasurable and 
fulfilling one in comparison to the others in the film. It begins as a seemingly spontaneous 
encounter. It is not clear how the couple first meet, whether it was online or just a random 
encounter at a club or otherwise. After their first sexual meeting, during which they bareback, 
Andrea discovers Claudio’s bankcard and calls him at work to let him know he has it. But 
instead of calling Andrea back and meeting up with him, Claudio asks his secretary to call 
and tell him to tear up the card and forget it. Claudio would rather get a new card than see his 
one-time lover again. The film magnifies the stereotype, whether founded or not, that 
anonymity plays a solid role in barebacking, as well as in the gay male community in general. 
Although one of many implied encounters, Claudio’s rendezvous with Andrea proves to be a 
game changer because they bareback. The film demonstrates this through a clear rupture; in 
one scene, Claudio is running on a treadmill and stops his exercise program—the words 
“Stop…Termina” in red letters appear on the screen of the treadmill. The scene cuts to 
Claudio stopping by Andrea’s workplace to meet him again. This “stop” signals 
metaphorically the end of Claudio’s relationship with Dario, and the start of a new one with 
Andrea, as well as the end of the old regime of ethics to which Claudio previously ascribed, 
which dictated safety, monogamy, and quantity of life over quality. Instead, the new model 
of absurdist-ethics I read through the image of barebacking is called into force, dictating that 
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the individual may yield more agency and satisfaction in life by living dangerously, but 
intensely. 
Moments before the couple barebacks for the second time, still in the throws of 
passion, Claudio asks if Andrea has a condom. He replies in the negative: “No. It doesn’t 
matter.” But Claudio insists: “I can’t.” Andrea: “Don’t you trust me?” Claudio: “You don’t 
understand. I can’t do it.” A moment of silence, and then Andrea takes Claudio’s chin in his 
hand, pulls it up to his mouth, and kisses him tenderly, reassuring him softly: “It doesn’t 
matter.” Claudio cannot resist. His voice-over narration makes clear that since his first 
barebacking experience with Andrea, Claudio has experienced an existential crisis. He 
cannot think of anything else but barebacking. Claudio proclaims that Andrea is unlike other 
previous lovers, not because of his physique, but because he has sanctioned this practice. 
Now, for Claudio, there is no turning back, at least not yet. But before Claudio plunges 
headlong into the world of barebacking, he experiences a moment of recognition about his 
own ethical position on quality of life while visiting his mother. In the scene, the mother 
insults her daughter Laura’s tendency to move from one lover to another, and then compares 
Laura to Claudio, and commends him: “You haven’t changed. You’ve always been calm and 
sensible.” A look of shock and then enticement comes over his face. The viewer realizes 
Claudio did enjoy “changing” and shedding his old skin through barebacking, and that he 
will most likely do it again.  
There are a number of meaningful double entendres in the film referring to the ethical 
viability of the new position of power gained through barebacking. When Claudio has a 
realtor come over to look at the summerhouse he wants to sell, she explains that it’s hard to 
sell a house on the ocean in the fall. She reassures him that it may be possible: “there is 
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always someone who is more original than others.” After the realtor leaves, Claudio turns to 
Andrea and affirms: “We are original.” They both laugh and nod knowingly. Metaphorically, 
a traditional paradigm dictates that one ought to start relationships in the spring of life, during 
the season of birth and/or renewal. While Claudio and Andrea are building a home instead in 
the late fall season of life, foretelling the soon to arrive death of life in the winter. Their 
affirmation also acts as a verification of their newly chosen lifestyle of barebacking. In their 
eyes, they are no longer doing something perverse or dangerous, instead, they are innovative, 
“original.” Andrea insinuates that they are practicing a new kind of ethics that may be 
preferable, if not more philosophical than others. Later, Andrea suggests to Claudio not to 
sell the house, but instead that the two of them move in together. Claudio looks disconcerted, 
distinctively torn between his regulated life with Dario and this new risky but pleasurable one 
with Andrea. Andrea calls Claudio amusingly a “chicken,” for not daring to keep the house. 
This conversation not only evokes the idea that Claudio should fully embrace their new 
relationship and the barebacking lifestyle, but also builds an analogy to the act of 
barebacking as equivalent to an economic purchase, as in he is “buying in” to becoming a 
member of a barebacking community, a sentiment evoked by some barebackers, which I will 
discuss further in the ensuing chapter. In this case, Claudio is not yet emotionally ready to 
invest his “life savings,” as Andrea is, and literally plans to do, with his own life. Finally, 
when Dario catches on that Claudio has a serious relationship with another man—it is made 
clear that Claudio has had many flings, which were acceptable within the parameters of their 
relationship—Claudio confesses that he has been barebacking. Dario is upset by what he sees 
as Claudio’s carelessness.  
Claudio: “We didn’t use anything, Dario.”  
Dario: “Why didn’t you tell him?”  
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C: “I told him right away. It’s been like this from the start.”  
D: “What are you saying?”  
C: “I don’t know how to explain it. He’s not afraid.”  
D: “And you?”  
C: “I don’t know. I like being with him like that. I like it.”  
D: “You like it?” (He asks sarcastically.) “What the hell does that mean? You mean the two 
of us were jackasses? All that effort. Being afraid to feel good.”  
C: “I know. I’m afraid now too. For me, for him.”  
D: “Who the hell is he? Who knows him? Maybe he’s like that with everyone?”  
C: “No! I am sure….”  
 
Of course, Claudio cannot be entirely sure that Andrea has not barebacked before. Andrea 
admitted earlier that Claudio was not the first HIV-positive person he had met. If anything, 
the narrative suggests that barebackers ascribe to a community, which entails one having 
multiple partners.  
Dario cannot accept Claudio’s explanation for why he barebacks. Although Claudio 
decrees that he barebacks out of love, Dario refuses to see Claudio’s actions as anything 
other than a selfish action, if not a sign of delusion. Dario demands: “I don’t understand what 
goes through your head. Tell me why at least. Tell me why.” C: “I don’t worry about it. 
When I’m with him, I don’t worry about it. He makes me feel invulnerable.” D: “You’re not.” 
Like Giuseppe, and probably most people, Dario cannot accept that a practice that promotes 
the spread of an infectious disease could be ethically viable, morally justifiable, or deemed as 
an act of love. Such reactions mirror the gay community’s backlash to the practice of 
barebacking, reactions which are in line with hegemonic ideals of enlightened, rationalist 
thinking that underpins Western European society today. Yet, the narrative reveals most 
provocatively a perspective of how such a radical practice may be conceived, however 
controversially as the opposite, as something viable, transcendental, and ethically justifiable, 
albeit only to a very minor community of individuals, and even if only in the space of a 
fictional narrative. I will discuss the realities of this practice as the radical instantiation of an 
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absurdist-ethics in the ensuing chapter, as I find it relevant to put this model into a greater 
cultural context. While in this chapter I deliver and analyze the logic behind the narrative of 
Days and its model of barebacking, I want to later deliberate even further the real world 
implications of such a practice. That subsequent step will show the wider applications of an 
absurdist-ethics as a philosophical tool, so that the dynamics at play in other manifestations 
of an absurdist-grotesque aesthetics may be found and discussed in terms of ethics.  
Going back to Muscardin’s work, the film also tests a model of absurdist-ethics in 
ways that a work of Cultural Studies could not, because fiction has nothing to lose. 
Muscardin’s depiction of barebacking is an extreme model, which I argue she crafts in order 
to prompt spectators to think about what ‘quality of life’ means to them. Muscardin also does 
this with respect to the issue of the ethicacy of taking medication in order to extend life, if, 
for example, one might experience certain reductions in quality of life as a result of the side 
effects of those medications. In the film, before Claudio meets Andrea, the thought that he 
might not take his medication appears to never cross his mind. Later, the sound of the timer 
becomes an important diegetic (and sometimes even non-diegetic) signal for those times 
when Claudio chooses not to take his medication, when he is potentially in danger of 
becoming ill as a result of refusing medication. Why Claudio chooses not to continue to take 
his medicine regularly has to do with an argument the narrative slowly builds against HIV-
drug regimes. The film does this through the careful placement of four counter-arguments: 1) 
HIV-medications are toxic. 2) HIV-medications are ineffective. Therefore, 3) the 
pharmaceutical companies (and the governmental laws that protect them) are conspiring to 
use drugs as a means to control the sexuality of gay men (and by extension other persons). 4) 
Taking drugs equates to a life less lived, whereby one must submit control of one’s selfhood 
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to the powers that be. One surrenders to a slow agonizing death, as opposed to dying quickly, 
which consequently means having to suffer less.  
Claudio first has his doubts about the effectiveness of such medications when he 
meets Irene, who is another HIV-positive patient at the hospital he attends. She looks healthy 
as well, but she too carries a larger grocery bag of pills home, like Claudio.37 She complains 
to Claudio about the side effects of the drugs. “They keep on telling me not to worry, but I 
can’t see anymore.” Her statement reflects the critique some HIV-positive persons have 
launched against drug companies in terms of the dangerous side-effects of the drugs. From 
the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, some AIDS activist groups avow that HIV/AIDS 
patients, and above all gay men with HIV, have been guinea pigs for drug companies seeking 
to make a profit off the epidemic, all the while possibly providing medications that do more 
harm than good.38 To further this argument in the film, Irene complains that the hospital 
makes her drive clear across town every day to receive her medication. They will only allow 
her to take some medications at home. In other words, the individual’s livelihood is in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Irene also acts as the token reminder to the audience that HIV affects all genders and sexualities of people, 
and not just gay men. She identifies as a straight woman, i.e., she mentions her husband. Irene’s inclusion in the 
film may have been little more than a political gesture on behalf of this fact.  
38 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, patients already expressed their fear of the ineffectively and dangers 
associated with the first real HIV-medicine on the market, AZT. In an article on “AIDS: Words from the Front” 
published in 1993, one patient writes: “‘Everyone I know has come off AZT,’ he said. ‘It’s happening in a big 
way here. There is a patient rebellion going on, in part because we’ve finally been allowed to call AZT what it 
is, in the press, which is a killer drug. They can’t just keep calling us loonies; we’re talking about our own 
experiences’” (Suchit, 116). Health policy scholars Kathryn Whetten-Goldstein and Trang Quyen Nguyen 
explain the stigma or what they call a ‘conspiracy theory’ commonly associated with the medical community 
vis-à-vis the HIV-drug regimens: “But as helpful as these medications have proven to be to numerous patients, 
many poor and minority individuals still believe that medications are part of the overall conspiracy against them 
due to their behavior, race, or financial burden on the ‘system.’ [In one case study] nearly all also took 
medication holidays without informing their providers, and some […] stopped taking the medications altogether 
because [they were] concerned about the side effects. As powerful as the medications are, the side effects are 
also often powerful, frequently causing exhaustion, nausea, and weakness. The medications are seen as harmful, 
while some believe that the FDA-approved medications are still under clinical study and that impoverished 
people are being used as guinea pigs. Other patients say that, if they take the drugs, then their HIV will progress 
to AIDS faster; they believe the drugs are part of a conspiracy effort to cause faster decline in minority HIV 
patients” (179).  
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hands of the doctors, who have say over who receives medication, which medication, where, 
when, and how. For the protagonists, it appears the doctors’ rationale is random. Irene finds 
it incomprehensible why she is allowed to take certain drugs at home, but others only in the 
hospital. Later in the film, Irene does go blind, presumably as a side effect from the 
medication. Claudio also becomes increasingly more suspicious of his doctor’s motivations 
and the effectiveness of the drugs. This comes to be more apparent later, when Claudio stops 
taking his medication. In a later scene, after Claudio’s immune system has weakened as a 
result of having stopped taking his medication regularly, he goes to his doctor to check in. 
She explains that his test results have not come back as positive as expected. He must 
increase the strength of his medication regime to compensate, a change that will make him 
sicker at least for weeks or even months to come. His doctor questions him on why he chose 
not to take the medication, and he replies: “I took a holiday.” The doctor replies in anger: 
“Good. I hope you had fun at least.” She asks him how he feels: “At times it becomes really 
difficult. You have to be so careful about everything. Always!” Doctor: “Don’t stop being 
careful now. I know it’s burdensome, but you have no choice.” C: “All this effort… with no 
end.” The doctor imports how, in her point-of-view, that of the medical community and 
society at large, there is no other option for HIV-positive persons: they are expected to take 
medication. Veritably, this relates to the ethical model based on a rationalist-based ideology 
that prescribes that life must be extended at all costs, regardless of quality of life. This issue 
stirs up similar debates over assisted suicides, mercy killings, or even by analogy, abortion or 
the death penalty versus a life sentence in prison. Alternate ethical models, which are 
undoubtedly generically related to an absurdist-ethics, put into question who has the right to 
decide if a person may end their own life, and/or how a person spends life, especially if the 
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individual decides to participate in risky behavior that could increase her or his chance for an 
earlier death. 
Until the high point of his relationship with Andrea, Claudio resists the medical 
system and does not take his medication. But not coincidentally, as Claudio’s guilt grows for 
having neglected his medication, he begins to question his feelings for Andrea or more 
accurately Andrea’s feelings for Claudio—for Claudio projects his own insecurities onto 
Andrea, and eventually gives in or gives up, depending how one reads this, and begins taking 
his medication as prescribed. Ultimately, he does return to better health. In comparison, 
Andrea represents the uncompromising position of one who refuses to submit to the system 
as a representation of control. It is Andrea, in proactively chasing the “bug” of HIV through 
his barebacking activities with Claudio, and ultimately in preferring to die without 
medication, who expresses the execution of an absurdist-ethics metaphorically most 
explicitly and fully.  
 One discerns this in the narrative when Andrea watches with sympathy as Claudio 
takes his medication. Andrea’s negative reaction to the possibility of taking drugs seems to 
prompt Claudio, for the first time, to question the effectiveness of his own medications, the 
reason behind why he is taking them, and the side-effects attached to the medical regime. In 
the dialog, Andrea asks Claudio: “They’re disgusting, huh?”  
Claudio: “These are real shit.”  
Andrea: “How many do you take?”  
C: “Lots…I don’t know.”  
A: “I wouldn’t be able to do it.”  
C: “Don’t tell me I’m the first [HIV-positive person] you’ve met.”  
A: “Of course not.”  
C: “You’ve a soft spot for men like me, or is it a one-off?”  
A: “I have a soft spot for you.”  
C: “But with the others…”  
A: “No, not with others.”  
	  	   114	  
C: “It’s never happened to me.”  
A: “I have never loved someone like you. It’s wonderful, huh?”  
 
The adjective “wonderful” may have several meanings here, beyond the joys of being loved, 
as in: “isn’t wonderful to bareback and isn’t it wonderful that I am willing to be infected by 
you?” Claudio responds in voice-over narration: “Suddenly, I didn’t know how I’d managed 
to live without him. How I’d been able to live, to eat, to sleep, to make love. It was like 
taking off a heavy cover, those very warm ones that heat you up, but when the sun comes out, 
they are heavy and you can’t breathe. I didn’t care about anything else.” While it is signaled 
that Andrea uses Claudio’s body as a vehicle to enter the tribe of barebackers, it is equally 
revealed that Claudio also must open and permit Andrea to enter his own system with no 
barriers.  
Claudio narrates his new perspective to the spectator, while walking through the 
hospital hallways, his head held high. He spots Irene through a window. She sits, looking 
despondently, receiving some kind of fluid drip. Gazing in from the outside through the 
window on Irene, one gets the impression that Claudio feels invincible, as if he were immune 
or free of HIV. Not like Irene. He continues: “That boring, insignificant, obsessive life that I 
lived before him. For the first time after so long, everything seemed simple and natural.” At 
the end of this monologue, Claudio decides not to attend his monthly check-up at the doctor. 
He watches another patient go into the doctor’s office, and then picks up his briefcase and 
walks away resolutely. In the meantime, Andrea already shows the first signs of being HIV-
positive. He relates to Claudio that he was “out of it” at work and mixed up customers’ 
orders.  
Later in the film, while taking care of Andrea, who is infected with HIV, and possibly 
already has AIDS, Claudio runs out of medication. When he finally decides to go to the 
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hospital in Rome to get more drugs, which Claudio does not do immediately because he does 
debate his options regarding quality over quantity of life for the first time, he learns they 
have already been shipped to his new home in Milan. Therefore, he is not legally allowed 
more drugs unless he goes to Milan to get them. He is furious with the system, and his doctor 
scolds him judgmentally; Doctor: “You just made another one of your stupid moves.” The 
film suggests that the doctor acts as if she is in a position of high-level authority, holding 
sway over Claudio’s decisions like a parent or even a warden, who would remind the 
prisoner of how he has violated the (unspoken) law associated with following the doctor’s 
orders. His doctor does eventually decide to give Claudio drugs leftover from a patient who 
has just died, and who happens to have been his acquaintance, Irene. He demands to know: 
“Who do they belong to? She’s dead, huh?” [Referring to Irene]. The Doctor does not answer 
his question, but continues to issue orders on how to take the medication. C: “You make 
fools of us and tell us a load of bullshit.” Doctor: “No, Claudio. You know that’s not true. 
Irene had complications you don’t have. She didn’t react to the therapy. Don’t look for 
excuses. Your situation is different. And don’t tell me it’s useless. That is not true!” The 
difference between Claudio and Irene’s reactions to medication articulates the fact that some 
people do feel side effects of certain medications more intensely than others and indeed, as 
the film wants to point out, some people do not respond to HIV-medications as well as others, 
or at all.  
Towards the end of the film, Claudio decides to cut ties with Andrea. He makes this 
decision after a telltale visit to his doctor, who declares that Claudio’s state of health is 
deteriorating. When Andrea seeks Claudio out to see why he has been ignoring him, Claudio 
replies: “Maybe there’s still time.”  
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Andrea: “For what?”  
Claudio: “To not make the situation worse.”  
A: “A little late, no?”  
C: “Maybe not. Maybe….”  
A: “If you want to go away. Fine. Don’t worry about me.”  
 
Andrea leaves and Claudio lives on, depressed and weak. A new stronger drug regime makes 
him sick. He vomits and has lost weight. His cheeks are sunken in and his face is paler. No 
smile crosses his face from this point going forward. The lighting turns shaded and grainy. 
Similarly, the scenery becomes dismal and out of focus. These visual aesthetic techniques 
cast the argument that those who choose not to take medication like Andrea enjoy life more 
fully. They are shown as sexually active and enjoying sex most pleasurably through 
unprotected sex. They even appear healthy, when compared with possibly fighting a long list 
of opportunistic infections and the side effects of using medications on a daily basis over the 
course of an extended lifetime. In other words, the film suggests that an individual’s life may 
be drawn-out through a drug regime, but that the quality of life decreases as a result.  
In the end, the narrative argues, the subject in question must decide what is more 
important, quantity of life or quality of life. To revolt against the drug regime means to 
embrace quality, and to adhere to it means extending a life sentence of a mediocre and almost 
unacceptable quality of life that demands that HIV-positive persons become non-sexual and 
regimented at the exclusion of serendipity. The narration wants to offer the assertion that this 
kind of life, the life that does not embrace an absurdist-ethics when an individual is HIV-
positive, equates to little more than a life sentence in prison—a life void of pleasure and 
meaning, without personal liberty.  
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 Despite Claudio’s sentiment of shared invulnerability with Andrea, he finally 
confronts him about not taking medication, trying to persuade him that there is still time 
enough to recover from the lapse in treatment.  
Claudio: “Enough. I can’t stand it.”  
Andrea: “But I can.”  
C: “Is everything ok with you?”  
A: “Yes.”  
C: “What we do, the way we are together. It’s all normal?”  
A: “I like being with you.”  
C: “Although you risk so much? It’s not romantic. It’s tough, and you feel terrible.”  
A: “I didn’t do anything to avoid it.”  
C: “Why?”  
A: “You know why? You know how it feels to be with me. It’s different from 
everything else. Just that. Nothing else. I won’t give that up. I love you.”  
C: “That’s all?”  
 
Claudio does not deem Andrea’s answer satisfactory. In truth, Andreas’s answer is 
significant because it emphasizes how the motivation for Andrea barebacking Claudio is not 
just about being with Claudio, or about Andrea’s love for Claudio, but about “how it feels to 
be with me.” In other words, Andrea admits he is or rather was what in the terminology of 
barebackers is called a ‘bug chaser,’ and likes the feeling of barebacking. Chances are, 
Andrea also barebacks with others and has now become a “gift giver,” in the same 
terminology of barebackers. Allegiant to his own absurdist-ethics and the community at large, 
Andrea is secure and satisfied in his choice to bareback until his death. It is important in this 
scene to see how it feels for Andrea to make Claudio realize his own stance in relation to the 
pathogen. Andrea’s self-projected ‘selfless’ act creates for Claudio the momentary fantasy 
and impression of invulnerability; for Andrea, it is a form of power to generate this feeling in 
Claudio. In this sense, paradoxically, Andrea has become a gift-giver to Claudio.  
 It appears that only Claudio is stranded at a crossroads. On one hand, he hates the 
controlled life he feels he must lead in order to adhere to the code of conduct the medical 
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community and society expects of him. On the other hand, he finds it hard to adjust his 
mentality to embrace Andrea’s life of barebacking and to let the disease take its natural 
course. In one scene, over dinner with his sister and mother, Claudio declares his anger and 
frustration: “I have to watch how I breathe, how I move, how I screw. How I spend my time.” 
Claudio cannot contrive a way to embrace this new code of absurdist-ethics, which would 
have enabled and supported him in this new lifestyle and would have arguably given him the 
freedom and pleasure he sought.  
In the final scene between the two main characters, Claudio seeks Andrea out at his 
job. Claudio is surprised when he sees that Andrea looks healthier again, despite the fact that 
he is not taking any medications. This is contrasted with an earlier shot of Claudio vomiting, 
miserable from his new medication. Andrea asks why Claudio looks so earnest. Claudio 
explains that he just learned of Irene’s death. Andrea urges him not to let it “get to him.” 
Claudio asks “But how?,” but Andrea leaves the question unanswered, and rushes to serve a 
table. Instead of waiting to hear an answer, Claudio decides to walk away. In a voice-over 
narration that serves as the epilogue for the film, he says: “Then I ran away. I still don’t know 
what made me decide. Maybe what they call survival instinct. A year has gone by and I’ve 
resumed my life again. I live in a different city and have a different job. Now I live alone.” 
Ironically perhaps, Claudio becomes the one who abandons his lover in his time of sickness 
and need. The role of the Good Samaritan does not seem to hold sway over the relationship 
between Claudio and Andrea at all, because neither is fundamentally co-dependent on the 
other. They are free agents in terms of sexual relations and even in terms of love. Claudio 
returns then to the ocean summerhouse, where he had spent his best days with Andrea and 
shares his emotions in the voice-over:  
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I had eliminated Andrea so well from my thoughts that I thought I had forgotten him. 
Sometimes I felt like calling him, I always found a good excuse not to. I was 
frightened. A few days ago I just happened to find out he died. He didn’t want to do 
any therapy. That I am sure of. Everything else seems suspended. Even the memories 
of those days spent together. That which remained hidden, and which I never 
understood. The doubts and unanswered questions that arise. I want to believe that 
since death comes for everyone, he decided to get it from me because he loved me. I 
will slowly convince myself. I will end up believing it and it will hurt less, as always. 
Time helps. Time.  
 
Although the film leaves the question of whether barebacking is an option or not unanswered 
or at least ambivalent, there is an unambiguous overarching message that shines through. 
Andrea represents that person who by my theory ascribes entirely to a model of an absurdist-
ethics, and reaps the benefits of enjoying his life as much as possible up until his death. On 
the other hand, Claudio at first embraces, but later rejects this ethical code, and in the end, 
lives what is presented as a lonely life, void of pleasure, love, or fulfillment. The film 
defends the notion that the price for taking medication and ending his barebacking activities 
costs Claudio more than Andrea’s choice, which cost him his life.  
 In contrast to Virus and Animal, Days is the only film in which I can read an 
absurdist-ethics as being taken to its most postmodern conclusion, and this via a model of 
barebacking as a radical instantiation of this ethical paradigm. In other words, Days explores 
what happens when humanity embraces life at the expense of prolonging it. Within the logic 
of this model, as suggested in Days, when a subject embraces an absurdist-ethics, she or he 
may experience a moment of agency, catharsis, and enlightenment, but also this instant 
signals impending death, which, within the paradigm of rationalism, appears as both absurd 
and grotesque.  
 In contradiction with the controversial nature of the film, many reviews of Days are 
surprisingly positive, although the interpretations presented generally tend to focus less on 
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the ethical considerations for life, and more on the ethics of love, which many reviewers 
deem more interesting in terms of the narrative. I would argue that such reviews are avoiding 
the issue of barebacking altogether, perhaps dismissing it as an anomaly without 
understanding the cultural backdrop and realities of the practice. In other words, while the 
film is a radical appeal for an ethical stance that confronts death head-on, sidelines safety, 
and puts other people at risk for infection, some reviewers appear drawn or distracted by the 
love story at the expense of tackling the more serious issue at hand—infection and death. For 
example, in the periodical The Advocate, one critic writes: “The people with HIV in this 
movie are neither glorified nor demonized, and it’s up to the audience to decide how to feel 
about the characters’ actions” (Duralde, 65). The reviewer also contends that Italian cinema, 
in comparison to other national cinemas, can somehow present ethically neutral cinema. 
Another reviewer focuses on the entity of love as some transcendental force that almost 
appears to absolve the characters of intentionality, as if individuals were not in use of their 
will to control their own actions, and as if love could control that will and ethically justify 
Andrea’s actions:  
[Andrea] who perfectly captures the emotional intensity of love, one so strong that it 
overpowers his sense of self-preservation, having sex sans condoms so as not to ‘ruin 
the moment’ with the HIV+ man he adores. Only the central theme of the piece 
overshadows their efforts, given this disturbing feature is dominated by both the 
medical and personal ramifications of unsafe sex and how in loving someone so much, 
many it would appear are prepared to put their own life at risk.  
(Hall, par. 4; my emphasis)  
 
Here one witnesses the limitations of such fantastical, absurdist celluloid representations, 
where the moving image draws spectators in, narrowing their focus on certain images and 
meanings, at the expense of others.  
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 In the other direction, but in the same trite path, one may also find the inveterate 
response of repulsion at the absurd and grotesque aesthetic of the model of barebacking 
presented in Days. One skeptical viewer admitted to being “nervous” to watch the film, as he 
is “as anti-‘barebacking’ as you can get” (“A Real World View,” par. 1). Yet, he reveals that 
he “approached it with a more open mind because [he] recently experienced [his] first 
significant ‘slip’ in [his] own behavior” (par. 1). Watching the film changed this reviewer’s 
perspective on barebacking positively. Even such reviews contain a kernel of apprehension at 
something redeemable in the presentation of materials. This kind of approach senses the 
absurdist-ethical paradigm, but without being able to identify its nature. Nevertheless, after 
viewing Days, the reviewer perceived the subject matter of barebacking as less central to the 
film, and instead empathized with the characters’ behavior, as a habit to absolve himself of 
his own guilt and ethical dilemma for having participated in this practice:  
We hear various characters voice a variety of opinions and judgments, yet we also get 
a clear view of the protagonist’s confusion, desire for change, wish to escape. A 
variety of tools are used to show as how time can control us, define our expectations 
and behaviors, and, how we sometimes want to escape that. The consequences are 
clear. […] I never felt lectured. Instead, I cared about the characters, all of them. 
Somehow, in the meantime, I came to understand myself a little better. And to be a 
little less harsh in my judgments. I still hate barebacking. But I better understand 
slipping, and also how I can recognize the triggers and avoid them for myself. (par. 3) 
 
It would appear that the typical agenda that one expects from an AIDS film is circumvented 
in Days, whereby that which is characteristic would be, as I have argued in another paper, to 
challenge “viewers to identify with those infected and teach us better avenues by which to 
have safer sex, and yes, enjoy sex nonetheless. Through [AIDS] films, we have learned to 
mourn the deaths and the lives of those infected. They have also provided us with hope for 
longer lives and perhaps one day a cure” (Riley, “Transnational Queer AIDS Cinema,” 44). 
	  	   122	  
Or, as Peter Jobst describes in “Notizen zu Film und AIDS” [“Notes about Film and AIDS”], 
an AIDS film should be a kind of Bildungsroman, it  
should be unobtrusive, fierce, and educate—a sexual bildungsroman, that paints a 
positive picture. How the image of a sickness, how AIDS can be shaped in a positive 
way, that is a matter of opinion. Films about AIDS are works of mourning. Messages 
for the afterlife, an attempt to find clarity in one’s last years of life. (20, my 
translation) 
 
Days is nevertheless not a typical work of mourning. Instead, this Bildungsroman delivers 
quite another story, in which sickness is pursued and embraced over health. Mourning takes 
on another shade of grey, whereby the affect in mourning is colored in some sense by the 
potency of life itself.  
 Some spectators, who witnessed the death of a friend or family member from an 
AIDS-related illness, found the film less than insightful. One anonymous reviewer chastised 
the film calling it “Tragic:”  
This movie was slow and depressing. It’s not about the triumph of the human spirit, 
it’s about how truly mean lonely self-absorbed people can be. This is the type of 
realism I can do without. In the final analysis there was a point to this movie, and 
without spoiling it, well, the point is offensive. I’ve witnessed too much real love and 
courage to pretend that this movie has any kind of meaningful voice. (“Tragic,” par. 
1) 
 
Whether positive or negative, despite initial hasty reactions to what would generally be 
conceived as an ethically corrupt scenario, reviewers almost always perceived the core of the 
film as founded on principles of a traceable, queer love. Another anonymous reviewer 
informs:  
And, yes, this is a film about ‘living with Aids,’ how it can in some ways ‘robotize 
one’s behavior, cut one off and harden one in his/her interactions with others…and 
Trabacchi (as Claudio) is excellent in showing us every facet of such a ‘throwaway’ 
man (for in the end he does just that). However, I am more interested in another of the 
players…the one who shoves in our faces the purity and certainty of simple love: 
Salerno (as Andrea). He gives such a pure performance that we come face to face 
with a love so strong that it overpowers any thought of self-danger…so strong that it 
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overpowers wisdom and any sense of self-preservation. […] Never have I seen pure 
love transmitted more powerfully than through this man’s eyes and facial expressions 
(would that many of us ever have been able to have had a love such as his). What he 
is feeling is projected so strongly that your need is to reach through the screen, grab, 
and tightly hold him. (“The ‘Eyes’ Have it,” par. 1-2). 
 
On this point, I diverge from the reviewer. In my opinion, it is not Andrea who represents the 
lover, but instead the beloved. Claudio is the one who seeks out Andrea, then runs away from 
him several times, only to be overcome by his love for him—or at least by the way Andrea 
makes him feel through barebacking. Andrea, on the other hand, is satisfied to be without 
Claudio. Every time Claudio leaves him, Andrea makes it clear that he will be fine without 
him. In the end, Claudio leaves Andrea and Andrea does not seek Claudio out again. While 
Claudio pines, Andrea easily moves on with his life. Andrea’s resolve is not the sentiments 
of someone madly and passionately in love with another. Instead, Andrea is loved intensely 
by Claudio. Andrea is the non-lover. The critic of this last review is understandably attracted 
to Andrea’s refreshing simplicity in his position with respect to his life. In my opinion, the 
reviewer is enticed by the effervescence emitted by Andrea’s absurdist-ethical stance, and 
not actually by the fact that he observes a “pure love transmitted” through Andrea’s character.  
 Perhaps spectators and reviewers, such as the ones I have presented, wrestle explicitly 
or implicitly with notions of shame comingled with pride. Mixed feelings for being gay, for 
participating in dangerous sexual acts, and perhaps for belonging to a (part of a) queer 
community that in part (even if it is only a sub-population) condones such an ethically 
precarious behavior. At the same time, some queer reviewers express pride for belonging to a 
gay community, even if that may be a mythical construction. Many are also proud of having 
a tradition of a minor cinema, to the point that many of them put in the time to write reviews 
of queer films, even if some films of the Queer Cinema are so ethically complex and 
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controversial. Perhaps the collision of these notions of pride and shame is part of the 
educational purpose of this kind of minor cinema.  
 The model of barebacking in Days can be read as a radical instantiation of the 
practice of an absurdist-ethics. This paradigm reveals the tension in the ways people have 
historically dealt with the trauma of the AIDS epidemic along the lines of pride, shame, fear, 
or revolt. The model does, however, prescribe one mode of living over others; it is most 
supportive of agency in revolt, which often takes the form of absurdist and/or grotesque 
representations, situations, and aesthetics. At the same time, the model devalues those 
courses of action that follow lines of hegemony, that is, those that equate to the ideals of 
rationalist behavior and that support actions for the betterment of the human community as a 
whole, even at the expense of minor ones. An absurdist-ethics demands the opposite, that the 
individual may celebrate the minor, by participating in cultural practices that serve minor 
cultures, even if, and partly in spite of those practices being dangerous and threatening to the 
hegemonic values of a society as a whole. Muscardin’s model of barebacking, as an 
absurdist-ethical practice, offers two options in dealing with the AIDS epidemic as a gay 
man:  
 The first option is that the individual can resolve to be celibate, basically stop 
enjoying life, and wait to die. This is the most extreme form of a response and replicates 
early responses to the pandemic, a feature I will discuss further in Chapter four. This mode of 
living is prescribed by an ethics of dying that has been held by society at large since the 
beginning of the AIDS epidemic. It mirrors the mentality of those countries that 
contemplated (and even tried) to quarantine HIV-positive persons. This mentality is also in 
line with some of the ideals of the Enlightenment and of religions that have traditionally 
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dictated that illnesses, and above all epidemics, are signs of a sinful mind and soul. The idea 
that some people have expressed, that AIDS is the gay plague, reflects this mentality. The 
Enlightenment promised that scientific progress could cure anything with time. In this 
formation, death and dying are associated with illness. The idea of progress meant that 
eventually someone like the scientific character of Frankenstein would come to understand 
exactly how the human body works and one day be able to sustain life, instead of 
understanding the possible value of illness, suffering, and ultimately letting those dying die. 
To further the analogy, because Frankenstein could not appraise the value in illness, 
malformation, and perversion, he could not recognize his creature as a viable human being. 
When the creature dares to dream of a life worth living, with a companion by his side, 
Frankenstein refuses him this opportunity. Instead, he demands that the creature commit 
suicide. This mode of response to the epidemic is not, however, encouraged in Muscardin’s 
model of an absurdist-ethics, in particular as the narrative questions the pharmaceutical 
companies’ philanthropic mission and the effectiveness of AIDS medications. Sexual 
fulfillment is equally valued in barebacking, which would be eliminated in this model of 
abstinence. Muscardin’s model of barebacking makes it clear that sexual fulfillment is 
equivalent to one’s quality of life. 
 The second option is that prescribed by the kind of response to the AIDS epidemic 
represented by Muscardin’s model in Days. It embraces the paradigm of an absurdist-ethics 
in its radical instantiation of barebacking without medication. In this option, barebacking is 
read as a conscious, rational, consensual act on the part of all participating individuals, who 
seek and glean a greater quality of life through that which many or most would consider a 
risky relationship to death. Barebacking here is a deliberate conscious act, practiced by gay 
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men, with the purpose of combating the AIDS epidemic and the consequences of sickness, 
dying, and death, on their own terms.    
 Where cinema ends, the cultural, theoretical, and philosophical threads continue. As a 
product of a minor culture, and in terms of the real, it is necessary to offer further discussion 
of the cultural implications of a model of barebacking put into practice. It is equally 
necessary in this regard to provide a philosophical framing of my theory of an absurdist-
ethics. In the next chapter, I offer the cultural background to the practice, along with the 
philosophical lineage I announced in the introduction. My discussion incorporates Foucault’s 
conception of strategic relationships, Nietzsche’s theory of transcendental ethics, and 
Camus’s take on the absurd.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
IN CULTURAL PRACTICE: BAREBACKING AS RADICAL AESTHETIC 
INSTANTIATION 
 
 
 
THIS SITE DOES NOT CONTAIN any material, either written or visual, that 
constitutes child pornography, violent sex against the will of another, the 
promotion of sex for hire, demon worship, bestiality, or the engaging in the 
sale or distribution of illegal or controlled substances. - 
www.barebackjack.com  
 
After the critical assessment of the issue of barebacking in Laura Muscardin’s Days 
in the previous chapter, in this chapter I study how the enticement of the mythology 
surrounding the practice of barebacking lies centrally in the risk and vulnerability of the 
individual in relation to the disease. The model of barebacking serves as the most radical 
instantiation of an absurdist-ethics. I study barebacking as a representation of radical agency, 
to the backdrop of a history of the policing of sexual mores and behaviors, and examine 
examples of other culturally specific models, such as Socrates and Foucault’s discussions on 
strategic relationships, as points of comparison and contrast. I show how artists and thinkers 
may have historically invoked a model of an absurdist-ethics represented in the mythical 
guise of death as possessing transmutable powers of agency.  
Even pornographic sites, such as the one referenced above, barebackjack.com (BBJ), 
set ethical parameters: no child pornography, bestiality, or devil worshiping permitted.39 
These condemnations act threefold. They function as a campy foil against the stark taboo of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See figure 3 for an example of how BBJ reminds parents it is their job to police their children’s Internet 
viewing habits, and not the duty of the website.  
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barebacking: satire may soften the impact of the prohibition. The re-regulated ethics 
concurrently feed and dismiss possible fears that the website openly anticipates, and outline 
as much in their “terms and conditions.”  
If you are a member of any right-wing or religious organization which agendizes anti-
homosexual sentiment, or if you personally feel that such explicit adult homosexual 
content, or content embracing sex without condoms will be offensive to you, 
PLEASE EXIT NOW!  
 
This ethical statement also implies that even those who participate in the most radical of 
social practices can be encompassed by the norm, at least in part. In The Trouble with 
Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (1999), Michael Warner calls this form of 
negotiation with the status quo a queer ethics of sexual shame. Warner advances that all 
social groups attempt to justify their existence, to develop a normalizing discourse, in this 
case one dependent on sexuality, by casting other so-called deviant groups to the periphery. 
People who are defined by a variant set of norms commit a kind of social suicide 
when they begin to measure the worth of their relations and their way of life by the 
yardstick of normalcy. The history of the [gay] movement should have taught us to 
ask: whose norm? … The problem, always, is that embracing this standard merely 
throws shame on those who stand farther down the ladder of respectability. It does 
not seem possible to think of oneself as normal without thinking that some other kind 
of person is pathological. (59-60) 
 
For this same reason, barebackers too, as in the case of this website, may cast to the 
periphery other sexual habits sanctioned as deviant, even if they do so only to accentuate the 
strong and disparaging, and what some might argue, morally prescriptive views of their 
enemies. Such declarations do not render barebacking any more justifiable to the greater 
public. The mode of argumentation does underscore the way in which many barebackers try 
to legitimize their unsafe sexual activity of explicitly unprotected consensual anal sex 
between gay men. 
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 Although barebacking is in essence unprotected, consensual sex between any 
number of persons, regardless of gender identity, sex, gender, or sexual orientation, social 
norms, as well as countless barebacking communities, dictate that barebacking is defined as 
the former—a purely homosexual act. The self-proclaimed “longest-surviving” barebacking 
website on the Internet (since 1998), BBJ has received recent scholarly attention, due to its 
politically neoliberal, quasi-intellectual, ethical stance. Sharif Mowlabocus, author of Gaydar 
Culture: Gay Men, Technology and Embodiment in the Digital Age (2010), debates the 
extent to which BBJ’s investment in “a neoliberal critique of contemporary discourses” 
adequately addresses issues of safety (165). As stated by Mowlabocus, BBJ “provides a 
forum in which unprotected sex can be interrogated using the situated truth of the 
barebacking community. As such, it offers a counter-discourse to prevailing hegemonies” 
(162). BBJ reasons that their underlying motivation for the creation of the site is health and 
information on safer sex practices. They remind users of the risks of unprotected sex, thereby 
demonstrating that even a pornography site devoted to barebacking “[will not ignore nor] 
sweep HIV under the carpet.” Still, this is a social-networking site that encourages users to 
meet other barebackers in person and have consensual, unprotected sex. Their motto: 
“You’re not a true Barebacker unless you’ve got someone to bareback with, right?” They 
argue that while one may fantasize about barebacking, the danger and thrill derives from the 
physical threat of contamination through a real exchange (not only a virtual one) of bodily 
fluids —semen, blood, and urine— all of which may or may not be infected with HIV, or 
other sexually transmitted diseases for that matter.  
As I stated briefly in the introduction, the porn industry is important to the cultural 
understanding of barebacking. The practice did emerge chiefly out of the rise and 
	  	   130	  
development of the Internet, and ultimately in the establishment of porn websites. Those who 
work in the porn industry, who engage in the practice of barebacking, such as actor Tony 
Valenzuela, to whom I will refer later in this chapter, not only act as porn actors in this 
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Figure 3: Satirical Warning 
An image posted on the homepage of www.barebackjack.com. The satirical announcement anticipates viewers, 
whom the comic portrays as a 1950’s nuclear family, including mom, dad, son, and daughter, all settling down 
to watch television. The content of the television show is not so conservative, but instead a black and white 
image of two barebackers. Possible viewers that aim at preserving the status quo, and looking to point fingers at 
pornographic sites for the corruption of family members, are warned: “It is our steadfast opinion that the 
welfare of your children is your responsibility, not ours.” 
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milieu, but also as cultural actors with a voice and power of representation, and in that sense 
relevant for an academic discussion. Regular mainstream actors oftentimes become 
emblematic figures for certain political positions, like Clint Eastwood or Sean Penn, and in 
that perspective, they are engaged in a cultural discussion. The same can be claimed of an 
actor like Valenzuela. I am therefore not talking merely about barebacking porn, but about a 
place where the dynamic of the cultural practice of barebacking is centrally represented. 
Insofar as I claim that the ethical dimensions of the dynamics at play in barebacking 
and its community provides a metaphor to better understand a postmodern conception of an 
absurdist-ethics, I find it necessary to offer a cursory introduction to the historical 
development of the term barebacking. First, I want to address a question that those 
unfamiliar to the concept of barebacking oftentimes ask regarding why the word sodomy is 
not simply used to talk about gay male sex. Although sodomy is historically a word attending 
negative connotations, gay men could have conceivably ‘taken back’ the word and 
recuperated it as something positive, just as the gay community has reclaimed the word queer 
to have positive and empowering associations. The same cannot be said for the word sodomy, 
at least not in any larger cultural context. However, the origins and development of the word 
sodomy are not entirely unrelated to the meaning and coinage of the term barebacking, 
especially those connotations of sodomy that communicate ideas of decadence, as well as 
sodomy’s historical association with the priesthood, and the legal and moral prescriptions 
that many persons in power have written in order to control and eradicate the practice of gay 
male sex. There is a vital distinction between the terms sodomy and barebacking. Although 
the latter is by definition an act of sodomy, not all acts of sodomy are barebacking. 
Barebacking is solidly bound to the history and culture of HIV and AIDS.  
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In Sodomy: A History of a Christian Biblical Myth (2004), Michael Carden explains 
that historically speaking the word sodomy did not originally “signify sexual sin but rather 
arrogant self-indulgence and luxurious living,” a “soul lapped in luxury” (123). This 
connotation was derived from the story of the city of Sodom (and by extension Gomorrah) in 
Genesis 18.1 through 19.38 in the Old Testament. Following the moral of this story, the word 
sodomy derived at least conceptually from the word to mean a citizen of the city of Sodom, a 
“Sodomite” (Spong 127). While the word sodomy was not used until the fifth century, texts 
of the second and third century did address and condemn the behavior of the citizens of 
Sodom as sexually immoral. Sodomites were chided for their participation in what Carden 
calls “unspecified wickedness” (117). In the fourth century, the biblical acts performed at 
Sodom were identified as explicitly homosexual. Possibly the earliest illustration of this 
interpretation is found in the Apocalypse of Paul. In this text, on a trip through hell, a group 
of men are identified as “those who have committed the iniquity of Sodom and Gomorrah, 
men with men” (qtd. in Carden 125). In 538 C.E., during the reign of Roman Emperor 
Justinian I, the story of Sodom took on a political force, when sanctions that condemned acts 
of homosexuality were issued,  
to ensure ‘that the city and the state may not come to harm by reason of such wicked 
deeds’ because the scriptures say ‘that because of like impious conduct cities have 
indeed perished, together with the men in them.’ (qtd. in Carden 126) 
 
The first person to write a word that could be roughly translated as sodomy (or rather 
“sodomitic” or sodomia in Latin) was possibly a fifth-century abbot named St. Nilus, who 
was referring to the Sodomites as the archetype of a decadent way of living. Although, 
Carden asserts that St. Nilus did not intend for the word to have a sexual connotation, let 
alone a homosexual one, Christians in the fifth century did read the story of Sodom as having 
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a homosexual significance nevertheless (123). The sex-hungry crowd in Sodom (as the Bible 
suggests as well) was made up of all of the town’s citizens, from all walks of life and of all 
ages, including those men married to Lot’s daughter. This was not a crowd of gay men, but 
instead characteristically a stereotypical group of straight, ‘normal’ men, who were 
apparently indulging in the “excessive pleasure” of anal sex, although notably the sex in this 
case was non-consensual. 
One may attribute the modern-day connation of the word sodomy, as in the act of men 
having anal intercourse with other men, to the eleventh-century monk, and later a saint, Peter 
Damian, in his Book of Gomorrah, the translation of which bears the subtitle An Eleventh-
Century Treatise against Clerical Homosexual Practices. Damian formulated his 
condemnations to be enacted as ecclesiastical law. Biblical scholar Mark Jordan illustrates 
Damian’s design:  
The booklet begins by identifying the vice’s four species: self-pollution, mutual 
grasping or rubbing of ‘manly parts’ (virilia), pollution ‘between the thighs’ (inter 
femora), and fornication ‘in the rear’ (in terga). The order of these four is an order of 
increasing offense, but each belongs to Sodom and each merits suspension from 
ecclesiastical office and deposition from priestly orders. (46) 
 
From this point onward, including throughout the early modern period up until today, the 
word sodomy has mostly been used in similar ways, primarily in reference to laws and 
sanctions prohibiting male-to-male sex, consensual or not. Sodomy has been also applied to 
describe anal sex between a man and a woman, oral sex, any non-procreative sex, 
masturbation, sex with animals, and even in some cases cross-dressing, pedophilia, and other 
assorted “crimes against nature.”40 One finds these definitions prevalent in so-called “sodomy 
laws,” written primarily in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the United States, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For an extensive history of sodomy laws in the United States, see William N. Eskridge’s Dishonorable 
Passions: Sodomy Laws in America, 1861-2003 (2008). See bibliography.  
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Europe, and elsewhere by bodies of governance, including the church, the state, and the 
medical, psychiatric community.  
Between the colonial period and the 20th century, in the United States and Western 
Europe, there was a distinct shift in the larger cultural understanding of gay male sex as 
sodomy, from total prohibition and widespread intolerance to a more tolerated (although 
never unequivocally normative) part of a healthy functioning society. As noted by Jonathan 
Katz, author of Love Stories: Sex Between Men Before Homosexuality (2001), 
“homosexuality in the U.S. changed from indicating a behavior (sodomy), to an abnormal 
personality (the homosexual) [in the 19th century], and [according to Katz] finally to an 
affirmative social identity (gay/lesbian) [in the 20th and 21st centuries]” (qtd. in Seidman, 11). 
Katz also invokes the term sodomy in reference to barebacking, and in particular as a word 
synonymous with “condomless sodomy;” this term being applied to the cultural backlash 
against the risky practice.41  
The introduction of the condom into the discussion of sodomy indicates the point of 
divergence between the practice and definitions of sodomy and barebacking, as the later 
designation did not appear until the onset of the AIDS epidemic. Before that time, pre-1980s, 
advocates of the belief that homosexuality is a sin spoke out largely against male-on-male 
sex, but not specifically against the actual logistics of the act, e.g., whether or not gay men 
used protection or whether they infected each other with venereal diseases or not, unless of 
course, their sexual ‘misconduct’ lead to the spread of a contagion such as syphilis to 
heterosexuals. It was not until gay men coined the word barebacking as a positive and 
empowering activity, that opponents of the practice of anal sex even considered that gay men 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For an informative, Christian fundamentalist example of the use of the phrase “condomless sodomite” to 
delegitimize homosexuality, see Fox and Virtue, 206.  
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might want to intentionally have unprotected sex with other men precisely because of and in 
spite of the risk of consensually contracting or transmitting the HIV virus.  
While it is clear that gay men practiced a form of barebacking at the start of the AIDS 
epidemic in the early 1980s, the term barebacking did not appear in writing at least until June 
of 1997, in a still controversial article entitled Riding Bareback in an HIV-Positive 
publication entitled POZ. In the article, the author Stephen Gendin, AIDS activist and 
journalist, expounds on what he sees as the joys and thrills of having sex with someone HIV-
positive without a condom, a practice he refers to as “fucking raw,” “riding bareback,” and 
“skin-to-skin” (“Riding Bareback,” par. 3): 
A year and a half ago at a conference, I heard a talk by a really cute positive guy on 
the fun of unsafe sex with other positive guys. He was beautiful, the subject was 
exciting, and I soon ended up getting fucked by him without a condom. When he 
came inside me, I was in heaven, just overjoyed. I’d had unsafe sex before, but never 
intentionally. Those experiences were guilt-ridden because I worried—both during 
the sex and afterward—about exposing my partner to HIV. (“Riding Bareback,” par. 
1-2) 
 
Gendin identifies a positive change in the way he had perceived unprotected sex at the onset 
of the epidemic, and now, at the time he wrote the article in the late 1990s. Not interpreting 
his change in attitude to the development of a reckless spirit, Gendin instead defines this new 
way of barebacking as a cathartic, consensual experience, open expressly to HIV-positive 
men:  
This was different. Knowing the guy was positive made it empowering, not guilt-
inspiring. I relaxed into my desires instead of fighting them and felt good doing so. 
On a purely physical level, the experience wasn’t extraordinary, but emotionally 
everything purred so fine. (“Riding Bareback,” par. 2) 
 
To validate that he does not stand alone in his proclivities, Gendin discloses a search he 
supposedly conducted on AOL personals (this was back in the late 1990s), looking for gay 
men who indicated their willingness to have sex sans condom. He was happy to discover 188 
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men who were into “condomless sex.” twenty-five of which identified as HIV-positive, and 
five as negative. While the last number indicated that at least a part of this culture included 
negative men, popular opinion voiced at that time, Gendin included, generally considered 
barebacking only a viable possibility between HIV-positive men. Gendin outlines the 
benefits as follows:  
The physical sensation is much better. The connection feels closer and more intimate. 
The sharing of cum on the physical level heightens the sense of sharing on the 
emotional and spiritual planes. Then there’s the satisfaction of knowing that 
seroconverting has its advantages (Or, to use American Express-speak, ‘Membership 
has its privileges.’) It’s a tasty revenge. (“Riding Bareback,” par. 4) 
 
Gendin’s use of the economic illustration of American Express, calls attention to 
barebacking’s exchange value and communal nature. The individual must pay a price to 
become a member, in this case risking becoming infected. That barebacking could be a kind 
of “revenge,” implies that the practice is also a means of revolt against a system of laws and 
sanctions that prescribe that HIV-positive men are essentially dead to the world, and 
therefore, asexual and/or non-viable sexual subjects. Gendin’s sexual encounter appears to 
provide proof, to himself at least, that this was not the case. He stands instead emboldened, 
and even discovers an unspoken sanctioning within the barebacking community through this 
encounter:  
There’s even something empowering about the idea of sharing someone else’s HIV. 
It’s like being thrown into jail for life and then, while serving your time, having the 
warden threaten to extend your sentence. The threat has no power because nothing 
can make a life sentence any worse. You can laugh at the threat, even spit in the 
warden’s face. That time I got fucked by another positive guy, I felt I didn’t have to 
fear HIV any longer. I could taunt it, challenge it by taking it into my body without 
being further hurt. (“Riding Bareback,” par. 5) 
 
One can also garner from the above passage evidence of the two manifestations of an 
absurdist-ethics, which are central to an understanding of barebacking as a metaphor for a 
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postmodern perspective of ethics today. These two manifestations are the indices of the affect 
of an absurdist gallows humor and the aesthetic of the grotesque, upon which I have 
expounded in the previous chapters. Gendin imagines himself at a crossroad, whereby he 
may take one of two paths. The first leads to death, in accepting having been dealt a life 
sentence. In other words, and I openly rely on extremes for the sake of the metaphor, an HIV-
positive man may give up on life, knowing he will most likely soon die of AIDS anyway (at 
least in the 1990s). Just as Muscardin represents barebacking in Days, giving up entirely 
would entail choosing no longer to have sex, because to have sex would mean, following this 
model of barebacking, putting others at risk of infection and ultimately death. This approach 
is however, of course, a fatalistic one, which dictates that the individual has no power over 
his or her fate. The alternate road leads to life, in this case through barebacking. This model, 
and this choice imply that while the individual faces the inevitability of impending death, she 
or he may still yield power from the determination to embrace death’s inescapability.  
In the face of opposition, which Gendin exemplifies in a Kafkaesque fashion in the 
portrayal of “the warden” threatening him with an even longer life sentence, Gendin chooses 
the position of life, and embraces his death. When Gendin imagines his dilemma, choosing an 
ethical position of life or death, as a metaphorical one between a prisoner and a warden, he is 
basically confirming a pattern of modern structures of power that HIV and AIDS summons. 
While the powers that be, such as the CDC (Center’s for Disease Control), did not explicitly 
prohibit positive men from having sex in the 1980s and 1990s, it stands to reason that the eye 
of the state and the pressure of the medical community was ineffably palpable and powerful, 
perhaps so much that some HIV-positive men considered not having sex for good.  
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Franz Kafka’s telling parable entitled “Before the Law” comes to mind as an allegory 
for the way a system of power might passively encourage the submission of an individual 
unto death. In terms of a call for individual agency, especially with regards to sex for those 
HIV-positive, I see Gendin indirectly conjuring Kafka’s demand that one discover room for 
agency even in the face of such a power that may work largely to deny an individual agency. 
In Kafka’s book The Trial (1925), in which the main character K. is accused of an 
unspecified crime, he meets a priest who relates the parable as a means to explain to him his 
seemingly inexplicable predicament. A man, not unlike K., goes to court to find answers to 
questions the reader knows not. When he arrives at the court, he finds the door guarded. The 
guard refuses the visitor entrance for an unspecified reason, but suggests the visitor may gain 
entrance in the future. The visitor then spends the rest of his life waiting to be allowed into 
the court. At the end of his life, literally at death’s door, the visitor asks the guard why no one 
ever went through the door in all the years he had waited there. The guard replies: “Nobody 
else could have got in this way, as this entrance was meant only for you. Now I’ll go and 
close it” (155). The reason the visitor did not enter was not because the guard always 
prohibited him to do so, but instead because the “visible” structure of the court, and by 
extension the door and guard, in addition to the “unverifiable” power of the court (and not 
knowing exactly who could actually give him permission to enter), compelled the visitor to 
never ask to enter again. He was also constrained from ever trying to physically, forcibly or 
not, enter through the doorway. What the guard reveals in his last words is that the visitor 
could have entered the court through this doorway at any time. The visitor himself, his own 
resolve, was in fact the only obstacle.  
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When applied to a model of barebacking, by acknowledging the power structure and 
yet still seeking agency, Gendin’s position vis-à-vis HIV outsmarts the guard in Kafka’s 
parable. Instead of becoming an asexual man, defeated emotionally and physically by the 
prospect of dying from AIDS, Gendin courts death and life by barebacking, just as Andrea 
and Claudio do in Days. Feeling a sense of empowerment, which I anticipate comes from the 
inherent understanding of his newly acquired, ethically viable position, he indulges in the 
possibility of revolting against that threat, either through the affect of humor, by laughing at 
the warden, or through the grotesque, by spitting in the warden’s face.  
Gendin may have been fooling himself into thinking that he may outsmart death. 
Some may argue that Gendin is selfish, evil, dangerous, or even emotionally ill, that he is not 
representative of gay men or of barebackers at large. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that the goal of the present discussion is theoretical, and aims at testing the realm of the 
hypothesis of the model of an absurdist-ethics. Therefore, the model of barebacking is in part 
a metaphor, if not a mythical cultural construction, which has some basis in the real, but at 
the same time cannot be entirely accounted for in the real, and certainly cannot predict how 
all men may act in the community of barebackers or in the gay community at large. Beyond 
testimony, my discussion of barebacking is by no means a reflection of the real, nor based on 
any actuality or real person. Taking into account this caveat, one may set aside such 
otherwise understandable considerations in the name of working through the potentially rich 
ethical model presented through this particular philosophical conundrum.  
Even Gendin, who spoke from first-hand experience, was pressured ultimately to 
qualify his predilection for barebacking. Although he ends his article on barebacking on a 
cautionary tone, warning readers of the possibility of re-infection, his support of the practice 
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did garner much negative criticism from the gay community at that time (Shernoff 14).42 
Others like Gendin who expressly and publicly condoned the practice of barebacking have 
also received retorts from the general public and academic communities. For example, also in 
1997, at the annual Creating Change conference sponsored by the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force, HIV-positive porn star Tony Valenzuela boasted of his participation in unsafe 
sex on the job. Co-chair and speaker of the event, Valenzuela declared before 2,000 people 
how “The level of erotic charge and intimacy I feel when a man comes inside me is 
transformational, especially in a climate which so completely disregards its importance” (qtd. 
in Gendin, “They Shoot Barebackers,” par. 3). Valenzuela qualified his proclamation like 
Gendin as a positive-on-positive activity. Gendin, who captured the event, describes the 
debacle:  
His cautionary caveat—‘When I talk about having unprotected sex, I am speaking for 
myself, and not as a proponent of condomless sex for all’—was undercut by his 
defiant assertions—‘I am a sex gourmet in a community serving sexual TV dinners… 
and I have placed myself in the middle of HIV anarchy.’ Even I still feel a chill up 
my spine when I recall his words. It was too much information, too fast. The personal 
had become more political than he could have imagined.  
(“They Shoot Barebackers,” par. 3).  
 
It is ironic that Gendin finds Valenzuela’s proclamations almost too personal and too 
political, given his own defense of the practice. Notwithstanding, Gendin’s surprise 
exemplifies the truly dual nature of barebacking, being all at once an intimate, collective, and 
largely anonymous act. Each individual embraces a personal experience of barebacking, and 
although a barebacker clearly knows that he shares this experience with others, his lovers for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Gendin deliberates the perceived drawbacks of barebacking, including re-infection from multiple strains of 
HIV (e.g., HIV-1 and HIV-2) as well as the risk of acquiring other STDs. The consequences of contracting 
multiple strains of HIV include the possibility of acquiring a strain that is more virulent than other. Early on, 
scientists began to understand that HIV subtypes differ in their progression time to AIDS (Kanki et al., 73). One 
study published in 2007 found evidence that persons infected with so-called subtype D have a higher mortality 
rate and a faster rate CD4 cell count decline than do those infected with subtype A (Baeten et al., 1177).  
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example, he is at the same time taken aback to hear the personal tale of the involvement of 
another. This is parallel to the model of barebacking suggested in Days, whereby barebackers 
supposedly participate oftentimes in anonymous sex; as a consequence, the person does not 
truly know his partner, nor will he speak to him again about their shared sexual encounter, 
although at the same time, the individual may claim to belong to the community at large.  
 Like any other cultural critic, Valenzuela and Gendin had to wade through the 
backlash of their radical political position on barebacking. In a later interview with Gendin, 
Valenzuela offered his apologies to his public, not for having spoken about barebacking, but 
instead for having not addressed the loss of millions of lives to the virus—a criticism, along 
with blatant ostracism, he sustained from the gay community following his speech. Gendin 
transcribes Valenzuela’s remorse: 
‘I realize I failed to acknowledge the huge amounts of loss people have gone through,’ 
he says quietly. ‘So it was shocking for many of them to hear about a behavior that 
essentially wiped out a generation of men they had loved.’ He pauses. ‘I should have 
let the audience know that I feel that loss too, painfully and directly.’ (“They Shoot 
Barebackers,” par. 5) 
 
While Valenzuela backtracked to appease the normative voice of those touched by his claims, 
his tone indicates his understanding, as an HIV-positive man, of the intangible yet present 
value of uncovering an opportunity to reinvest libidinal energy into his (sex) life. For 
Valenzuela, the ethics of barebacking did not pertain to death nor to an epidemic, but just like 
in Days, to life and living again. It is this model of agency I find most provocative, which 
makes up the radical crux of my own theory of an absurdist-ethics. In the spirit of abstract 
discussion, it is relevant to debate how the pieces would fall if one were to conceptualize the 
ethical implications of such a model, and if one were to follow it to its furthest conclusion, 
when it is put into practice. As I will signal later, the corollaries of this discussion may apply 
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not only to the practice of barebacking, but also to other contentious and risk-taking cultural 
practices.  
 Throughout the late 1990s, barebacking remained largely a buzzword synonymous 
with selfishness and death. Political figures and popular culture caught wind of the phrase. In 
1997, Newsweek published an article on barebacking calling it “A Deadly Dance.” In the 
article, Marc Peyser relates the details of an interview he had with a gay man who conceded 
that, after the initial scare of HIV and AIDS was over, condom use was no longer prevalent 
in gay clubs. Peyser affirms:  
Though he’s been doing it for years, Hilburn, 32, says he’s recently noticed a change: 
it’s much easier to find men willing to have unprotected sex. ‘I’ve been to clubs 
where there’s sex all over the place and they have a little fruit bowl full of condoms 
and it’s covered with dust,’ says Hilburn, a computer analyst in a New York hospital. 
‘The taboo has worn off.’ (par. 1) 
 
Peyser attributes the rise in barebacking activity to a growth of apathy due to the 
development of the protease inhibitors/triple pill therapy (Henkel, par. 4). This medicine 
regime is popularly known for its “Lazarus-effect,” which references the biblical figure who 
became fatally ill from an unspecified disease, although commonly interpreted as leprosy, 
which produces sores all over his body. Lazarus famously rose from the grave to live again. 
Due to the effectiveness of such medications and prevention efforts, 1997 became a 
significant year in the trajectory of AIDS. In the United States at least, the death rate dropped 
by forty-seven percent. Also, for the first time since 1990, AIDS was no longer part of the 
top ten causes of death in the United States (Henkel, par. 6-7). One survey published in 1997 
in The New England Journal of Medicine informs that, after the introduction of drug 
cocktails, some gay men became less concerned about having safer sex. In this survey, 
twenty-six percent of surveyed gay men admitted to being now “less concerned about 
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becoming HIV-positive,” thirteen percent “‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ agreed with the 
statement ‘I am more willing to take a chance of getting infected when having sex;’” and 
fifteen percent of the men surveyed stated that they had already engaged in higher-risk sex 
(Dilley, 501). On one questionnaire, a participant wrote: “If I am exposed to HIV, I can take 
the new drugs […] that will prevent me from becoming infected [with opportunistic 
infections]’” (Dilley, 501-502). Therefore, if these results are any indication of a change in 
gay men’s perception of the virus, then the popularity of barebacking appears to have come 
in bloom, not coincidentally, at least initially, as a result of the development of such cocktail 
drugs.  
The rise and growth of the Internet in the late 1990s seems to have also contributed 
significantly to the evolution of the community of barebackers, and a handful of papers have 
been published on the connection between the practice of barebacking and the Internet.43 In 
one study from 2003, looking back at the growing practice of barebacking in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, authors P.N. Halkitis and J.T. Parson’s nod in agreement towards studies 
that suggest that “sexual risk taking is related to high levels of sexual compulsivity and 
cybersex compulsivity among gay men who seek partners using the Internet […] and the men 
using the Internet are likely to demonstrate more sexual risk than those not seeking sex in this 
venue” (368-369). Halkitis and Parson reduce barebacking to a thrill-seeking behavior of 
addiction and mental illness. Their assumptions do not, however, explain why those who do 
not contrive to meet other barebackers via the Internet may also participate in this same 
behavior. The authors do not take into consideration all motivations, and their conclusions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See Halkitis, “Intentional Unsafe Sex,” pg. 368-369, for a list of studies linking the rise in barebacking to the 
growth of the Internet.  
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exclude the possibility that gay men might seek to engage in risky sexual behavior for 
reasons that are not necessarily to be interpreted as unhealthy. Instead, like most doctors and 
analogously most of today’s ‘Western’ normative, rationalist-based culture, there is a 
tendency to pathologize risky sex. Yet, a counter-argument could be made that risk is a 
natural dimension of any kind of sex, and part and parcel of human belonging, whereby the 
antithesis could mean a life without pleasurable sex, which for many people is a necessary 
part of a livable life. It might argued that the antithesis corresponds in fact to a kind of 
emotional and even partial physical death void of bodily pleasures. That does not mean that 
barebacking is not a dangerous and deadly practice. It is.  
This line of abstract argumentation of barebacking as a space of representation 
renders a particularly fruitful model of conceptualizing a postmodern absurdist-ethics. 
Nevertheless, its implications may demonstrate the opposite of that which one might reason 
to be safe, logical, healthy, legal, good, and moral. In order to draw out the fullest 
implications of this space of representation, it is necessary to provide an alternative to the 
otherwise normative, moralizing, and pathologizing stance concerning barebacking. 
Although controversial, a proof of its representational power is that barebacking has not 
remained a hushed concept confined to private encounters facilitated neither through the 
Internet nor to the medical scholars attracted to the study of this risky behavior. In 1998, the 
practice of barebacking entered popular media, making one of its first débuts on the 
television series ER, in an episode with a side story of a teenaged gay sex worker who is paid 
extra by certain clients for unprotected sex.44 He is found badly beaten after a sexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See ER, episode 5.6 “Stuck on You.”  
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encounter—a picture that carries a moral warning in no unclear terms: those who engage in 
risky sex court death, and as this narrative suggests, some possibly deserve it.  
The implications in public policy ensued. In 1999, the neologism was introduced to 
President Clinton’s AIDS Advisory Council by then Vice President Al Gore (Scarce, par. 3). 
Former Miss America, Kate Shindle also intervened, giving her opinion in America’s top-
selling gay magazine, The Advocate, in an article entitled “Barebacking? Brainless!” Shindle 
asserts: “Given the knowledge of what causes the spread of HIV and what we need to do to 
stop it, how can we put ourselves in grave danger and then give it a cute nickname like 
“barebacking”? (par. 5). Similarly, in an article entitled “In Search of Death,” published in 
Rolling Stone magazine in 2003, several sources estimated that 25% of new cases of 
infection between gay men in the United States could be attributed to barebacking. In the 
article, one interviewee, who went by the name of Carlos, grants that the lure of barebacking 
lies in his wish to be a part of a unique, gay community: “I think it turns the other guy on to 
know that I’m negative and that they’re bringing me into the brotherhood. That gets me off, 
too” (Freeman, par. 1). The interviewee’s comment marks a moment in history, when in the 
early 2000s, the practice of barebacking began to include both positive and negative gay men, 
as a more intricate cultural practice that had begun to establish its own niche and whereby the 
chance for infection became a desired risk. At the level of representation, it is also significant 
that the interviewee points to the issue of belonging to a brotherhood, a viewpoint that has 
very relevant ramifications in ethical terms, given that ethics are inevitably ingrained in a 
communal system that shares the same goals.  
This change of intentionality is not an inconsiderable event, but in fact a particular 
one that signals a revolution in the way some gay men approach life and death. This is 
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perhaps the most intriguing development in barebacking culture, and includes the moment 
when some barebackers began to name the strategic positions of power, namely, “he, who 
will be infected by the other,” is commonly called a “bug chaser,” and “he, who will infect 
the other,” goes by the name of “gift giver.” This is how Gregory Freeman, the author of the 
article in Rolling Stone magazine, responded to this new positioning:  
Carlos is part of an intricate underground world that has sprouted, driven almost 
completely by the Internet, in which men who want to be infected with HIV get 
together with those who are willing to infect them. The men who want the virus are 
called ‘bug chasers,’ and the men who freely give the virus to them are called ‘gift 
givers.’ While the rest of the world fights the AIDS epidemic and most people fear 
HIV infection, this subculture celebrates the virus and eroticizes it. HIV-infected 
semen is treated like liquid gold. Carlos has been chasing the bug for more than a 
year in a topsy-turvy world in which every convention about HIV is turned upside 
down. The virus isn’t horrible and fearsome, it’s beautiful and sexy—and delivered in 
the way that is most likely to result in infection. In this world, the men with HIV are 
the most desired, and the bug chasers will do anything to get the virus—to ‘get 
knocked up,’ to be ‘bred’ or ‘initiated into the brotherhood.’ (Freeman, par. 3) 
 
One can trace the use of this terminology in two of the main scholarly works on the topic of 
barebacking several years later: Leo Bersani’s and Adam Phillips Intimacies (2008) and Tim 
Dean’s Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking (2009). Dean 
applies the lingo that was already prevalent in the barebacking community in the early 2000s, 
including phrases such as “‘impregnatin’ men or ‘plantin’ seed” (45). One can glean how 
there was already a notion of romanticism embedded in the terminology surrounding 
barebacking that would suggest that one might upon closer look discover an underlying 
system of ethical justification, which not only condones barebacking, but that also valorizes 
it in the name of a more refined system that might be deemed comparable to heterosexual, 
romantic, procreative love.  
In the “topsy-turvy” world presented in Days, there is one further development in the 
culture of barebacking that none of the authors of books and articles on the topic address, 
	  	   148	  
namely the fact that a barebacker may consider not only that being HIV-positive is a gift, but 
also that he may revel in the belief that those who become positive need not necessarily be 
‘cured’ by medications. Instead, as Andrea’s attitude suggests, some barebackers might 
believe that infection and dying make up the wholly anticipated, and even welcomed and 
expected, consummation of the act. Some barebackers may refuse medication and embrace 
the moment of infection, acquiring opportunistic infections, and the raw experience of pain 
and dying. I have found a small amount of testimony of this viewpoint in gay advice columns, 
but I cannot guess how many men in the barebacking community actually choose to follow 
this model such as it is presented in Days, nor can I guess how many refuse to take 
medication.45 This development in barebacking may seem inexplicable. However, in the 
realm of a theory of an absurdist-ethics, this choice makes sense. For argumentative purposes, 
I want to demonstrate along the same line how this particular scenario would abide by a code 
of an absurdist-ethics put fully into practice, although it may be argued that both Muscardin 
and myself deal with theoretics and in fantasy, that is, at the level of abstraction, as a means 
to generate a productive philosophical debate about life in the presence of more eminent 
death.  
The history of barebacking reviewed thus far illuminates how, as representation, this 
cultural practice is an enterprise charged with notions of gay sexuality and issues of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 However there are studies on HIV-positive persons refusing medication, as well as anecdotal evidence in 
online blogs and chat rooms that indicate that people have chosen this path. For example, one study links mental 
illness, such as bipolar disorder, to reasons why people would intentionally not adhere to medical regime 
protocol. See Clatworthy in bibliography. Other studies seek other reasons for non-adherence like alcohol and 
drug abuse, and even lack of literacy. In an “Ask the Expert” column on the website The Body: The Complete 
HIV/AIDS Resource, on March 23, 2010, a man writing into the column says that he has barebacked a man three 
or four times, who he knows is HIV-positive, and has a low Cd4 blood count, which qualifies him as having 
AIDS. He also adds: “I know this person does not take medication.” See: 
http://www.thebody.com/Forums/AIDS/SafeSex/Q207495.html. 
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vulnerability, as well as with the history of the AIDS pandemic in toto—a heavy burden to 
bear, which renders barebacking as a construct arguably one of the most radical possible 
activities, or at least one may envision that it is culturally constructed as such. An individual 
willingly and consensually partakes in an event whereby he may infect and/or become 
infected with a deadly virus; this moral dilemma is one that a few gay men are willing to 
interrogate with their own bodies. The social stigma that burdens this risky activity cannot be 
removed, and neither can the desire it animates. Even if, in a simplistic, generalizing 
approach, this practice may be interpreted as a selfish and dangerous game of chance, it is a 
fact that in the world of barebacking with HIV, a few gay men challenge the frontiers of their 
bodies and face death head-on. More complexly, and what is clearly more difficult to fathom, 
barebacking may be conceptualized in abstract terms as an exertion of free will or even 
procreation, as well as part and parcel of the pursuit of the death drive.46  
In his discussion of enlightenment, Immanuel Kant distinguishes between the private 
and the public, markedly in the propinquity between private and public reason, and 
introduces a theoretical discussion of the ethical dilemma of barebacking. It is my 
supposition that the practice of barebacking is a form of enlightenment [Aufklärung], insofar 
as this practice may be read as a proposal of sexual—individual and collective—liberation. 
Rereading Kant’s stake in the paradoxes of the private and the public helps illustrate my 
point. In his essay on “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” (1784), he asks: 
Which restriction is hampering enlightenment, and which does not, or even promotes 
it? I answer: The public use of a man’s reason must be free at all times, and this alone 
can bring enlightenment among men: while the private use of a man’s reason may 
often be restricted rather narrowly without thereby unduly hampering the progress of 
enlightenment. (136-137) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Freud characterizes the death drive as the compulsion “to return to nonliving,” whereby “the goal of all life is 
death” (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” 77). 
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At first, barebacking appears to fit squarely into the realm of the private. In theory, gay men 
come together ‘behind closed doors’ to participate in a private, sexual act, which normatively 
is deemed unethical, narrow, and even corrupt. But following Kant’s definition, barebacking 
might not hamper the progress of enlightenment, although many may suppose that the sexual 
custom could never be a means to promote it.  
Yet, if one considers barebacking as a representation of a postmodern ethics, the 
practice and rationale behind why gay men bareback may be read as much more complicated 
and meaningful than calling it simply a degenerate, private act. The risky practice can also be 
read as a private AND public act that is prescribed not by private reason alone, but in fact 
largely by a public rationality. Within the dynamics of this form of representation, the 
freedom that barebackers seek through this act would not just be sexual freedom but also, 
more importantly possibly, ethical enlightenment itself. I call enlightenment that which 
lightens one’s load of the weight of one’s impeding death by prescribing the conditions and 
possibilities of life and living before and into the course of one’s death.  
A model of barebacking as an instantiation of a postmodern absurdist-ethics is not 
dissimilar to Kant’s own model of enlightenment, which also inscribes the existence of both 
normative and dissenting representations of ethics. Kant’s archetype of enlightenment 
requires first, like an absurdist-ethics, both individual agency and the autonomy of thought. 
Kant reproaches those who let systems-that-be circumscribe one’s life, including for example 
“a pastor who acts as my conscience, a physician who prescribes my diet, and so on—then I 
have no need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others will take care 
of that disagreeable business for me” (134). The path to enlightenment, according to Kant, is 
not that difficult: “Now this danger is really not very great; after stumbling a few times they 
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would, at last, learn to walk. However, examples of such failures intimidate and generally 
discourage all further attempts” (134). Yet, just as Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” 
illustrates, it is not any actual physical presence or force that is key, but in fact the power 
dynamic that holds sway over an individual.  
Kant anticipates how difficult it is to actually go against a system of power. In the 
model of barebacking as ethical instantiation, revolting means becoming a being other than a 
being for death, or as Heidegger invoked, a being-toward-death, when one is faced with 
HIV.47 Instead, one engages wholly with life. Within this paradigm, in order to be courageous 
and invoke Kant’s motto of enlightenment —“Sapere Aude! [You must have] the courage to 
use your own intelligence” (134)—, it is important not to submit to the plain idea that sex 
with HIV equates death, but instead try to understand, try to know, how a participant of such 
a practice may find pleasure and even a sense of kinship in such relations. Kant too inserts 
the element of death into the equation of becoming intellectually enlightened. He deems that 
those who seek enlightenment must “make an uncertain jump over the smallest trench 
because he is not accustomed to such free movement. Therefore there are only a few who 
have pursued a firm path and have succeeded in escaping from minority by their own 
cultivation of the mind” (136). I am not suggesting that Kant would have considered 
barebacking a concept definable or worthy of a kind of enlightenment. If anything, one could 
argue that barebacking, even as abstract representation, might go against everything that 
enlightenment is supposed to conjure because it goes against “the spirit of a reasonable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Heidegger’s position regarding the individual’s living on the edge of death more authentically helps to re-
locate the core of an absurdist-ethics. He suggests that “when one has an understanding Being-towards-death—
towards death as one’s ownmost potentiality—one’s potentiality-for-Being becomes authentic and wholly 
transparent” (307). I pull from this sentiment its contrario. One is not a being-for-death, but a being-for-life. 
Within the paradigm of an absurdist-ethics, only if the individual embraces her or his own death, is it possible to 
live ethically and authentically as something other than a being-for-death.  
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estimate of their own value,” (136) which is a stance enlightenment is supposed to uphold. In 
that sense, it might be argued that a model of barebacking cannot be considered in terms of 
value or even ethics. Yet, as Kant makes clear, those in positions of power impose their 
prescribed values on society at large, whether they agree with those values or not. In fact, 
following Kant, for those that are not enlightened, they may not even know what they value 
because they have not sought to think for themselves. Therefore, there may be many different 
alternative models of ethics that could be deemed viable, but which are not supported by 
society as a whole. I argue consequently that barebacking may be read as an abstract 
representation of one such alternative ethical model: a postmodern absurdist-ethics.  
Kant supports such abstract experiments in the name of what he considers the most 
important ingredient in enlightenment: freedom of thought in terms of “the public use of a 
man’s reason,” which he defines explicitly as “the use which a scholar makes of it before the 
entire reading public” (136-7). In opposition, the realm of the private is a rule of order that 
prescribes and maintains normativity, which is also equally necessary but distinctly different 
than one’s use of public reason. Kant describes this duality in the enlightened human, for 
instance, through the example of a pastor. 
Likewise a clergyman is obliged to teach his pupils and his congregation according to 
the creed of the church which he serves, for he has been accepted on that condition. 
But as a scholar, he has full freedom, in fact, even the obligation, to communicate to 
the public all his diligently examined and well-intentioned proposals regarding the 
better institution of religious and ecclesiastical matters. There is nothing in this for 
which the conscience could be blamed. (137) 
 
In this constellation, the pastor can and should ideally be both clergy and scholar, whereby 
certain modes of thought and behavior belong either to the dimension of the public or 
alternatively, the private. While the pastor may challenge the norm as a scholar, s/he must 
conform to the moral code of society in her or his duties as spiritual guide.  
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In this same way, this would explain how one may use the word ethics generally to 
describe a code of living consented to and agreed upon by much of society, while the model 
of ethics that barebacking may metaphorically portend is by no way a paragon of normativity. 
If this constellation were reversed, the human race would indeed go extinct. Yet, there are 
people today who embrace such an absurdist-ethical model. This model does not in theory 
apply just to barebackers, but also would include people who partake in other kinds of life-
threatening, high-risk behavior for the sake of finding fulfillment in life, that is, for the sake 
of personal enlightenment. Therefore, an absurdist-ethics is not just illustrative of 
barebacking in theory, but in fact may provide a practical way of understanding how one 
could conceive of ethics in a postmodern guise.  
Kant’s conception of enlightenment allows for extreme challenges to normativity, 
such as an absurdist-ethics suggests. He vindicates that “succeeding generations are entirely 
justified in discarding such decisions [made by figures of authority in the past] as 
unauthorized and criminal. The touchstone of all this to be agreed upon as a law for people is 
to be found in the question whether a people could impose such a law upon itself” (139). To 
question traditional models of ethics does not mean to displace them by and large, especially 
because most humans abide generally by an ethical code that favors life over death. This 
same code also dictates that persons with HIV do not spread around contagion, and that 
persons that are not yet infected do not go seeking to change their status to positive. An 
absurdist-ethics is not a code for the every-person, but instead one that might theoretically be 
followed by people who live in the face of death, in end-times, and who choose still not to 
accept disability, stasis, and defeat when encountering the seeming unconquerable or even 
the unknowable. Instead, within the terms of this paradigm, a model of an absurdist-ethics 
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sees the individual as courageous, finding her or his own way to live a life that is dignified 
despite every obstacle, every force of resistance, every voice that claims that such a life, or 
even life itself is impossible. Kant ends his essay on enlightenment precisely demanding 
dignity: every human being should be free to think freely and equally, to be treated 
“according to his dignity” (141). Within this paragon of a postmodern absurdist-ethics, some 
people find value in belonging to a community of consensual adults who share a 
commonality of risk, even if this means consensually contracting or infecting another with a 
contagious disease. This positioning may happen even if normativity may deem such a way 
of life amoral; the case of barebacking functions as one possible instantiation of its premises.  
Freud and Foucault demonstrated how modern, and by extension postmodern, 
configurations of the public and the private are not so rigid, nor clearly dichotomous. Both 
authors also certify how the reasoning behind participating in private sexual acts is never just 
an issue related to the private sphere, but also to the public. While the public demands openly 
that individuals follow sexual norms, Freud and Foucault illustrate how, at the same time, the 
dynamics of the public sphere encourage and depends upon deviations from the sexual norm, 
therefore paving the way for ethical models that challenge normative models. Freud 
speculated for example on the role of the so-called “Oedipus complex,” which establishes a 
dynamic of power relations not only within the family unit, but also within the community of 
human beings at large:  
What began in relation to the father is completed in relation to the group. If 
civilization is a necessary course of development from the family to humanity as a 
whole, then—as a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the 
eternal struggle between the trends of life and death—there is inextricably bound up 
with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the 
individual finds hard to tolerate. (“Civilization and Its Discontents,” 763)  
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Freud also explains how sexuality (and deviations from the sexual norm included) is 
imperative to the framework of the public, in its cultural activities and one’s public 
contributions:  
all of these affectionate impulses were originally of a completely sexual nature but 
have become inhibited in their aim or sublimated. The manner in which the sexual 
instincts can thus be influenced and diverted enables them to be employed for cultural 
activities of every kind, to which indeed they bring the most important contributions.  
(An Autobiographical Study, 24) 
 
Barebacking as a model would be included as a part of the private sphere of a human’s 
sexuality, since it is also a mechanism that prescribes the behavior of consenting adults (with 
each other) in the public sphere, and is therefore not simply a behavior flaunted in private. In 
postmodernity, the break between private and public has become more and more blurred. In 
addition, as I mentioned before, electronic media has become a combination of private 
practice with virtual public ramifications. Foucault praised Freud and his theory of 
psychoanalysis not only for being a “project of a medial technology appropriate for dealing 
with the sexual instinct,” but also for having “sought to free [sexual instinct] from its ties 
with heredity, and hence from eugenics and the various racisms” (History of Sexuality: Vol. I: 
119). The French thinker may be seen as a precursor to an absurdist-ethics that would support 
a theoretical model of barebacking. For Foucault, sex and sexuality are so important to the 
public expression of human identity, in which sex is so intrinsically tied up with the notion of 
one’s identity, that it becomes more important than life:  
The Faustian pact, whose temptation has been instilled in us by the deployment of 
sexuality, is now as follows: to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the truth 
and the sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for. It is in this (strictly historical) 
sense that sex is indeed imbued with the death instinct. (156, my emphasis) 
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One may say that, as an abstract model, the barebacker would take this pact seriously, indeed 
through the exchange of the virus, inviting the possibility of a sooner and more calculable 
time and means of death.  
Furthermore, Foucault avows that “now our business is to realize sex,” which 
spotlights an additional important dimension to his theory of sexuality and power along with 
the co-mingling of the private and public spheres, and perhaps most decidedly as it applies to 
a postmodern mentality (157). Foucault explains how economy and labor are intrinsically 
bound up in sexual politics, and how with the evolution of capitalism, society has reached the 
so-called “threshold of modernity,” when 
the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a 
political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a 
living being into question. (143) 
 
Foucault is explaining how life (and by designation, sexual identity) has changed from being 
a matter of the private sphere, as Kant would understand it, to becoming a commodity, 
weighted by society as a “value and utility” within the public sphere (144).  
Recent economic theorists such as Teodoro Dario Togati also give prominence to the 
breach of the mythically divided public and private spheres, precisely as culture is equated to 
a commodity, and advertised and sold as such:  
Indeed, whereas modernist social science regards society as being sufficiently 
differentiated to proceed to autonomous analysis of its subsets based on different 
principles, post-modernism claims that the lines of demarcation between various 
realms of society or between nature and society or culture have broken down. This 
can be seen, for example, in the increasing role that advertising plays in contemporary 
culture, in the increasing influence of cultural industry in advanced economics and in 
the fact that ‘nature is gone for good’ as Jameson (1992) puts it. (50) 
 
Togati’s reference to advertising in particular relates acutely to the case of barebacking as a 
model on several levels. First, some barebackers seek other sexual partners in the anonymous 
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public sphere of the Internet. Once a viewer enters a barebacking website, he does not 
however always just look passively at images or short clips of barebackers, but also 
oftentimes barebacking sites encourage viewers to rate and comment on a public ‘wall’ space 
and in blogs on the sexual attractiveness of those images and videos of barebackers. In 
encouraging viewers to respond in a public forum on their own personal, private, and sexual, 
aesthetic experiences, the divide between the public and private breaks down.  
In essence, the model of barebacking has become commoditized online, and in 
particular in pornography. This dynamic would relate to what Gail Hawkes, in her book on 
Sex and Pleasure in Western Culture (2004), calls a kind of “commodified eroticism.” She 
speculates how 
commodified eroticism breached the public-private divide in two senses. First, it 
offered the viewer a virtual entry into the intimacy of the bedroom—once the most 
private of spaces. Second, opening this space offered a legitimate context within 
which to condone sex disengaged from any commitment or emotional ties. […] [In] 
the postmodern world this stigmatized connection has been severed by the 
fragmentation of contexts. (7) 
 
This “fragmentation of contexts,” and this unchaining of desire from the realm of the private, 
and even the commodification and public exposure of bodies, sex, and sexuality through such 
means, is still by definition a means of enlightenment. In other words, recalling the previous 
approach to Muscardin’s Days, barebacking as a metaphor for an ethical model of 
postmodern engagement may be apprehended not just as a disengaged gesture motivated by 
raw sexual desire, but a practice, at least conceptually speaking, that is steeped in great 
emotion, levied by private and public reason as a means to spiritual and bodily 
enlightenment—within Kantian terms. Additionally, in a postmodern sense, the space of 
transformation would not just be haptic nor psychic, it would not and could not just be 
captured solely in the private sphere, nor just in the dominion of the public, but on the liminal 
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space of the virtual and anonymous public, as can be seen in online chat rooms and blog 
spaces of barebacking websites.  
The representational model of barebacking flourishes in the postmodern era, as 
exemplified by the virtual public gestalt that barebacking upholds. Calling barebacking a 
form of enlightenment, following Kant’s decree, is an essential part of the anatomy of the 
absurdist-ethics. Just as there may be resistance to the idea that the practice even as mere 
supposition might have an ethical core, it may also meet opposition invoking a system of a 
postmodern ethics altogether. I understand the word ethics in connection with those in 
capacities of power, who appear to submit to a code that claims to protect minority 
populations, a rationalist and humanistic tradition that draws its ideals from the 
Enlightenment. Alain Badiou calls one’s attention to an illustration in his book, Ethics: An 
Essay on the Understanding of Evil (2001):  
The International Tribunal is clearly prepared to arrest and try, in the name of ‘human 
rights,’ anyone, anywhere, who attempts to contest the New World Order of which 
NATO (i.e. the United States) is the armed guard (1v). ‘Ethics’ is a matter of busying 
ourselves with these rights, of making sure that they are respected. (4) 
 
Within this configuration, ethics as a concept emerges as a system that demands merely its 
own replication and obedience to that same system. Those persons in positions of power 
identify the deservingness of a group of so-called ‘victims,’ while the ruling country or 
normative status quo provides and protects their chosen disenfranchised group(s). If another 
country or normative status quo gets in the way of one’s ‘protecting’ of their minority group, 
as Badiou points out, any opposition will be punished (at least socially) in the name of 
‘human rights.’ Those who oppose these supposed humanitarians are therefore by definition 
human rights ‘violators,’ and this behavior is deemed unethical. Meanwhile, countries will go 
against their own moral codes in order to guarantee their assets.  
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 Badiou decries this class of ethics, and entreats his readers to consider an ethical 
human who is “precisely something other than a victim” (166). For Badiou, this kind of self-
victimization engenders fatalism and apathy, whereby the victim becomes again a 
Heideggerian “a being-for-death” (166). Badiou puts forward a position in which one should 
aim to be the exact opposite, as in “something other than a mortal being,” one who is 
immortal and faces death directly, yet is divested of fear (166). I apply this perspective to the 
genre of ethics that characterizes barebacking as well.  
Richard Schacht, in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (1994), captures the dynamic of 
this seemingly paradoxical architecture, as it would apply to Nietzsche’s theory of ethics, 
bringing the discussion of an absurdist-ethics back full circle:  
Here an imposing (and preferably metaphysically sanctified) ‘law’ is not what is 
required. What is needed is the very opposite: newly imagined devices of individual 
encouragement, enticement, and inspiration—conceivably images like that of 
Nietzsche’s ‘overman,’ designed to give people the heart and stamina, but also the 
irreverence and the sheer truculence needed to persist in the awesome task of peeling 
themselves out of their pulp. (emphasis in the original; 94) 
 
In a way, this take on Nietzsche has many romantic resonances, related, for instance, to the 
romantic rebellion—the same resonance that can be drawn from the ethics that underpins an 
ethical model of barebacking. This is not the Romantic in some dichotomous sense as an 
outright rejection of the ideals of the Enlightenment, but more complexly it describes the 
moment when the poet refuses to differentiate reason from sentiment, and it is in this sense 
that the term “Romantic” is used in the present discussion. The result is freedom à outrance, 
existential, and many times brought to the limit with the individual’s determination to 
commit suicide or to render his own vitality to the course of nature. The writings of some 
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romantic poets, as well as those writings that influenced the Romantic period (from previous 
centuries) elicit this density. 48  
Yet, one may too hastily draw parallels between the element of suicide and a model 
of ethics as related to a paradigm of the practice of barebacking. Barebacking is not, in 
principle, a suicide pact, as I discussed in the previous chapter, because the act of taking 
one’s life is not supported. In other words, barebackers are not encouraged to become 
infected with HIV in order to kill themselves. The model of the ethical paradigm I am 
developing here is instead related to the intense moment, associated with the spirit of 
romanticism, of living between the time of infection up until the death of the individual. This 
intensive form of living is romantic, even if repellent and disastrous for all parties involved, 
as is the case with Goethe’s iconic Werther, a character who willingly sought his death 
because he could not be with the one he loved. In fact, because of the precarious and 
dangerous nature of the romance it supports, I argue that this model is characteristically 
postmodern.  
Many scholars have also noted the ties between Romanticism and Postmodernism, 
and the intersections between the two mentalities feed into an absurdist-ethics. In The 
Postmodern Turn (1997), Steven Best and Douglas Kellner explain this connection:  
In one way or another, 18th- and 19th-century conservatism, romanticism, and 
existentialism form the backbone of a counter-Enlightenment tradition and are 
important influences on some versions of postmodern theory. Kierkegaard, for 
instance, anticipated postmodern theory with his critiques of reason and the 
Enlightenment and his insights into how the emerging mass were producing a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Further illustrations of Romantic writers expressing the romantic ideal of revolt or rebellion, and in particular 
sexual revolt or revolt for sexual reasons, include Alfred de Musset’s poem “Rolla” (1878), Jacques-Henri 
Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s Paul et Virginie (1787), Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856), and Leo 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1877).  
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realm of social experience and a ‘phantom public’ that lost its individuality and 
capacity for critical thought. (29) 
 
Here, one can recognize the foreshadowing of a virtual public sphere, which does manifest 
itself today in the Internet. Additionally, scholars have addressed Nietzsche’s romantic 
influence in his forewarning of the possibilities that would develop as a result of a kind of 
postmodern-like turn: 
Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche carried out a radical critique of reason, the 
Enlightenment, and modern philosophy, a critique that anticipated the postmodern 
turn in thought and also argued that modern society had become so chaotic, 
fragmented, and devoid of ‘creative force’ that it had lost the resources to create a 
vital culture, thus demanding a break with modernity and the creation of a new 
society and way of life […]. (Best and Kellner, 29) 
 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are crucial to my theory of an absurdist-ethics, because they 
introduce moments in their theory that provide room—even in the face of the ‘phantom 
public’ or the idea of fragmentation—, for the development and employment of the romantic 
notions of love and reason, of self-fulfillment and self-effacement, and the possibility of an 
intense, however momentary futurity that might yet spark the seedling of a “vital culture.” I 
contend that a model of absurdist-ethics as demonstrated through barebacking, in particular 
as it is represented in Days, could be thought of as this kind of new culture.  
Following Nietzsche in this sense, ethics becomes a means of transformation. A 
Romantic will-to-knowledge of the self, an execution of self-actualization at the same time as 
self-annihilation, is possible in the postmodern. If the individual is supposed to become who 
the individual is, as Nietzsche commands, in order to live an ethical life, then the actions of 
the barebacker, figuratively speaking, may mirror what could be assessed as an illustration of 
those humans who take Nietzsche’s challenge to heart, by revolting against the will to life 
itself, as a channel through which to engage in an ethics of living life fully, by aiming at the 
	  	   162	  
futurity of their selves and their bodies, individually and collectively within a community of 
imagined barebackers, as foreshadowed by Nietzsche in aphorism 270 of Gay Science: 
What does your conscience say?—‘You should become who you are,’ which implies 
that we should become that which we will become—our future selves. This is an 
ethics of death, as we will all be dead in the future. Yet, in striving for death, with 
more celebratory care, we are arguably enjoying an ethics of living up until the point 
of death as well. (219)  
 
This is not about undertaking an act of aimless refusal to conform, but rather a use of free 
will to be free—to live and die as one wills it, communally and as part of a brotherhood, 
although this theoretical claim may have little bearing in reality. If I were to lay forth this 
theory in practical terms, the conclusion would mean that people who spread HIV might be 
described as heroic bareback rebels. Yet, I am not making this claim, nor am I able to judge 
the practice of barebacking here. What I intend with this discussion is to flesh out a 
theoretical model of ethics that I see as instantiated by the mere conjecture of barebacking.  
 Hypothetically, barebacking is largely an anonymous act of sex. A barebacker meets 
other men online. Potential barebackers may exchange a picture of themselves, as a filter to 
judge whether the couple should meet for sex, but also they hypothetically also only learn the 
online pseudonym of the other person. Alternately, a couple could meet in a bar, and have 
anonymous sex. These types of rendezvouses, while they may depend in part on mutual 
attraction, in theory would not do so exclusively. Put simply, my theory of barebacking 
envisions a scenario whereby a would-be lover within a community of barebackers, seeks to 
have sexual exchanges with multiple partners. In this sense, the ideal relationship would not 
be co-dependent, but independent, yet still mutually fulfilling. Additionally, this 
metaphorically invokes the exchange of the virus, over the will to suicide and death, i.e., as 
in the ultimate expenditure. I argue that, in this instantiation of a postmodern absurdist-ethics, 
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there is a much more equitable power relation because the positions of power are occupied 
by two non-lovers, which would not mean the entire dissolution of power per se, but it would 
render relations more communal, fraternal, and consensual. In this scenario, neither the 
bestower of the pathogen nor the one who is receiving it necessarily has more power than the 
other, because what is being courted on both sides (the virus aside) is in fact the experience 
of radical awakeness to life through the lens of death. This awakeness is a kind of 
enlightenment that characterizes my theory of an absurdist-ethics.  
 Socrates’ theory of the lover and the beloved is fruitful when he envisions an 
aesthetic rapport between them, whereby the relationship between two men could be 
compared to an act of reading, an instantiation of an aesthetic ideal. John Peters, in Speaking 
into the Air (1999), outlines this argument well.  
More specifically, reading for the ancient Greeks was often figured as the sexual 
relation between penetrator and penetrated. […] To read—which meant to read 
aloud—was to relinquish control of one’s body to the (masculine) writer, to yield to a 
distant dominating body. To write was to act as an erastes; to read, as an eromenos. 
(40)  
 
This love between philosophical lovers is related to communication and mirrors particular 
dilemmas of post-modern communication: 
Socrates provides a checklist of enduring anxieties that arise in response to 
transformations in the means of communication. Writing parodies live presence; it is 
inhuman, lacks interiority, destroys authentic dialogue, is impersonal, and cannot 
acknowledge the individuality of its interlocutors; and it is promiscuous in 
distribution. Such things have been said about printing, photography, phonography, 
cinema, radio, television, and computers. (47)  
 
Similarly, within a model of barebacking, browsers of barebacking pornography on the 
Internet might rouse many of these notions. Online communication above all other media 
“parodies live presence,” and along with anonymous acts of barebacking, both can be called 
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impersonal, favoring the collective over the individual, and of course, both are promiscuous 
in nature and distribution.  
 In order to further the idea of a postmodern absurdist-ethics, I turn now to the ideas of 
the gift and sacrifice as related to barebacking, and its connection with the two chapters on 
the roles of the absurd and of the aesthetic of the grotesque. If one thinks about giving a gift 
as a contingency of power that imposes certain obligations on an individual or group, then 
giving another body HIV may be interpreted in the same fashion. If one understands a gift as 
Pierre Bourdieu does in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972), as a deferral in time, then 
one is no longer playing a correlative game. In my model of barebacking, this gift does not 
come with a disavowal of expectations. Instead, participants are hypothetically fully aware of 
the price they pay when they play such games. Veritably, in this case, this is why the game is 
played. There might be a moment of ‘don’t mention it’ during the act itself, but the presence 
of this obligation or the repercussions of these actions are evident; and it is this heightened 
difference that categorizes the representational model of barebacking as a postmodern, 
impersonal, and absurd and grotesque gesture, instilled with great expectations, whereby 
what the individual expects as the gift is in fact the absurd sacrifice.  
This absurdist-grotesque expression of sacrifice that barebacking portends is closely 
related to what enthralls Kierkegaard, and by extension Derrida, in their responses to the 
biblical story of Abraham and his son Isaac. In the Bible, God asks Abraham to kill his son; 
and Abraham intends to carry out this act, only to have his son saved by God in the end 
(Genesis 22. 9-10; 22.12). What fascinates Derrida, as well as Kierkegaard, is Abraham’s 
willingness to sacrifice his son, to embrace his death because someone [God] asks him to. In 
his crucial work Fear and Trembling (1843), Kierkegaard maintains: “[Abraham] did not 
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believe that he would be blessed one day in the hereafter but that he would become blissfully 
happy here in the world. […] He believed by virtue of the absurd,” for all human calculation 
had long since ceased (30; my emphasis). I prefer to read this scenario, as Derrida does in his 
essay The Gift of Death (1991), as the theory of one’s responsibility to the Other. Derrida 
suggests:  
As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my absolute singularity 
enters into relation with this on the level of obligation and duty. I am responsible to 
the other as other, I answer to him and I answer for what I do before him. But of 
course, what binds me thus is my singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, 
immediately propels me into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice. (68) 
 
Being for the other, as happens hypothetically in the practice of barebacking, will always be 
an absurdist, grotesque and romantic act of revolt, a gift of death, and a betrayal of the other 
and the self. One sacrifices one’s ethics in the name of another—that is, one embraces the 
responsibility of living in this postmodern moment at the expense of fearing for the future. In 
this representational model, a barebacker no longer holds back, because at that moment he 
must invest his fear of death into an arguably ethically viable, libidinal act, which is at once a 
paradoxical form of destruction and creation.  
The cultural ties that emerge through this process of the “gift of death” have clear 
consequences in the conformation of communal cohesion. In Using Social Theory in 
Educational Research (2008), Mark Dressman invokes Bourdieu in this regard: 
[Bourdieu] argued that the supposedly free choices people make […] are reproductive, 
that is, they signify membership in a particular cultural or social group to others and 
to themselves, and in so signifying, they limit also the social and cultural parameters 
of the individuals’ aspirations. (43) 
 
What some only esteem as acts of free choice or preference are invariably signs one imposes 
on the Other. Such transmissions are not always traceable, but they are infinite; and as 
Badiou proposes in his essay on “The Subject of Art,” this is not a transcendental infinite, but 
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an immanent one (par. 17). Introspection into the corporeal consequences demands a 
metaphor of an epidemic, and not one that relies on morality per se. The afterlife of the 
community of barebackers may trust instead in the absurd and grotesque performances that 
by definition threaten and simultaneously ensure an inevitable “plague [on all their] houses.” 
The importance of community and belonging is not only hypothetical within a 
barebacking community, but also in practice. In 2000, in Österreichs Magazin für Schwule 
[Austria’s Magazine for Gay Men], the author of an article relates: “There are HIV-negative 
gays, who proclaim that they would like to finally be positive, to finally ‘belong.’ When he is 
‘finally’ positive, he need no longer be afraid about becoming positive, and he can once 
again enjoy sex without fear” (Bussi 59; my translation). The proclivity to belong to this 
group—this queer genealogy of men—may be halted nevertheless, even if only temporarily, 
by the consideration that this knowledge and pledge comes with a deadly price. For those 
men who overcome this hindrance, jouissance is most simplistically the death drive 
exteriorized through actions of the flesh.49 Jouissance here also suggests a surplus of pleasure 
in the pleasure economy, whereby bodily pleasure combines with pleasure of risk, such that it 
becomes an incandescent and annihilating act of pleasure, the kind that sends one to 
obliteration, just as barebacking may do in the ethical model proposed here: to bareback is 
absurd, thereby fashioning the body as grotesque, infected and dying. More enigmatically, 
within a postmodern absurdist-ethics, the pursuit of jouissance, as menacing as it may seem, 
is in point of fact an ethical schema by which to live; otherwise, the individual would be 
arguably unceremoniously surrendering to a joyless life.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In the words of Lacan: “This track, this pathway, is familiar to us. It’s ancestral knowledge. […] Knowledge 
is what brings life to a halt at a certain limit on the path to jouissance. For the path toward death […] is nothing 
other than what is called jouissance.” (18) 
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Such model of a postmodern absurdist-ethics is evidently controversial, but the ethics 
behind a practice that confronts death and the restrictions of the body head-on has a long 
lineage of philosophical interest. Alain Badiou’s discussion of the ethics of bodies helps 
illustrate this paradigm.  
But finally, what is a limit of the body, a limit of the living body? […] So we can say 
that in the form of the subjective paradigm the subject is experimentation of death as 
final limit of the body. […] and the real and final experimentation in the field of body 
art can be to commit suicide in public. And it’s a philosophical determination, 
because a long time ago Heidegger said that finally Dasein or subject is a subject for 
death. I can name, in general, the subjective paradigm which is experimentation of the 
limits of the body something like enjoyment because enjoyment is the name of 
experimentation of death in life, experimentation of the big thing (das Ding) as death 
in life itself. (“The Subject of Art,” par. 8) 
 
What Badiou also suggests here is again Lacan’s conception of jouissance, which for Badiou 
is the first paradigm of the human’s subjectivity as enjoyment of anticipating one’s own 
death. One experiments with one’s own life and the limits of the body as a way to tweak 
pleasure (“The Subject of Art,” par. 8).  
The experimentation of the body, and the ultimate absurdist act of such for Badiou, is 
perhaps the most grotesque form of aesthetics, which goes hand in hand with an ethics of life 
through death, an absurdist-ethics. If the “real and final experimentation” of our bodies 
would be “to commit suicide in public,” then barebacking as an instantiation of the ethical 
model I propose here may well be an example of such. Nevertheless, the public suicide 
would not be a literal one, but instead the choice to live HIV-positive and bareback, and 
consider and defend that choice as a viable, ethical choice. Badiou suggests that in 
postmodernity, such radical absurdist acts are the only ones that bring meaning to life, 
although I am not suggesting that Badiou anticipated this model applying to something as 
radical as barebacking. Still, the model supplies one possible reading of a grotesque aesthetic 
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ideal, which raises the stakes philosophically and politically. This absurdist-ethics allows 
room for life and sexual and emotional fulfillment, while the previous only dictates 
asexuality, insularity, and ultimately a spiritual death, even before one’s time. The result of 
this viewpoint is paradoxical, as when Nietzsche speaks of the paradox and even absurdity of 
the capacity of some individuals to deliberately set the perimeters of life so that they are 
always confronted by thresholds of pain and the thought of death—a situation many 
individuals might regard as intolerable, the lateralization of which would be grotesque.  
But for the ascetic priest, who Nietzsche sees in the role of philosopher, it is his job 
and his life to live on the brink, always acknowledging the possibility that life is pain, that 
life could end at any moment. Nietzsche classifies he who chooses this vocation as one who 
is the “apparent enemy of life, this denier—[yet] precisely he is among the greatest 
conserving and yes-creating forces of life;” and congruently, he adds that 
The sick animal, […] the great experimenter with himself, discontented and insatiable, 
wrestling with animals, nature, and gods for ultimate dominion—he, still 
unvanquished, eternally directed toward the future, whose own restless energies never 
leave him in peace, so that his future digs like a spur into the flesh of every present— 
how should such a courageous and richly endowed animal not also be the most 
imperiled, the most chronically and profoundly sick of all sick animals? […] The No 
he says to life brings to light, as if by magic, an abundance of tender Yeses; even 
when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-destruction—the very 
wound itself afterward compels him to live. (“Genealogy,” 557)  
 
Accepting the nature of Nietzsche’s ascetic priest acts as a foil of an absurdist-ethical model 
of HIV via barebacking, a paradigm of endurance and survival emerges from this crux, and 
one that is compatible with the seemingly Thanatos-striven core of barebacking. If one 
adopts this framework, within the constraints of this model as a representation for a 
postmodern ethics, one may conceive the barebacker as one whom openly tackles the human 
condition and the perception of the inevitability of death. Forced to wrestle with HIV and 
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AIDS, the sick man, the grotesque human body, which Nietzsche defines as one infected (he 
references historical epidemics), as one who tests the absolutes of life and gratification, 
engages in the practice of barebacking, and collides and battles in the interstice of ethics, 
placing himself at the heart of the philosophy of the absurd, which defines an absurdist-
ethics.  
Following the philosophical lineage that frames the model of an absurdist-ethics, 
Albert Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) is also a relevant signpost. In the preface, he 
explains that 
The fundamental subject of ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’ is this: it is legitimate and 
necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the 
problem of suicide face to face. […] This book declares that even within the limits of 
nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism. […] It sums itself 
up for me as a lucid invitation to live and to create, in the very midst of the desert. (v) 
 
Camus turns to the absurd as an ethical position, and philosophical revolt as the only viable 
action through this position:  
[The absurd] is that divorce between the mind that desires and the world that 
disappoints, my nostalgia of unity, this fragmented universe and the contradiction that 
binds them together. […] I am not interested in philosophical suicide, but rather in 
plain suicide. I merely wish to purge it of its emotional content and know its logic and 
its integrity. Any other position implies for the absurd mind deceit and the mind’s 
retreat before what the mind itself has brought to light. (Sisyphus, 50)  
  
The instantiation of barebacking as it interplays with HIV connects an absurdist-ethics to 
Camus’s understanding of the absurd. He defends the absurd as an act of revolt, and as one of 
the only possible coherent philosophical positions: 
It is an insistence upon an impossible transparency. It challenges the world anew 
every second. Just as danger provided man the unique opportunity of seizing 
awareness, so metaphysical revolt extends awareness to the whole of experience. It is 
the constant presence of man in his own eyes. It is not aspiration, for it is devoid of 
hope. That revolt is the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought 
to accompany it. (54)  
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For Camus, in order to stay alive, the absurd must be experienced deliberately again and 
again, as if it were “at the extreme limit of the condemned man’s last thought, that shoelace 
that despite everything he sees a few yards away, on the very brink of his dizzying fall. The 
contrary of suicide, in fact, is the man condemned to death. […] That revolt gives life its 
value” (54-55). The consequence of Camus’s premise is that the absurd and the grotesque 
must be realized as something ethically positive, for together, the ethical paragon stands as 
the will to life. Indeed, the barebacker is a rebel who challenges the limits of life. Pursuant to 
Camus, rebels are not just mavericks who strive without purpose, history, or reason. Instead, 
such individuals are largely compelled and driven by history’s collective memories. They 
rebel in order to experience true consciousness, in order to exist, and to survive. Camus 
discloses in The Rebel (1951) that: 
In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the ‘cogito’ in the realm of 
thought: it is the first piece of evidence. But this evidence lures the individual from 
his solitude. It founds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore we 
exist. (62) 
 
Camus lays down rules for this kind of rebellion, an absurdist act, which is a not just any and 
all unbridled and radical action. Instead, a rebel must be mindful of community, of history, 
guided by principles of reason, by what I contend is an absurdist-ethical code of conduct. 
Camus continues:  
In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion must respect the limit it discovers in 
itself—a limit where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist. Rebellious thought, 
therefore, cannot dispense with memory: it is a perpetual state of tension. In studying 
its actions and its results, we shall have to say, each time, whether it remains faithful 
to its first noble promise or if, through indolence or folly, it forgets its original 
purpose and plunges into a mire of tyranny or servitude. (109) 
 
Rebels, like barebackers in the theoretical model I propose here, are those who live on the 
precipice of enlightenment. Only in engaging with the limits of one’s body and mind, as 
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Camus stresses, can one transition from accepting the mundaneness and apathy that goes 
along with a cursory understanding of the absurdity of life, to the discovery of the value of 
the absurd and the grotesque. Only then, after suffering, can the individual come into her or 
his own right and identity as a rebel, only then does one begin to truly exist in an ethical 
manner.  
This suffering is not, after all, something that must be done alone. Camus maintains 
that suffering, just like cultural memories, are collective, and collectivity, that is, the social 
bond, is at the core of an understanding of ethics: 
In absurdist experience, suffering is individual. But from the moment when a 
movement of rebellion begins, suffering is seen as a collective experience. Therefore 
the first progressive step for a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to 
realize that this feeling of strangeness is shared with all men and that human reality, 
in its entirety, suffers from the distance, which separates it from the rest of the 
universe. The malady experienced by a single man becomes a mass plague. (22)  
 
Camus likens the human condition to a mass plague, but one that may be managed by 
individual struggle through cognition of the matrix of the struggle of the collective. To 
Camus, the allegiance to the absurd, and by extension its most grotesque manifestations, as in 
he who is infected by the plague of the humanity and assumes a grotesque form, is accepting 
of the fact that life is absurd, and that by living according to an absurdist-ethics, which 
sanctions such a radical lifestyle, one may locate comfort and satisfaction. The connection to 
AIDS is easily summoned in my own representational conception of the barebacker, his own 
struggles with his positive status, his culturally constructed infected and dying body coded by 
grotesque aesthetics, and the comfort he may attain in a community of his equals.  
Although one may grasp one’s own state of insularity among mankind, one may still 
discover a sense of belonging and solidarity within a community. The dynamic is thus 
explained between, hypothetically, the isolated barebacker and the virtual collective of the 
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barebacking community in the Internet. Both need each other in order to glean consolation 
and resignification of the conditions of possibility of living in the moment, in the shadow of 
death. In “Restoring the Self as Subject,” Stanford Lyman helps elucidate the role that 
agency plays in configurations of the absurd:  
The Absurdist position holds that the world makes no ontological sense but nearly 
always is socially constructed and reconstructed to give it a sensibility. […] Thus the 
sociological investigation [of the absurd] proceeds by finding out whether, how, and 
to what extent the particular human agents under investigation are able to transform 
space into territories, convert duree into disparate time tracks, and render accounts, 
employ disclaimers, or develop aligning actions in the course of securing, 
maintaining, or shoring up the sometimes stable, sometimes fragile, and sometimes 
fractured sociations in which they find themselves. (17)  
 
The absurdist individual may obtain a more valuable life experience, and yield agency, 
specifically through border engagements, which also include, perhaps surprisingly, art and 
aesthetics as something that necessarily go hand in hand with the ethical in this regard. If life 
is absurd, and engaging in absurdist behavior is necessary to live an ethical life, and if this 
grotesque form of aesthetics makes an absurdist life bearable, then by extension those who 
seek an ethical life must necessarily scout out ways to configure their absurdist behavior in 
an aesthetically grotesque, complex fashion in order to disavow the inevitable and the always 
unavoidable presence of negativity, as a mark of death that evades life. In effect, an ethical 
life, as my model portends it, must embrace the absurd and grotesque aesthetic 
simultaneously, that is what a postmodern absurdist-ethics calls forth. The embodiment of 
this negotiation takes form in the esperpento, which I discuss in the ensuing chapter.  
I maintain that the practice of barebacking can be represented as absurd, which I have 
illustrated above, and at the same time may be depicted in art in an aesthetically complex 
form, the grotesque, as a way of engaging spectators philosophically. This unique 
manifestation of art can also be seen, just as one may view barebacking itself, as a symptom 
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of postmodernity, whereby postmodern citizens desire to deconstruct the metanarrative of life 
in more paradoxical, complex, intellectual, and enriching ways. As Ian Ward explains in his 
Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (2004): “Whereas Plato and Aristotle feared poetry for 
its disruptive potential and challenge to the sovereignty of reason, postmodernism has 
returned to the aesthetic in an effort to reinvest some sort of intellectual unity” (155). 
Following this definition, my approach to barebacking as an instantiation of an absurd-ethics, 
although controversial, may be seen as an ideal form of absurdist-grotesque art, as the 
fashioning of the body through disease.  
To further understand the mechanism behind an absurdist-ethics in the films I 
presented in an absurd AIDS Cinema, and in order to explore the consequences of the 
theoretical framework I have laid out in the present chapter, it is necessary to assess the way 
the grotesquely fashioned, mythical body with AIDS might be represented in its most 
philosophically developed form. For this purpose, I invoke in the ensuing chapter the figure 
of the esperpento, a politically compelling aesthetics whose metaphorical representation 
seeks agency in radical, absurdist acts, dressed in a grotesque aesthetics. The esperpento’s 
figure foils most poignantly that of the barebacker as rebel and revolutionary, that is, as the 
agent of an absurdist-ethics. As the most complete culmination of my theory of an absurdist-
ethics, the esperpento also helps to explain how an absurd AIDS Cinema can be described as 
a schizophrenic, postmodern cinema, which makes it evident how it would be possible, 
logical, and even necessary to laugh at AIDS jokes in Virus, to discover a saint in a rapist in 
Animal, and to refigure a barebacker as a noble rebel in Days, all of them acting in relation to 
and through the vehicle of the HIV virus. The esperpento explains ultimately how one may 
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act in an ethically justifiable manner, and seek agency, within a postmodern philosophical 
landscape.   
 
 
CHAPTER V 
ESPERPENTO AS RADICAL AGENT 
 
 
 In this chapter, I identify and deepen my understanding of the nature of the particular 
aesthetic model that I argue goes hand-in-hand with the paradigm of an absurdist-ethics, 
which I denote as culminating in the aesthetic form of the esperpento, a term coined and 
illustrated in the works of early 20th century Galician writer Ramón del Valle-Inclán (1866-
1936). I contend that works of art that engage with an absurdist-ethics deliver representations 
of traumatic events by drawing upon the tradition of both the absurd and the grotesque, 
oftentimes with the aim of provoking the viewer intellectually through laughter, disgust, or 
desire. In the context of HIV/AIDS, the affect of the esperpento, as a politically charged form 
of an absurd-grotesque aesthetics, calls forth the deepest fears the epidemic invokes. Affect 
reveals itself visually as death, or more complexly in one’s psyche, as a schizophrenic 
multitude of affective forms. 
Ramón María del Valle-Inclán’s Luces de Bohemia [Lights of Bohemia] (1920-1924) 
is a story of the last moments in the life of Máximo Estrella, a poet who, slowly dying of 
alcohol poisoning, wanders until dawn through the streets of Madrid with his drinking 
companion Don Latino. They stir up trouble through their encounter with prostitutes, 
gambling, and violence. Eventually imprisoned that night for causing a riot, and later upon 
his release, Max walks home and in the early morning hours on his doorstep, he dies, but not 
entirely without reflection. Indeed, in this night of murky intoxication and misdeeds, sensing 
his impending death, Max stumbles almost haphazardly and apathetically, and altogether 
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comically and grotesquely upon moments of philosophical clarity and epiphany about the 
human condition.  
Early on in the night, after contemplating the wonders of his distorted reflection in the 
mirrors of the Callejón del Gato, Estrella has a revelation:  
Max: Distortion determined by strict mathematical norms is no longer distortion. 
That’s my aesthetic creed from now on: to transform all the classical norms with the 
strictly mathematical impartiality of a concave mirror.  
Don Latino: And where do you find your mirror? 
Max: At the bottom of a glass. 
Don Latino: You’re a genius! I take my head off to you!  
Max: Latino, we must distort our expression of reality in the same mirrors that distort 
our reflections and the whole miserable charade of Spanish life.  
Don Latino: We’ll go and live in an amusement park.  
Max: [Feeling ill]. My hands have gone numb and my fingernails hurt. I’m a sick 
man! 
Don Latino: […] You’re just trying to make me feel sorry for you. 
Max: Idiot, take me home and let me die in peace. (123) 
 
The aesthetic creed, to which Max ascribes in the face of his imminent death, is the 
esperpento. Although he is blind, he knows that the image in the mirror is distorted. His 
blindness has been “the gift of Venus,” for Max is ill with syphilis. Still, he has the insight to 
realize that the deformity before him is reality. Human nature is grotesque and comical, and 
entirely absurd, although it can be explained through a mere mathematical calculation. I 
contend that the aesthetic of the esperpento helps to illustrate and reconcile the pairing of the 
absurd and the grotesque in the mythical body of AIDS in an absurd AIDS cinema. 
Furthermore, Max’s epiphany that the esperpento can be mathematically contemplated is also 
telling with reference to an absurdist-ethics. Through the esperpento aesthetic it is possible to 
fully open up and explain the mechanism of an absurdist-ethics, that I contend is more clearly 
understood through an absurd AIDS cinema. In this context, the genre is also best accessed 
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as a schizophrenic, postmodern cinema, that explains how an absurdist-ethics can prove an 
ethically viable vehicle in film today.  
The simplest translation of the word esperpento is a “slovenly person” (Hess, 151). It 
has even been translated as “eye sore.” The term is also analogous to “the scarecrow,” and 
has been translated as such, but it is important to note that this kind of scarecrow may be 
more than just a bag of straw.  
To put my understanding of the absurdist-grotesque body into context, I begin by 
thinking about popular cultural references to bodies that are meant to scare and at the same 
time may be scared themselves by society at large, such as scarecrows, monsters, and other 
minor border creations that, as is the nature of the esperpento, have no designation. This 
approach will pave the way to consider more complexly, as one manifestation of the 
esperpento, the cultural fears of images of a body infected with HIV or a body with AIDS in 
its mythical configurations. The potent figure of the esperpento, and the philosophical 
paradigm that underpins it, provides a mode of radical political agency that facilitates hope. 
At the end of a campy and carnivalesque night on the town, he who comes home infected 
with HIV will die with a grotesque, yet enlightened smile at his doorstep. 
The esperpentic scarecrow is a grotesque figure “filled with twisted, fragmented 
bodies often integrated with mechanical parts” (Johnson, 158). The scarecrow is first and 
foremost that which one uses to scare away those agents (birds or wild animals) that destroy 
the objects one holds dear, e.g., crops to feed the family in order to survive. The esperpento 
scarecrow is scary, as the name suggests; he is meant to rouse fear in humans. The material 
form of the scarecrow (stuffed clothes with hay, a hat, and a pitchfork) comes to embody fear 
itself. He is familiar, yet uncanny: grotesque. The esperpento is also a monster, one that may 
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never be considered fully human, but that may act as a doppelgänger for the real, for the 
human. One encounters such an esperpentic representation in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
(1818), a story in which a near human-like creature struggles with his own trials of becoming 
human. In the novel, the body of the creature is defeated, even before his mind—that 
importantly appears to be the one obtaining the human ideal. That is, in the process of 
becoming human, the misshapen creature acquires a profound ethical-philosophical 
understanding with which he has to come to terms. This individual gathers value in living an 
existence he knows can only lead to his ostracization and his death. And yet, he still finds 
solace in the presence of the grotesque mind of human beings and in their absurdist actions, 
inversely mirrored by his own grotesque body that has been created out of absurd 
circumstances. Ironically, it is a master of scientific process, following the rules of progress 
promised by the Enlightenment, who makes the deformed creature in Frankenstein. Yet, it is 
not the master who experiences a true philosophical, existential awakening, but the creature 
who, after experiencing the shock of the relative incongruence and seeming inhumanness of 
humanity, must in turn ultimately reject those ideals.  
 A third comparison, again to scarecrows, brings me closer to the sense of the 
esperpento in the context of HIV as the absurdist corporal signification of the virus. I am 
referring to American children’s author L. Frank Baum’s story The Wizard of Oz (1900), and 
more pointedly the 1939 filmic version from American director Victor Fleming. The 
scarecrow in The Wizard of Oz is known for the circumstance that he has no organs, but is 
instead only made of stuffing. Consequently, in the tale, the scarecrow seeks a brain, just as 
the tin man longs a heart. These mechanical and inanimate objects-turned-animate is what 
Deleuze and Guattari would call a body without organs: 
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The body without organs is nonproductive; nonetheless it is produced, at a certain 
place and a certain time in the connective synthesis, as the identity of producing and 
the product: the schizophrenic table is a body without organs. The body without 
organs is not proof of an original nothingness, nor is it what remains of a lost totality. 
Above all, it is not a projection; it has nothing whatsoever to do with the body itself, 
or with an image of the body. It is the body without an image. (Anti-Oedipus, 9) 
 
For the authors, “The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable, serves as a 
surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire” (12). With this concept 
in mind, I image how the role of the esperpento scarecrow as a body without organs might 
also compare to one’s fear of an image of HIV that one can never see or visualize, and yet 
can be manifested into multiple grotesque forms in the cultural mind eye. That does not mean 
that one should view individuals infected with the virus as grotesque. I am not talking about 
real lives or even people, but instead about how the virus across the body is represented or 
imagined, insofar as it evades representation. In these scenarios, as an aesthetic of an 
absurdist-ethics would prescribe, the body is represented oftentimes as doubled, fragmented, 
and disembodied, as well as grotesque and dying, whereby its decay is celebrated and 
eroticized. I extend this metaphor to the mythical body with AIDS in absurd AIDS films, that 
I have hypothesized is a body without organs, depersonalized, but also filled up with affect of 
the humor and fashioned by a grotesque aesthetic, which helps navigate and trace the 
bearings of the loss and death that occurred through the event of the pandemic. An absurd 
AIDS film reanimates the faces of the deceased in a macabre, yet oftentimes humorous, but 
always provocative way through the mechanism of the absurd and the grotesque.  
 Valle-Inclán’s literary contributions are clearly a form of aesthetic and political revolt. 
In a period of time when Spain confronted deep crises derived from the loss of its former 
colonies, the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, and the rapid dwindling of its 
international influence, Valle-Inclán coined the designation of the esperpento and developed 
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its aesthetic characteristics in his writings, which are known for being grotesque and radically 
political. Valle-Inclán was a forward thinker, famous for his boisterous and adamant manner, 
and his dialectic, which sought to expose the grotesqueness of bodies of power, such as the 
dictator, the church and the state, and their corruption as mirrored in the trickling down effect 
of venality from above into the community and the behavior of the individual.  
 Much of the inspiration for the development of the esperpento came from Valle-
Inclán’s involvement as a member of what critics have called Generación del 98 [The 
Spanish Generation of 1898]. This was a group of intellectuals who lived during the time of 
the Spanish-American War. Dealing with the trauma of the events of social and economic 
turmoil, namely the loss of the last Spanish colonies, and their dissatisfaction with the 
political moves made by Spain in the years of restoration that ensued, they voiced radical 
dissent in their writings. These authors were not however like an avant-garde group signing a 
common creed. They wrote following their own agenda, but they were also in contact and 
exchange with their counterparts from other Spanish speaking countries. María Delgado 
describes Valle-Inclán’s style after the events of the Spanish-American war:  
[The] author springs from purely artistic considerations to such sociopolitical 
concerns as the succession of inept governments [that] could neither better the 
miserable state of the peasant in the countryside and the worker in the city, nor rectify 
the many inequalities of daily life in a nation that had not learned the hard lessons of 
1898 when Spain lost the remnants of its once-vast empire through incompetence and 
an unrealistic belief in the viability of past glories. It was such concerns that formed 
the rationale for the new aesthetic of the grotesque and the absurd. (Spanish Theatre, 
39-40).  
 
Valle-Inclán also expressed this sentiment, stating that 
Ours is a harsh paternity … Because we are ever accompanied by indignation at what 
we see taking place around us fatally. Spain is a vast stage selected by tragedy. […] 
Our entire populace is worth less than a gang of trivial players set on staging the 
genial drama of Spanish life. The result, of course, is an esperpento. (qtd. in Delgado, 
40).  
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In this context. esperpento has the meaning of a shoddy, farcical, and grotesque 
representation of an imagined identity from which almost competing and contradictory drives 
can be derived. The esperpento, as a political agenda, yearns for the dissolution of corrupt 
governments and an enlightenment of the common folk, but at the same time, must exhibit 
the incongruent sense of nostalgia within this society for a lost past. The esperpento mirrors 
the preposterous sense of entitlement of a society that cannot measure to standards and 
illusions that are out of touch with testing present reality. This splitting of the cultural 
identity at the core of the image of the esperpento is very problematic, and summarizes the 
chiasm between reality and warped reality I mentioned in the introductory chapter.  
 The paradigm of the esperpento in my own absurdist-ethics, in particular as it applies 
to the practice of barebacking, also portends to the cultural differences, sometimes major, 
sometimes minor, in films of a Global Queer AIDS Cinema. As I have shown in the previous 
chapters, spectators are exposed to German-Berlin bathhouse politics of the 1980s in Virus, 
to Indian village micro-politics of poverty and lack of tools for education and dissemination 
in Animal, and to Italy’s endorsement of European and American pharmaceutical companies 
in Days. Inside the local differences, there is a community of members who rely on nostalgic 
notions of a mythical, bygone past—for example a time when gay men could copulate 
without protection or fear of HIV. But that is not the real situation; HIV and AIDS happens, 
the disease happens, death as a result of the disease happens, and still people are there, trying 
to live, living because and spite of that reality. The interstice between reality and desired 
reality is a warped reality: esperpento, barebacking. This great capacity of interstitial 
representation of the esperpento helps to illuminate the aesthetic corporal signification of the 
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grotesque experience and mythical body with AIDS in cinema, as a radical agent of revolt in 
an absurdist-ethics.  
 The barebacker, as represented in Days for example, has chosen his ethical position, 
and has found peace and standing in his reflection within an absurdist-ethical paradigm, just 
as Ayyanar does with respects to his own contagion and state of dying in Animal. Also, in 
Virus, many bodies are depicted as defaced or deformed by affective notions of the grotesque 
and humor. All three films demand that viewers take up their own viable positions vis-à-vis 
the virus, and choose what is their own image in that warping mirror that reflects those 
passing by in the street, that is, those who witness what happens in the silver screen. What is 
at stake ultimately is a process of discovery and enlightenment that portends to the 
individual’s acknowledgment of the power dynamics at play in respect to her or his ethical 
position to life and death, the personal station in relationship to minoritarian cultures and the 
powers that be, such as doctors, scientists, and law makers, who control how humans live and 
die. HIV is only the catalyst in this particular context. I maintain that, through this process of 
engagement, one may achieve enlightenment, and thereby reach a form of catharsis.  
 The symbol of agency is the grotesque figure of the esperpento and his absurdist 
actions, which make him in turn an agent of an absurdist-ethics, and what some might call an 
anti-hero, not unlike other (post-)modernist heroes such as James Joyce’s Leopold Bloom. 
Valle-Inclán’s Lights of Bohemia has often been compared to James Joyce’s Ulysses (1918-
1920), and the figure of the esperpento to Ulysses’ protagonist. María Delgado explains how 
“the episodic form, as in Brecht’s work, functions as a dramatic statement, which like James 
Joyce’s Ulysses, charts the journey of an anti-hero through a capital city—‘un Madrid 
absurdo, brillante y hambriento’ [‘an absurd, brilliant, and hungry Madrid’]” (1986). In the 
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opinion of some scholars, the journey Max undertakes is one of seeing, that is, esperpentic in 
terms of the visual and visibility. In Reading Culture at the Threshold: Time and Transition 
in Modern Spain (1800 - 1990) (2008), Jonathan D. Synder conjectures that for Valle-Inclán 
the esperpentic lens “distorts and deforms to reveal its concrete object of reflection” as would 
the mirrors in a funhouse. Valle-Inclán had specific mirrors in mind, the concave and convex 
mirrors once featured in a busy market street in Madrid called the Callejón del Gato (142). 
These mirrors referenced in the definition of the esperpento aesthetic no longer exist in 
Madrid. During Valle-Inclán’s time, they were full-body size and the people would look 
either tall and skinny or short and fat, like Cervantes’ Sancho and Don Quixote. For Valle-
Inclán, the misshapen mirrors and the aesthetic within their reflections worked well as an 
analogy for how one might see reality, otherwise distorted by ideology and dogma, now 
unmasked through the lens of its reflection. In other words, that which was distorted is 
restored to its true nature in the looking glass, via a doppelgänger effect. Vision in this sense 
is not however merely an individual activity, but a collective one: 
Goya invented esperpentism. Classical heroes have gone to stroll in the Callejón del 
Gato. [...] The Classical heroes reflected in the concave mirrors become the 
Esperpento. The tragic sense of Spanish life can only be rendered through a 
systematically deformed aesthetic. [...] The most beautiful images are absurd in a 
concave mirror. (123, My translation) 
 
These mirrors represent the classical image of the grotesque, as expressed through the 
configuration of the esperpento, which the author also associates with the works of renowned 
Spanish Romantic engraver and painter Francisco de Goya (1746-1828). A good example of 
Goya’s affinity with an esperpento-like aesthetic is his etching titled Disparate alegre 
[Grotesque Dance or Merry Folly] (ca. 1819-20) (fig. 4). This etching, along with the others 
in what was to be Goya’s last series of prints—the Los Disparates-Proverbios collection—
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was not released to the public until well after his death. Disparates, which means the absurd, 
nonsense, or the follies, and in a more literal sense “that which has no pair” in Spanish, was a 
collection of grotesque etchings that supposedly represent Goya’s disillusionment of the 
Spanish uprising of 1808 against the Bonaparte regime (Clair, 83). In this image, a 
carnivalesque dance of death appears to be taking place. Men dressed in drag and some 
dressed as “bobalicones” (‘Silly idiots’) contort their bodies in uncomfortable angles, which 
renders a queasy sense of momentum. The most grotesque in this image is the mere excess: 
excess of gender and sexuality, costumes, shadows, and human bodily movement. 50 
 Art scholar Jean Clair asserts that the entire collection, which represented many 
similar grotesque images of clowns and costumed figures, does relate specifically to the 
Spanish Carnival. She illustrates:  
In spite of the surreal atmosphere and incongruous aspects of the images, […] the 
subjects, while unconventional, relate to Spanish Carnival customs practiced in 
Goya’s days, such as the dance of the giants, the wearing of two-headed masks, and 
the display of monstrous figures in public places. All of them, he believes, serve to 
question authority, Carnival being the one period during which the reversal of social 
hierarchies and traditional values was permitted. (83) 
 
But in Goya’s etching, the landscape is not of a folk festival, but instead a wasteland full of 
inexplicable shadows and light, which makes the image only apparently one of irreality and 
illusion, but aesthetically one of all too real desolation, depicting a group of individuals 
incapable of taking action, or of making sense of their situation, prone to silliness, and 
convinced of the bliss of their ignorance.  
 When contrasted with the reality at Goya’s time, the bobalicones, the esperpentos, are 
perhaps not the characters engraved in his work, but those he saw as his public, that is, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The bobalicón comes from Spanish folklore. According to one source, the bobalicón is “represented as a very 
tall humanoid being with an enormous head and a horrible leering grin that hovers terrifyingly over potential 
victims. But the fear of the bobalicón is countered by his potential for being duped by a human being” (Rose, 
54).  
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society to which he belonged. Images such as Goya’s Disparate alegre are a grotesque 
representation of a philosophical revolt against traditions of art and the powers that be. This   
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Figure 4: Disparate alegre 
From the Disparates-Proverbios collection (ca. 1819-20), Francisco de Goya  
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esperpentic mirroring of society is an agent of radical revolt that follows a creed of an 
absurdist-ethics. Given that the mythical body infected with AIDS has also been represented 
in a comical-grotesque way in an absurd AIDS Cinema, Goya’s grotesque partygoers act as 
an appropriate transition into my discussion and understanding of the absurdist-grotesque 
body.  
 The monstrous figures in Goya’s etching are mirroring the other dancers and the 
viewers as well; they dance together in formation and incorporate the unwilling public into 
the circle they conform. But this dance is one that disobeys harmonious order because the 
images are slanted and incongruent. These characteristics recall Max Estrella’s definition of 
esperpento in Lights of Bohemia, and his invocation of the Callejón del Gato and the 
funhouse mirror as not just an image separate from reality, but a true image of reality in all 
its contradictions and deformations, as that which gazes into the surface of the mirror. The 
focus is not only on the individual body reflected in the mirror, but the collective. In this vein, 
one may contemplate how the AIDS figure—the mythical person infected with HIV, close to 
death’s doorstep and dying of AIDS—may be depicted in AIDS films as a personal 
instantiation of a single doomed man, as well as a body that represents the entire social 
collective. The grotesqueness is never just regulated to one individual, but is always 
reflective of a collective that, for example, actuates and explains the emphasis on the 
community of barebackers versus the individual. The mirrors presented in this passage are 
also no ordinary mirrors. Not only do they reflect reality, but they also show depth in their 
distorted nature. This is a positive characteristic insofar as depth stands metaphorically for 
depth of (collective) character, and however shallow, it indicates room for intellectual, social, 
and/or political growth. The mirrors in the Callejón del Gato depict the public reflection of 
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‘normal’ people, of which one has no access to in their private sphere. Yet, it is also an 
‘outing’ of the reflected individual’s inner self, which is perhaps monstrous or at least 
grotesque: esperpentic. 
 The Callejón del Gato, as a public space of commerce, also witnessed the flux and 
constant exchange of cultural products. Valle-Inclán’s clever use of the urban space conjures 
Walter Benjamin’s The Arcade Project [Das Passagen-Werk] (1927-1940), which invokes in 
part the on-goings and commerciality of the Parisian arcade district, where goods were 
bought and sold, and the citizens of Paris met face-to-face in the realm of the public. 
Consumers encounter in the arcade a dialectical, double image of themselves, which 
according to Benjamin goes through various stages that remind one of the esperpentic 
experience in the Callejón del Gato. Notably, Benjamin calls forth both the images of mirrors 
and the importance of the collective, as is relevant to the esperpento.  
The outermost, merely quite peripheral aspect of the ambiguity of the arcades is 
provided by their abundance of mirrors, which fabulously amplifies the spaces and 
makes orientation more difficult […] it remains—in the sense of mirror world—
ambiguous, double-edged […] The space that transforms itself does so in the bosom 
of nothingness. In its tarnished, dirtied mirrors […] it is an utterly equivocal wink 
coming from nirvana. (878).  
 
Benjamin’s description of mirrors, like those of the Callejón del Gato, tellingly reflects the 
phasing distortion of reality and the passersby’s moment of transfiguration through 
recognition of the self and the collective. Benjamin envisions the arcade undergoing two 
distinct dialectical stages. In the first, the veil of splendor is lifted to reveal a place of decay 
(907). In the second, the viewer himself now experiences an unveiling, whereby “the arcade 
changes from an unconscious experience to something consciously permitted” (907). The 
viewer then becomes aware of what Benjamin calls a  
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Not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been. Structure of what-has-been at this 
stage. Knowledge of what has been as a becoming aware, one that has the structure of 
awakening. Not-yet-conscious knowledge on the part of the collective. All insight 
according to be grasped according to the schema of awakening. (907)  
 
Similar to Benjamin’s process of awakening, Valle-Inclán’s notion of the esperpento, and by 
extension the absurd as a grotesque distortion before the dissolution of the distortion of 
reality, describes a moment of self-recognition that pertains to all humanity. We all will pass 
in front of the mirror at some point, and in that sense, an idea of an absurdist-ethics finds 
grounds of universality, that is, of human-ness. One should remember that the Lights of 
Bohemia in general, and the passage of the Callejón del Gato in particular, are conceived by 
Valle-Inclán as a piece of theater, which is a re-presentation of reality with vivid, immediate 
consequences. The cathartic and spectacular qualities of theater are replicated in this sense in 
the direct experience of the senses when seeing films.  
 While the term esperpento was originally coined in the narrative of Lights of Bohemia, 
one may valuably trace the paragon of the esperpento through Valle-Inclán’s other literary 
works (Sinclair, xi).51 For example, his Sonatas emulate this aesthetic paradigm in its 
“embryonic form” (Foster, 173). In all four Sonatas, the main protagonist is a character 
called the Marqués de Bradomín, a controversial figure that represents and at the same time 
attacks the corrupt government, and which establishes a critique of the nature of Catholicism 
as a religion saturated by a grotesque aesthetics of sexual desire and pleasure. Nöel Valis 
comments how in this vein the religion of the Marqués de Bradomín “is of a modern variety 
that worships at the altar of sex and beauty more than at the cross [whereby] religious 
references [always appear] within a context of physical pleasure” (158). Valis calls attention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Other major works of Valle-Inclán include his plays, Divinas palabras [Divine Words] (1920), his Sonatas 
(1902-1905), and his novel Tirano Banderas [The Tyrant] (1926). 
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to a passage that is not unlike the passage I mentioned in chapter two from Mann’s Death in 
Venice, in which Aschenbach draws satisfaction from the sickly condition of his love object 
Tadzio; In the Sonata de otoño [Sonata of Autumn], Bradomín’s lover Concha is also 
described similarly as having a “delicate, sickly pallor of a mourning Mary, and she was 
beautiful in that weakened, emaciated state that my eyes, lips, and hands found all their 
pleasure in the very thing that saddened me.” (qtd. in Valis, 158). Bradomín’s relationship to 
Concha is imbibed with an esperpentic framework within which Concha’s sickness is 
romanticized and eroticized. Bradomín’s response to the knowledge that she is dying evokes 
nostalgic regret and bitter-sweet romanticism, complicated with irony, which makes it 
evident that Bradomín’s mourning over her condition may be in part a selfish contemplation 
over his own experience of love, and mourning of his own impeding death, rather than of 
hers (Valis 146, 148). In this scenario, the female body is broken down into individual parts, 
which “miniaturizes Concha’s presence, turning her into a kind of bibelot or decorative 
object” (148). As I read this, Concha becomes a part of the grotesque artwork on the 
periphery of Bradomín’s existence. I argue that this same process occurs in absurd AIDS 
films, in which, through cinematic means, the images of the virus, i.e., persons infected by 
the virus, are also fragmented, depersonalized, and made alien through absurdist actions, 
sometimes colored by the affect of humor, and of the grotesque. The combative reactions of 
critics to the self-conscious process of these works, a process whose goal is to demand the 
spectator’s attention, proves that this is a very effective method of critique.  
 Alternately, in Sonata de primavera [Sonata of Spring], it is Bradomín’s character 
interestingly, who is grotesquely miniaturized as a kind of decorative object. Here, Bradomín 
tries to seduce a young girl about to take the vows of the convent. To prevent him, her 
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mother relies on the work of witchcraft. In one scene, a witch draws from the ashes of her 
fire a “literal idol [of Bradomín] in the hex shape of a small wax figure [which] bears a 
grotesque resemblance,” calling forth a doppelgänger motif that stresses “the connection 
between the imagistic fragmentation of the body and death” (Valis, 148). In the end, even 
Bradomín starts to believe he is the devil. This doubling scenario draws comparisons 
between the Sonata of Spring and other literary works: the previously discussed Frankenstein 
by Mary Shelley, Oscar Wilde’s story of The Portrait of Dorian Gray, and French author 
Rachilde’s (1860-1953) novel Monsieur Vénus (1884). The Dorian Gray figure too “clearly 
takes on a spectral life of its own, worshipped as a kind of idol of the self. But this strange 
vitality of the portrait also points to the death of a soul” (Valis, 148). A similar motif of 
doubling is conjured in Rachilde’s story of cross-transvestism that questions the boundaries 
of gender and sexuality in their excess. In this novel, Raoule—a woman dressed in drag as a 
male, seduces Jacques—a young man with feminine features. At the end of the novel, Raoule 
makes a wax figure, molded in the likeness of her deceased lover, out of artificial and real 
body parts (including Jacques own hair, teeth, and nails). The wax figure is also endowed 
with a mechanism that simulates kissing and possibly more. Raoule makes love to the wax 
figure, and through this act, brings Jacques back to life. Such analogies put Valle-Inclán’s 
early notions of the esperpento into perspective, especially on the subject of the Deleuzian 
concept of a body without organs to which I have referred to in Chapter two and early in this 
chapter. I will return to this concept when discussing the relevance of the idea of 
schizophrenia as a useful way of approaching postmodern reality.  
 A third example of Valle-Inclán’s development of the notion of the esperpento is 
present in his earliest dramas, the so-called Comedias bárbaras [Savage Plays] (Delgado, 
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Spanish Theater, 38). One of them, Divinas palabras [Divine Words] (1920), recalls 
Montaigne’s essay on “Of a Monstrous Child,” which I discussed in Chapter two in relation 
to the grotesque, and which introduces the sentiment of the esperpento. Divinas palabras is a 
story about country folk exploiting the spectacle of a deformed child to make money, even in 
the child’s death. The story is also about sexual excess and corruption. In the end, the main 
protagonist, a man named Pedro Galio, who is sexton of the town church (but described as a 
non-believer), is asked to stand up and talk to the angry crowd, who ultimately wants to stone 
his wife for the exploitation and untimely death of the child, along with other charges of her 
infidelity. Pedro, in completing this task, delivers his “divine words,” asking the crowd to 
reflect: “He that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone!” (88). Upon Pedro’s 
first proclamation, the crowd, against the normative teachings of the New Testament, begins 
to stone his wife. But, then he repeats the call, this time in Latin: “Qui sine peccato est 
vestrum, primus in illam lapidem mittat,” and the crowd, as if looking finally into a mirror, 
perhaps hearing the voice of God in the Latin language (however inauthentic coming from 
secular, non-believing Pedro), or perhaps bewildered by a language they simply cannot 
understand, and recognizing their own culpability in relationship to the crimes committed, 
stand down and walk away. The power of the anomalous speech act provokes the moment of 
crisis of the esperpento, in which the crowd, even if only momentarily, understands, 
acknowledges, and accedes to a new absurdist-ethical stand, which for a moment, salutes a 
state of enlightenment, even though that knowledge bears witness to the fact that they all, as 
a community, are or rather were invested in the joy gleaned from the exploitation of the child 
for money and entertainment. They are grotesque, but they are finally pushed to see their 
image in the mirror of their self, and decide if it reflects someone that is authorized to cast a 
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stone. It may not be a pretty acknowledgment, but it is a true one of revelation. Thus is the 
power of the esperpento. 
 The theatrics of such scenarios in which the figure of the esperpento is depicted also 
recalls the Brechtian drama. As María Delgado suggests, one may draw parallels between 
Brecht’s “theater of alienation” and the “theater of the esperpento,” or what I appraise better 
defined as the “theater of the absurd” or the “theater of absurd tragicomic.” More precisely, a 
Brechtian drama, following the principles of drama developed by German dramatist Bertolt 
Brecht (1898-1956), dictates that, in order for spectators to fully empathize with the 
characters on the stage in a play, the drama must first ensure that the spectators are initially 
estranged from sympathizing with them. This can be done by a process Brecht called the 
Verfremdungseffekt [effect or process of estrangement]. One scholar describes the objective 
of this distancing: “Brecht’s innovation is to detach the audience from serious characters with 
whom we would normally feel sympathy so that we may better judge the social and political 
circumstances which govern their lives. [Through this process], Brecht not only makes his 
audience think critically about the causes of their suffering, but he also creates the 
simultaneous engagement and detachment that defines the quintessential tragicomic response” 
(Foster, 160). The esperpento’s mode of transmission functions similarly by a technique of 
estrangement of reality and a process of reorientation and seeing as epiphany or 
enlightenment. Cardona and Zahareas describe this process, stating that “the historical events 
grotesquely projected are intrinsically absurd, farcical and even bizarre yet always imbued 
with serious or disastrous consequences—there is a tragic potency in burlesque situations and 
vice-versa” (198). The motif of a distorted reflection is elicited as a lens through which to see 
reality in all its true grotesqueness and absurdity. In terms of the process of reorientation, I 
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disagree with Cardona and Zahareas insofar as they suggest that seeing truth depends on one 
viewing the object at hand “distinctly, coldly and objectively [so that … it removes] all 
possibility of traditional catharsis; anticipating or paralleling Brecht” (198). I would argue 
that catharsis may be gleaned when operating within the framework of an absurdist-ethics. 
The esperpento serves as a vehicle with which to provoke, promote awareness and 
enlightenment, and by extension, provide the means for philosophical revolt. In other words, 
the esperpento creates room for collective human agency. 
 In an absurdist tragicomedy such as Lights of Bohemia, the world presented is not real, 
but metaphysical. There is no real motivation beyond bodily needs and simple pleasures. The 
characters appear oftentimes flat, superficial, driven by animalistic motives, and given to 
excess, particularly in their relationships to desire. In this case, the real processing work is in 
the hands of the spectator, and that is why the esperpento belongs to a “dialectic theater,” 
which describes the way that the audience would engage with the aesthetically fashioned 
character, and as a provocative manifestation of the interplay between historical reality and 
fiction (Cardona and Zahareas, 192). Similarly, Priscilla Meléndez describes how the 
esperpento is also related to an “anti-tragic theatre” and a “theatre of protest” (67). More 
importantly, Meléndez explains the difference between the “theatre of the absurd” and that in 
which an esperpento would play, whereby both theaters focus on problems of communication. 
The absurd is guided by “word-play and a search for words” to describe reality, and the 
esperpento on the “deformation of reality through language” (57). Moreover, the 
esperpento’s “popular and caricaturesque language takes center stage, and is linked to […] 
humorous and vulgar language and double entendres [which] carry a desacralizing tone and 
the appearance of lack of meaning” (57).  
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 While the distinctions between the two genres might hold true for some narratives, 
those in absurdist AIDS films really combine elements of both the theater of the absurd and 
of the esperpento. Spectators are bombarded with word-play and humorous, vulgar language, 
while also encountering problems with communication and caricature. All of these elements, 
as I demonstrated earlier, are necessary characteristics of the style, and a combination of both 
is a needed manifestation of a comical-grotesque nature in an absurdist-ethical framework. 
Because any representation of a non-human entity—such as a virus—will ultimately be both 
a reflection of reality and at the same time a gross “systematic deformation,” as Valle-Inclán 
described the esperpento (123), this ethics also demands a conception of an image that is 
absurd and circular, such as the doppelgänger and double entendres that express excess, 
along with an image which the esperpento signifies as a grotesque deformation of reality.  
 Beyond Brecht, in the theorization of esperpento, Valle-Inclán openly identified with 
creators from different time periods and styles who applied forms of a grotesque style in their 
art, including Spanish writers, and plastic artists like the already mentioned Goya. Valle-
Inclán describes how the esperpento emerged from the legacy of the struggle of the Spanish 
artist to capture a Spain bogged down by its own drama:  
We Spanish authors, youthfully deified, love to sprinkle a bit of pain into the realities 
we create. […] There is always a dramatic moment in Spain, a drama beyond the 
abilities of the performers. These puppets, made out of cardboard, without idealism 
and without courage, look ridiculous to us harnessed as heroes. They gesticulate the 
most sublime, tragic situations with the clumsiness of itinerant comedians. Don 
Quixote must become incarnate in a simpleton Quixote. Doctors declare that the 
dramatic impetus of Don Juan is in truth ambiguous physiology. Our entire registered 
population is not worth the value of a gang of comiquillos, who are determined to 
represent the great drama of Spanish life. The result, of course, is an esperpento. (qtd. 
in Lyon, 210, my translation).  
 
The esperpento may, therefore, be read as a portrayal of a collective and historical absurd, 
comical, and grotesque body, intended to be perceived more clearly and in its rawest and 
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truest form through its estrangement in various art forms. For the case of the AIDS epidemic, 
the representation of HIV and AIDS must be necessarily absurd, comical and grotesque in 
order to capture the full philosophical impetus of the social and political agenda of that image, 
and in order to gain the attention of the audience. This forced entry into the social stream 
aims at giving new, radical tools so that those affected by it may struggle and ultimately and 
hopefully attain the moment of recognition that might bring an instant of enlightenment or 
clarity, if not even possibly a tenor of catharsis to their own mêlées with that traumatic event. 
If spectators fail to recognize the philosophical and agentive undertones of the film or image 
as a work of art that expresses the absurd, then they will inevitably falter and discover 
nothing but meaningless atrocity before their eyes. Alternatively, individuals might just 
imagine such films as amusing, getting superficially captivated by the carnivalesque and the 
campy nature of the comical and the grotesque, without realizing their greater concealed 
significance. 
 Both elements, the carnivalesque and the camp, are necessary characteristics of the 
esperpento aesthetic and not foreign to absurd AIDS films either. Going one step further in 
the analysis of the passage of the Callejón del Gato in Lights of Bohemia, I had claimed that 
the esperpento is experienced through the malformed reflections in the street warping mirrors. 
Being in the public realm, the streets become a sort of funhouse. As passersby cast their gaze 
momentarily, they see their individual images reflected in the mirrors. But upon careful 
attention, the mirrors do not reflect just the individual, but also the collective. Together with 
their image, the passersby looking in the mirror are forced to grasp the grotesque reflections 
of their neighbor as well. The carnival, the folk festival, the Internet, the cinema, are all 
uniquely grotesque configurations of the social, and may be equally understood as funhouses 
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of reflections and doublings for a community of spectators. In this same manner, I adjure that 
one can more easily and even more intimately visualize a mythical body infected with HIV 
through such a collective, through the vehicle of this carnivalesque house of mirrors.  
 I explained in earlier chapters that Bakhtin relied on the concept of the carnivalesque 
in his discussion of the grotesque. Spanish literature critic David Gies furthers the connection 
between esperpento and the carnivalesque giving a series of carnivalesque features in Valle-
Inclán’s work that will offer new insight into the relationship of an absurdist AIDS cinema 
and the esperpento. He calls our attention to the fact that the title of three of Valle-Inclán’s 
literary works marked as esperpento include the name carnaval, and as is characteristic of 
carnival Valle-Inclán’s literature involves the mixing and parody of genre and styles, the 
comic and the grotesque (485). The esperpento also depends on the representation of people 
through puppetry, whereby characters are depicted as two-dimensional. Gies summarizes the 
connections between the esperpento and puppetry as a list of features: “ridicule and 
debasement of characters; esperpento as a poetics opposed to official culture; puppet-
characters are the ‘fools’ of carnival; inversion of hierarchies” (485). Excess is celebrated in 
forms of “attraction to the decadent (but also to melodramatic popular culture); erosion of the 
borders dividing the serious from the comic” (485). Language is a tool through which one 
may manipulate reality, whereby esperpento also encourages “polyglossia (simultaneous 
presence of several languages interacting with each other) of the marketplace; profanation 
[…]; and the ubiquity of laughter” (485). I would add in the latter sense that laughter should 
be understood as non-verbal communication.  
 These affinities are equally present in camp aesthetics and their associations with gay 
culture, as indicated by Bergman in Camp Grounds: Style and Homosexuality (1994), a book 
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I discussed in Chapter one. Bergman describes how in an English translation of Bakhtin, one 
of the most common words used to translate the word “carnivalesque” is “gay” (99). While 
he acknowledges that neither Bakhtin nor the translator surely applied the word 
carnivalesque to mean “queer,” but instead “lively,” “carefree,” and “light-hearted,” he 
argues how Bakhtin did depict the word “in its droll aspect, in its gay relativity. … 
triumphant, and at the same time mocking and deriding” (99). He argues that since the 
carnivalesque enjoys 
punning especially in sexually provocative ways, and since the homosexual 
subculture has carried in its celebration of Mardi Gras and Halloween the very 
traditions of the carnivalesque, the two meanings blend in a form Bakhtin virtually 
licenses. (99)  
 
While it appears that the terms camp and carnivalesque are interchangeable, there is an 
important difference. Camp is about playing with and poking fun at reality with the goal of 
having a laugh. The carnivalesque can take on alternately more serious and grotesque forms 
as a process of estrangement in order to challenge and rebel against established orders of 
power and ideologies. Sherry Marie Velasco points out how camp  
keeps its audience at too great a distance from the reality […] to inspire real 
revolutionary impulses. It is not that camp does not desire change, but rather that it 
refuses to specify which shape change should take, […] while carnivalesque humor 
has the potential for overturning status quo. (124)  
 
These two elements, the camp and the carnivalesque, should however be seen as equal 
partners accompanying the esperpento paradigm, and underpinning an absurdist-ethics as 
applied to what I have called Absurdist Queer AIDS Cinema. The works may at times appear 
as minor instances without a clear agenda, or simply with a gesture of a warning, but under 
this new revealing light, their message is definite. The mix and mash of the absurd, the 
comical, and the grotesque style, of the carnivalesque and camp aesthetic, and of the 
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embodiment of AIDS fashioned in the dress of the esperpento, has as its most powerful goal 
the creation of a fertile space for ambiguity and slippage that ultimately allows radical 
political agency.  
 My discussion of camp and the carnivalesque expressed through the grotesque 
notions of dressing up, masks, puppets, and scarecrows works as a bridge to address the 
connection of the esperpento to a disembodied materialization and a mirroring of the 
grotesqueness of humanity. I maintain that the esperpento aesthetic, as presented through the 
body of a puppet, can be read poignantly as a postmodern visual representation. Valle-Inclán 
originally conceived the esperpento to be played out by theatrical puppets, and not by human 
actors. In essence, it was important for him that the characters were shown as being driven by 
the strings of society. Cardona and Zahareas highlight how the esperpento applies 
particularly to various art forms, including cinema, whereby this aesthetic style may mingle 
“effectively the grotesque plasticities of Goya, the farcical tone of the puppet show, the ritual 
of traditional theater, and the fragmented montage of cinematography” (93). For the case in 
point of absurdist AIDS films, in helping the spectator separate the visual of the epidemic 
from the image of an actual human being, a unique foil is created that engenders a 
philosophical space in which the spectator may engage with fantasies and fears that may 
extricate him from a view of life as wretched, but only through an initial drastic obliteration 
of the comfort provided by uncritical identification. Valle-Inclán did not do this, however, 
because he was disenchanted with the theater, as Lyon emphasizes, but for aesthetic reasons 
in order to create most effectively a lens of disengagement and estrangement. Lyon explains 
further how puppets also afford directors “a whole new range of dramatic possibilities, visual 
and linguistic, to express what Valle increasingly came to see as the manipulated condition of 
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humanity” (106). One could say that the puppet as doppelgänger may present an absurd and 
grotesque rendering of the world much more easily than could a real actor, whose face and 
body (even of the best actor) are subject to the stresses and manipulations of human emotion. 
At the same time, the audience can laugh more easily at a puppet’s response or grotesque 
fashioning of a serious issue, rather than responding to an actor doing the same.  
 There is no doubt that there is something uncanny and even absurd about puppets. 
Cardona and Zahareas write: “The esperpento is structured as the true spectacle of a fake 
tragedy whereby Spanish puppets in the very attempt to appear tragic, gesticulate more than 
ever as the puppets they really are” (191). Not just the movements, but also the ventriloquism, 
the uttering of a viewpoint through a puppet, produces a schizophrenic experience, which is 
not always simply reducible to “I am speaking,” because the puppet is inanimate. 
Psychologists describe the usefulness of puppets or dolls to help children talk about traumatic 
events. Through the process of disassociation, when using the puppet as an extension of their 
own voice and body, children are more willing to talk about taboo subjects, rather than 
simply talking face-to-face to adults. One scholar describes how the schizophrenic role of the 
psychiatrist in fact transforms the voice of the child, the supposed psychotic patient, via the 
imagined body of the puppet:  
The puppet takes on more and more of the qualities of the therapist. […] The puppet 
seems to try to reconcile the interest of the girl and that of her therapist. The girl, 
through the mouth of the puppet, plays with a variety of identifications. At a point 
where the puppet displays some insight in comparing the patient’s experience with 
that of a dreamer and suggesting that the therapist knows, as does the puppet, that the 
girl was not actually dreaming, the therapist took this as a cue and joined the 
conversation as an active partner. (Esslier, 85-86). 
 
Relevant from this particular study is that the puppet’s voice does not come from the 
therapist, but instead from a recording made by another psychiatrist, who is absent on the 
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scene. This signifies an even further doubling of the experience of deferment, for both the 
patient and even the therapist must trust in the intangible authority of the voice on the tape, as 
well as the medium of technological process, and the puppet by extension as the mouthpiece, 
to serve its psychotherapeutic purpose. Psychiatrists relate how the schizophrenic individual 
may experience, in her or his illness, a hint of “deanimation,” a term related to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of becoming inanimate in relation to the mental processes of the 
schizophrenic and their connection to descriptions of human consciousness. One psychiatrist 
describes how this feeling of deanimation, or literally fear of dying or becoming dead, 
correlates to the sense that the individual’s humanity has been taken away from him, that he 
has been turned into a thing, and that he can experience no actively functioning self (Lifton, 
223) For instance, a person suffering from schizophrenia may make “reference to himself as 
a toy, puppet, or slave,” or as “a doll [who moves] like a mechanical toy, [whereby] the 
deanimation and desymbolization are accompanied by a sense of being controlled or 
manipulated” (Lyon 223-224).  
 The possible combination of puppetry, and by extension of the esperpento, with 
HIV/AIDS, and the corporeal significations thereof, produces a parallel way to express the 
tragedy of the virus from a removed psychological position. In this schizophrenic, detached 
way, the spectator can laugh at and be horrified or disgusted by the puppets’ behavior, 
instead of responding directly to her or his own particular conception of the virus and the 
epidemic. Spectators can respond to traumatic events, much like the child does with the 
puppet, from a safer distance.  
 The use of puppetry is not new to ways in which people have presented issues of HIV 
and AIDS. Scholar Marcia Blumberg, in her article entitled “Puppets doing Time in the Age 
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of AIDS,” relates a story from 2011 of a puppetry troupe in South Africa called Puppets 
against AIDS, and another used in prisons under the emblem of Puppets in Prison. Both 
troupes used puppets as a means of promoting AIDS awareness. Puppets in the latter play 
included, for example, a puppet representing a gay man in drag. In one scene, the gay puppet 
is brutally raped by a “straight” HIV-positive puppet. Blumberg describes the scene: 
Biza’s act of rape accompanied by the youngster’s screams for misery loses none of 
the horrific violence when enacted by puppets. The lack of physical and emotional 
inhibitions of puppets adds to the potential for increasing the severity of the violence, 
yet the human involvement is never forgotten, as the actors manipulating the puppets 
are fully visible; this linkage emphasizes egregious modes of behavior in and out of 
prison. (261).  
 
Additionally, the director takes the provocation through puppetry one step further by having 
the puppets directly address the audience: “the intervention of the former guerilla fighter, 
Sporo, who has lost a friend to AIDS, provokes a fight in which Bra Biza stabs Sporo […] 
and triumphantly declares to the audience, ‘I am boss.’” (261). Through the disassociation 
and distancing made possible through puppetry, the AIDS activist puppeteers hope that 
spectators, in this case the prison inmates, will be able recognize and negotiate their own 
issues of violence and the seriousness of HIV. As Blumberg describes, “The message is 
always one of fear and spells out the equation, AIDS=death” (261-262).   
  It is possible to visualize HIV more cogently in its corporal signification as an absurd, 
comical-grotesque body without organs, who fashions himself in the paradigm of the 
esperpento, and is persuasively incarnated in the body of a puppet. This presence that has 
become inanimate is the body of a gay man with HIV in the streets of New York, San 
Francisco, Berlin, London, Mumbai, maybe even in Philadelphia and all streets in the world 
beaten by the epidemic, but not defeated ethically speaking. One should imagine this figure 
rather as a puppet on a stage. The esperpento as a puppet is at the same time the corporal 
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incarnation of the virus at its most realistic, in terms of death and dying, and at its most 
unrealistic, with regards to the absurd, which manifests itself in the form of a mere 
fantastical analogy or symbol of something or someone just as dangerous, shocking, or 
grotesque. One encounters the HIV-positive esperpento in the visual media, and especially in 
film. Its presence is observable and perceptible—both the sound and the image—, and its 
appearance sends a wakening jolt to spectators’ bodies and minds. This shock gains 
spectators’ attention, and demands the viewer to arbitrate the reality of imminent death, 
regardless of whether one is healthy or sick.  
 When one engages productively and philosophically with the art of an absurd AIDS 
Cinema, one not only learns the value and potency of an absurdist-ethics, but also 
dialectically tackles issues of one’s own life and death. Even if one does not adopt this mode 
of ethics—and few surely do, for it demands much of the individual; an engaged spectator 
should not leave the cinema unchanged. The spectator should leave thinking more critically 
about the epidemic, more so than before s/he arrived. In this way, spectators are forced to 
view and identify themselves, in the face of the esperpento, just as one would in the warping 
mirrors of the Callejón del Gato. The esperpento in its ideal form can confront 
viewers/readers with philosophical impressions that demands that they reconsider their own 
positions vis-à-vis how they visualize HIV/AIDS, and the ethical value of life on the fringe, 
but always at the margins between the public and private sphere. Through this same manner, 
the barebacker or the mythical grotesque body with AIDS garners new life through the 
engagement with death. What is at stake here is the projection of many socially collective 
fantasies of the epidemic on a schizophrenic, and even postmodern body. In a funhouse, one 
looks into mirrors to appreciate one’s own face in an endless loop of the mise en abyme. As I 
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suggested earlier, this is a kind of schizophrenic experience that the spectator confronts 
specifically in the cinema, but it is also easily found in a social existence marked by a 
postmodern mentality. Consequently, one may visualize a mythical, absurdist grotesque body 
with AIDS as a social and schizophrenic collective. 
 As studied before, Deleuze and Guattari were especially invested in the theory of 
“schizoanalysis” to describe new ways of being and phenomenology. In developing their 
theory of a body without organs, the authors took their cues from Antonin Artaud (1896-
1948) and Freud. The designation body without organs was coined originally by French 
playwright Antonin Artaud in a radio play entitled “To Have Done with the Judgment of God” 
(1947), in which a celebration, a dance of death, takes place through the negation of the 
corporeal body. The play reads: 
 When you have given [a human] a body without organs, 
 then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms and 
 restored him to his true liberty. 
 Then you will teach him again to dance inside out 
 as in delirium of our accordion dances 
 and that inside out will be his true side out. (qtd. in Genosko, 71) 
 
This radio performance belongs to the genre of the “theater of cruelty” developed by Artaud, 
and which one might interpret as a kind of “theater of menace.”52 “To Have Done with the 
Judgment of God,” which is extremely vulgar and exhibits notions of the grotesque and the 
carnivalesque, was banned in 1948 until 1973. It starts by talking about the capturing of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Artaud compared the theater to a plague: “If the theater is like the plague, it is not because it is contagious, 
but because like the plague it is the revelation, the bringing forth, the exteriorization of a depth of latent cruelty 
by means of which all the perverse possibilities of the mind, whether of an individual or a people, are localized” 
(qtd. in Plunka, 42-43). For Artaud, the theater was meant to provoke the spectator violently into action, by 
“furnishing the spectator with the truthful precipitates of dreams, in which his taste for crime, his erotic 
obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his utopian sense of life and matter, even his cannibalism, pour out, on a 
level not counterfeit and illusory, but interior” (qtd. in Plunka, 43). Through this experience, the spectator was 
supposed to experience a sense of catharsis, not unlike what I suggest absurdist AIDS films do on a functional 
level. 
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boy’s sperm to produce good troops for the homeland. He cracks jokes about all sorts of 
bodily functions, feces and flatulence. Beyond this, the piece is deeply antagonistic toward 
Christianity. Only one master copy of the original radio performance remains; all others were 
erased (Cull, 51). In other words, Artaud’s grotesque performance, as later happened with 
von Praunheim’s Virus, was clearly underappreciated, at least at the time of its nascence. 
Artaud crafted the designation of a possibility for a new way of conceptualizing becoming 
inanimate or becoming illegible, and becoming unrepresentable politically. He was 
prophesying a radical new way of being a part of the social collective.  
 Deleuze and Guattari also amassed much insight from Freud, who was fascinated 
with Daniel Paul Schreber, a German judge who suffered from schizophrenia. In 1884, at the 
age of forty-two, Schreber began psychiatric treatment, which he continued throughout the 
rest of his life. At the age of sixty-one, Schreber published his Memoirs of a Nervous Illness 
(1903), which Freud used to write his famous study on paranoia, “Psycho-Analytic Notes,” 
published subsequently in 1911. In this passage, Freud recounts the nature of the delusions 
Schreber wrote of in his memoirs how he believed, although he had suffered no real disease, 
that he had been “subject to the sort of damage to various organs of his body that would have 
quickly been the death of any other mortal” (9). He claimed to have lived years “without a 
stomach, without intestines, almost without lungs, with an esophagus in shreds, with no 
bladder, with smashed rib bones, had sometimes eaten part of his larynx with his food, and so 
on, for as long as he remained a man, he was quite immortal” (9-10). Furthermore, Schreber 
underwent a crisis of gender in which he believed he “had the feeling that large masses of 
‘female nerves’ had already passed over into his body, which would produce new humans 
through direct fertilization by God. Only then would he be able to die a natural death” (9-10).  
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 From Schreber’s descriptions, Deleuze and Guattari took their interpretation of the 
term a body without organs as “The model of death. As the authors of horror stories have 
understood so well, it is not death that serves as the model for catatonia, it is catatonic 
schizophrenia that gives this model to death. Zero intensity” (Anti-Oedipus, 329). Just as 
Schreber believed he was subjected to losing organs, or rather that his body rejected them, so 
too do Deleuze and Guattari describe how their “death model appears when the body without 
organs repels the organs and lays them aside: no mouth, no tongue, no teeth—to the point of 
self-mutilation, to the point of suicide” (329). Deleuze and Guattari associate this model of 
death akin with one of life, as ethical counterparts. In other words, they suggest that one 
cannot know life until one experiences dying and death because the experience of death 
“occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or 
becoming” (330). In turn, death “is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never 
finishes happening in every becoming—in the becoming-another-sex, the becoming-god, the 
becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones of intensity on the body without organs” (330). The 
authors read life itself as a kind of becoming-death, whereby “every intensity is extinguished 
at the end […] every becoming itself becomes a becoming-death!” (330). Yet, Deleuze and 
Guattari go perhaps too far, for in all that time one is living and dying, but certainly not dead 
until the final act is over; and this is the point emphasized in the configuration of the 
esperpento.  
 The schizophrenic, like the esperpento figure—the agent of an absurdist-ethics—lives 
as such, metaphorically at the edge of life and death and thereby elicits value in embracing 
suffering, in the same way that the barebacker does, in the same way the grotesque AIDS 
joke functions, and in the same way one may visualize HIV/AIDS in its most horrible forms, 
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and yet locate ethical value in such endgame encounters that arise at moments of cultural 
catastrophe and postmodern political bankruptcy. In the same path, Deleuze and Guattari 
surmise that “the schizophrenic is the one who lives the enjoyment and suffering of 
experience most intensely: ‘Far from having lost who knows what contact with reality, the 
schizophrenic is closest to the beating heart of reality, to an intense point identical with the 
production of the real’” (qtd. in Holland, 132-133). Living on the periphery of life and death 
is, for Deleuze and Guattari at least, the only ethical way to live, and their model follows 
mine as well.  
 The schizophrenic, multilayered universe and the many-masked individual describe 
the political. This line of argumentation is directly related to my understanding of the 
absurdist grotesque body of the esperpento insofar as the contemporary era is mirrored by the 
political carnivalesque. In this history, the epidemic plays a key role, just as Schreber’s own 
body stood for a kind of esperpento-fashioned figure in relationship to his own time. For 
Schreber, that factual reality was the growing political presence of fascism in Germany at the 
turn of the century. In an esperpentic fashion, Schreber projected “a storehouse of 
protofascist fantasies” onto his body. In doing so, he subverted and rebelled against National 
Socialism ( Jagodzinski 17). But as Eric Santner notes, “one should not, as they say, try this 
at home” ( qtd. in Jagodzinski, 17). Schreber was not privy to the distance of circumspection 
to offer him enlightenment, but instead fell deeper into a deteriorating mental state of decay. 
While in comparison, art, whether that be theater or cinema, may offer the viewer both an 
engagement, audio and/or visual, of a topic colored by an absurd-grotesque aesthetic, all the 
while providing the distance necessary between screen/stage and spectator as an effective 
catalyst for estrangement and moments of vision.  
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 After Deleuze and Guattari, other authors have already taken the leap in making a 
connection between the viral and schizophrenia, and even more have mused on how one can 
re-conceptualize HIV within this configuration, although not in the way I imagine it here. 
Robert O’Toole, in his article “Contagium Vivum Philosophia: Schizophrenic Philosophy, 
Viral Empiricism and Deleuze,” describes the state of a schizophrenic man (and his partner) 
after learning that he contracted the virus. The man had a psychotic break. O’Toole calls the 
patient’s erratic and destructive behavior after the fact, a Deleuzian “schizo-HIV positive 
assemblage” (175). I subsume the denomination of schizo-HIV positive assemblage, but not 
in the woeful way as O’Toole. Instead, I interpret this concept as a productive gesture, 
extending it to my own understanding of the mythical, grotesque body with AIDS as being a 
collective locus of multiplicity. This concept can also be used as a springboard off of which 
to describe how Deleuze saw his relationship to philosophy, which underscores my own 
theory of an absurdist-ethics as being a framework within which one may arguably obtain a 
sense of philosophical enlightenment through a genealogy or legacy of thinkers viewed in 
front of a warped mirror. Deleuze postulates how he imagines his relationship to other 
philosophers as a sexual act of copulation, albeit a queer one whereby the product of that 
encounter would be a grotesque “immaculate conception” not unlike the description of 
Frankenstein’s own creation:  
I would imagine myself approaching an author from behind, and making him a child, 
who would indeed be his and would, nevertheless, be monstrous. That the child 
would be his was very important because the author had to say, in effect, everything I 
made him say. But that the child be monstrous was also a requisite because it was 
necessary to go through all kinds of decenterings, slidings, splittings, secret dis-
charges which have given me much pleasure. (‘I have nothing to admit.’ 117)  
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What Deleuze describes as an impregnation recalls Bersani and Dean’s idea of establishing a 
grotesque genealogy through the transmission of HIV, an approach to which Deleuze adds a 
philosophical value.  
 One may extend this metaphor further in terms of thinking about the schizophrenic 
nature of cinema. Within the context of representing on screen altered states of consciousness, 
such as that of someone suffering from schizophrenia, Anna Powell explains how the cinema 
may function like a virus, mutating into schizophrenic multiplicities of possibility, infecting 
the viewer with alternate perceptions (185-186).53 In an absurd AIDS film, one beholds meta-
cinematic images in their ripest, absurdist states of becoming. Such images are grotesque, 
shocking, politically potent, bridging as result the association between an AIDS cinema and 
the paragon of the esperpento. As I addressed in Chapter three, the absurdist AIDS cinema is 
part of a postmodern cinema. But postmodern cinema is still another hybrid of the modern 
cinema, insofar as it may be defined more distinctly as that which is made up of minor 
cinemas. In particular, in reference to a Global Queer AIDS Cinema, the budgets for some 
films might be small, as initially might be the market. Yet, because of the powerful and wide-
spreading hand of the Internet, the market is thereby diversified and expanded. The qualities 
of the postmodern spirit also have other implications for an absurd AIDS cinema, in 
particular in terms of the existence of political agency, upon which my theory of an 
absurdist-ethics hinges, and which controverts the view of scholars that complain that the 
postmodern period is marked by a lack of agency. Robert Stacey calls this concept, 
humorously, a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The HIV virus does have multiple mutations. See the article, “Drug designer: New tool reveals mutations that 
cause HIV drug resistance,” in bibliography.  
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‘pessimistic pomo’ [which is a position that spawns an] ideological manifestation of 
nihilism, and that rather than rejoicing in the lack of epistemological center and 
seeing this absence as a site for liberation and reconstruction, despair[s] at the futility 
of existence and lack of agency toward social and cultural change. (105)  
 
The resolution to this dilemma is contained in Stacey’s definition. One must appreciate 
absence as opportunity for agency. I concurrently detect political agency in a postmodern era, 
but it requires grotesque moves that can be described as having a similar function and force 
as the product of Bakhtin’s “carnival laughter [which] forces attention on the belly and the 
body’s reproductive functions,” calling attention to the role of laughter in the style of the 
grotesque (Velasco, 124). Bakhtin explains that the carnivalesque laughter functions by 
means of degradation, but not in a traditional sense of destroying the object of the laughter. 
Instead, he emphasizes that “to degrade an object does not imply merely hurling into the void 
of nonexistence, into absolute destruction but to hurl it down to the reproductive lower 
stratum, the zone in which conception and a new birth take place” (21). By this token, 
carnivalesque laughter incites enlightenment on the topic that is being abused and distorted. 
Once the object of laughter has been effectively degraded, what emerges is a state of 
“Grotesque realism, [which] knows no other lower level; it is the fruitful earth and the womb. 
It is always conceiving” (21). Out of this productive spirit re-conceptualizations of ideology 
and accepted dogma emerge.  
 This brings me full circle to consider the body of the barebacker in Chapters three and 
four as the radical instantiation of an absurdist-ethics, a grotesque body subject to and 
debased by a reproductive virus through which it establishes legacies, as Dean and Bersani 
also suggest, between gay men through barebacking. Bakhtin calls attention to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of the body with organs as it ties to the infected, grotesque-absurd 
esperpento-styled figure of AIDS as emblem of ultimate degradation, corruption, and decay 
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when he states that “The grotesque image reflects a phenomenon in transformation, an as yet 
unfinished metamorphosis, of death and birth, growth and becoming. [As well as,] the dying 
and the procreating, the beginning and the end of the metamorphosis” (24).  
 Such a “politics that deals with life (Greek: bίos)” and by extension, of course, death 
is known commonly as bio-politics (Lemke, 2). AIDS and its impact on the political, social, 
and even medical culture (i.e., epidemiology), for example, have everything to do with bio-
politics, for it aims to provide a model of the intersections between the biological and social 
body. In a Foucauldian sense, bio-politics is particularly compelling with respect to the 
esperpento because it works to discover “a ‘nature’ of the population (e.g., rates of birth and 
death, diseases, etc.) that might be influenced by specific incentives and measures which is 
the precondition for directing and managing it (Lemke, 5-6). HIV and AIDS fit as part of the 
fold of bio-politics, and ultimately as part of the fear the epidemic incites, which can 
manifest itself in the forms of the absurd-grotesque, on the border of the collapse of a campy 
style and the unfolding of the carnivalesque as its dipole.  
 Slavoj Žižek captures the political essence of this ripe connection of bio-politics as it 
would apply to Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque, the postmodern period, and capitalism. 
He blasts: “My God, if you need a carnival, today’s capitalism is a carnival. A KKK lynching 
is a carnival. A cultural critic, a friend of mine, Boris Groys, told me that he did some 
research on Bakhtin and that it became clear that when Bakhtin was producing his theory of 
carnival in the 1930s, it was the Stalinist purges that were his model: today you are on the 
Central Committee, tomorrow…”54 Scholar Anna Klosowska further iterates how in this 
regard “According to Žižek, the work of ethics must be conducted on two levels as dictated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Divine Violence and Liberated Territories,” par. 12. There is no author listed. See bibliography.  
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by both the written rules and the obscene rules that become operative in the episodic space of 
the carnival” (114). These rules represent the particular ethical spin of the biopolitics at play. 
One can read by analogy how this model would apply to issues of ethics from a new point of 
departure for HIV and AIDS, and in particular with reference to queer cinema. Not 
surprisingly, Klosowska also suggests that queer camp might be a strategy for such a 
biopolitics that “paradoxically both unlocks and maintains boundaries, and it is in that sense 
a suitable answer to Žižek’s call for discipline” (Klosowska, 114).  
 In other words, Žižek’s conception of a bio-ethics is in line with the embracing of an 
absurdist-ethics, whereby his understanding of discipline, the direct attack together with the 
desire for normalcy, might be emblematic of this kind of ethics, which may be enacted 
through a battling with the epidemic of HIV head-on, even if only philosophically speaking. 
Bakhtin’s own conception of bio-politics is equally arcane to the discussion about AIDS. He 
invokes an aesthetics of the grotesque within the context of a plague, and the different kinds 
of ethics it engenders. He refers for example to the work of Italian poet Giovanni Boccaccio 
(1313-1375), who wrote the Decameron (approx. 1350-1353) during a time of plague. 
Bakhtin attests:  
[The plague] grants the right to use other words, to have another approach to life and 
to the world. Not only have all conventions been dropped, but all laws “both human 
and divine” are silenced. Life has been lifted out of its routine, the web of 
conventions has been torn; all the official hierarchic limits have been swept away. 
[…] And in accord with the general turnover, the problems of life may be discussed 
not in churches and schools but in whorehouses. (272-273).  
 
This is exactly what is happening when the “AIDS is a Mass Murderer” campaign I 
approached in Chapter two exploits Hitler’s and other grotesque images of bodies in sexually 
compromising positions with women. This grotesque message does come from the brothel in 
a way. On the subject of barebacking, it comes most certainly largely from pornography on 
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the Internet, and it is highly effective—it may repulse, but it does its job of starting a 
meaningful and urgent conversation.  
Bakhtin also establishes a viable relationship between the absurd-grotesque and the 
sexual body as a necessary component of a bio-ethics, whereby “the grotesque body is not 
separated from the rest of the world. It is not a closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, 
outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits” (26). This connotes an excess in terms of 
“apertures or the convexities, or on various ramifications and offshoots: the open mouth, the 
genital organs, the breasts, the phallus, the potbelly, the nose” (26). One can identify a touch 
of Valle-Inclán’s concaved and convexed mirrors in Bakhtin’s description of the “convexities” 
of the body, in its undesired, although human and natural deformation. Moreover, “the body 
discloses its essence as a principle of growth which exceeds its own limits only in copulation, 
pregnancy, childbirth, the throes of death, eating, drinking, or defecation” (26). This 
esperpentic theory of biopolitics as excess applies also to the cinema, whereby like a set of 3-
D glasses, an absurdist-ethics can shift the spectator’s perspective philosophically. The 
absurdist-ethics lenses in these glasses make visible a new perspective that could not 
normally be conceived of otherwise. One may now more clearly visualize the esperpento as 
radial agent in a time of cultural dissolution, as the mythical infected gay man with AIDS, 
staring as hero and revolutionary against the backdrop of a postmodern political wasteland of 
the post-AIDS era. As comically grotesque and absurd as it may sound, an absurd AIDS 
cinema is a postmodern funhouse.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
CIRCUS 
 
In economics, there is a high probability trading strategy called a risk-reward ratio, 
and in business there is a field of study called risk management. For economic theorists, the 
idea of someone exposing herself or himself to a risky deal in order to gain an economic 
advantage is nothing new. This risk-reward ratio informs my theory of an absurdist-ethics, 
which is also bound up in notions of risk, reward, and risk management:  
Any investment made entails exposure to a risk component. […] One must weigh the 
risk-reward ratio when making investment decisions. The idea is to acquire an asset 
with a well-balanced risk-reward ratio. In extremely bullish times if one pays 80 
times the earnings for a stock, then one is buying more risk rather than reward. The 
risk-reward ratio is in that case against the investor. (Parikh, 319)  
 
The postmodern period is a bullish time, and similarly an absurdist-ethics does call for a risk-
reward ratio that may appear out of proportion and excessive. 
This theory is also about living life intensely, which boils down to the idea that an 
absurdist-ethics is about acts of social revolt. This does not usually entail a full-out 
revolution. Even the smallest gestures can be acts of revolt. The group of directors and their 
films, as well as the works of the artists, writers, philosophers, and thinkers I present in this 
study, or those who are willingly involved in the cultural practice of barebacking, have 
participated in their own way in acts of revolt through their medium of choice. These are in a 
small way, acts of civil disobedience, although in most cases, no one is breaking the law per 
se. The embodiments of an absurdist-ethics, such as barebacking, a gallows humor, and the 
aesthetic of the grotesque and the esperpento, make it clear that a certain amount of 
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resistance to public, societal norms is required in order for people to feel like life is valuable 
in some way. In essence, one does not want to feel normal. In a true postmodern fashion, one 
wants to be abnormal, or more crudely, feel like a freak. 
In some way, all the abnormal figures I presented in this study make people feel more 
human, more grounded; a more complete subject. This is not because one does not identify 
with the images, but in truth because one does. In this fleeting moment of identification, one 
recognizes one’s perceived sense of abnormality and grotesqueness reflected, as well as the 
recognition of one’s impending death, seen as if through a warping funhouse mirror—the 
body distorted and contorted as if in the throes of death. In that moment, one cherishes 
feeling as if one is losing control of oneself, that one is beyond representation, becoming a 
body without organs, or perhaps that one has been a body without organs all along.  
In an article entitled “Organizing the Circus: The Engineering of Miracles” from a 
business journal on Organization Studies, Martin Parker provides some unusual perceptions 
into the history and functioning of the circus. He explains why people are drawn to spectacle 
and the grotesque, and ultimately to that which shocks. He reveals: “Stunts will only work if 
our understanding is stunted, if our imagination is constrained and our prejudices in place” 
(560). In other words, the absurd and grotesque spectacles of life that one glimpses at the 
circus, in the news, or in a film attract the common person because one’s intellectual 
understanding is stunted. Parker suggests that such audience members would ask themselves, 
if a bearded woman can be so strong, then what else could women do (561). In other words, 
the freakishness of the circus performers is not just in their deformed nature, or the stunts 
they can perform, but also their ability to traverse and test the boundaries of social norms. 
“[A] circus [challenges] conventions, perhaps even self-consciously engaged in ideology 
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critique, and not simply reproducing the dull routines of racism and sexism” (561). 
Otherwise, as Parker asserts in a true Foucauldian fashion, the circus performers have power 
over the masses, because they know how to provoke “the gasps and laughter not found in the 
boredom of the factory or the office” (563). In other words, the average circus-goer cannot 
break out of their mundane life or their stunted intellectual position therein, and so they go to 
the circus to experience wonderment.  
If this logic is followed, some people yield agency from the seemingly absurd act of 
high-risk behavior, while they are mere guests in what appears to be a grotesque spectacle of 
a suicide pact or of hearing a tasteless joke about AIDS. At the same time, the showcasing of 
such high-risk practices, like circus performers shooting themselves out of a canon, attracts 
many individuals, while many people fight to shut down such thrill shows in the name of 
rationalist ideologies. No sane person would subject her or himself to the threat of death. 
Parks reminds readers of something Karl Marx said about spectacle:  
When we see the back of an individual contorted in fear and bent in humiliation, we 
cannot but look around and doubt our very existence, fearing lest we lose ourselves. 
But on seeing a fearless acrobat in bright costume, we forget ourselves, feeling that 
we have somehow risen above ourselves and reached the level of universal strength. 
Then we can breathe easier. (qtd. 562) 
 
One way or the other, not every man is willing to walk the tightrope if given the chance. 
Only the rebel has the guts: the esperpento.  
Parker reminds readers of the historical connection and affinity between the circus 
and film. The cinema was born out of the tradition of spectacle and attraction, of the carnival 
and the circus. Film scholar Tom Gunning famously characterized early cinema as a “cinema 
of attractions” because of its focus on spectacle and not necessarily on narrative. Some of the 
first films were marketed and shown at such fun parks. 
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to discover that many of the earliest actors performed in the circus or in Vaudeville 
sideshows before they became part of the cinema:  
Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton made the switch from circus to cinema early, and 
the growth of the film industry in the 20th century turned film stunts into special 
effects. […] Why pay to watch someone jumping around on a horse when you could 
stay in and watch battles involving mythological creatures, or superheroes flying into 
buildings? (566) 
 
Masters of exaggeration, even of grotesque physical bodily movements and gestures, both 
Chaplin and Keaton used their circus talents to draw laughs on screen. This legacy explains 
why the medium of film is so fitting for a minor genre such as Queer Cinema, which also 
banks on providing a certain spectacle of desire, and even more so an absurd AIDS cinema. 
In the latter case, one may say that both desire and death are on display, just as they are in the 
circus. The myth also carries that early film viewers were so shocked by the image of a 
moving train on screen that they ran out of the movie theater; one might expect that viewers 
might react similarly towards the shocking and grotesque images and/or scenarios in the 
absurdist films presented in this work. However, truth be told, no one left the cinema on the 
day the Lumière Brothers’ film Train Pulling into a Station (1895) was shown. Just the same, 
as an early spectator of von Praunheim’s Virus admits, as I described in Chapter one, he and 
others were shocked by the absurd content of the film, and yet no one left the theater. 
Grappling with what he deemed inexplicable, the spectator concluded” “It was just 
too…strange.”55 In both cases the spectacle functions to jolt the spectator out of her or his 
seat, and incite them to reevaluate their perception of reality. In the former case, the 
emergence of cinema asked people to reimagine what technology could do and how one can 
see reality through this lens. In the latter, and particularly in the case of the films of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See: <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090266/>. 
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absurd AIDS cinema, spectators are asked to see images and scenarios that estrange them 
from more common perceptions of reality, and instead through the lens of an absurdist-ethics, 
to envision alternate modes of living, to question what it means to be human, to live, and to 
die. Even more, a few people, and perhaps these are the outliers in society, the esperpento, 
may glean solace and enlightenment from the engagement with the absurdist subject matter.  
Parker explains how those who might be deemed abnormal by society are the type 
who might join a circus, seeking solace in a minor community. They are usually sick, 
deformed, poor, or of minority status, and he even mentions gay people. Persons infected 
with HIV or with AIDS would also fall into the spectrum of social abnormality in this respect. 
The circus is understood as a place that offers a life that is not mundane, but marked by risk. 
One may be attacked by a lion, fall from the tightrope, or be cut into two in the magic box, 
“[we] are left with a version of the circus as a place where the romantic outsider can find 
fellow travelers. The grey stabilities of normal life can be escaped, and a life lived with 
danger and authenticity” (562). But sequins, contortions, and fireworks aside, the most 
important element to those involved in the circus is the sense of community. Circus is 
etymologically derived from the Greek word that means “circle.” After millennia, it 
preserves all its levels of signification. One may imagine equally the importance of the 
collective circle of life in minor communities, such as the gay community, those who are 
infected with HIV, or even barebackers. For Parker, the communitarian social relation is a 
key structural feature of the circus (562). Similarly, barebacking could not be conceived of as 
anything other than a community, just as humor and by extension AIDS humor expects that 
more than just the director is in on the joke, however tasteless or offensive. All films seek 
spectators. Similarly, those involved in a peripheral practice seek multiple partners who 
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ascribe to the same lifestyle, or frame of mind or reference, in order to sustain the practice. 
Following Bakhtin insight in the contradictory normativity of the carnival, the circus 
community, like any community, has its norms and forms, which in this case, accepts 
abnormality as the norm. Parker talks about how people historically have thought of fleeing 
to join the circus because they wanted to escape perhaps from “prejudice and history, and 
into some sort of tolerant community—a place where there will be no credit checks, 
qualifications, drug tests. So the travelling circus brings to mind refugees, a straggling line of 
the disposed, at the same time as it is a romantic gypsy caravan” (562). This is a place where 
“even freaks were paid differently depending on their relative freakishness and rarity” (565). 
No one is excluded, as long as they can work.  
When the individual invests in the collective she or he is no longer necessarily an 
individual. It is about the collective feeling of belonging and spitting and laughing in the face 
of the Man, or the warden, who threatens to extend your life sentence. The circus collective 
is also “a rolling show,” not only because it is always on the move, given its diasporic nature, 
but also because many circus performers have physical deformities or mental illnesses that 
make them so-called freaks (563). Because of these ailments, or as a result of the high risks 
they take in the life they have chosen, they may have shorter life spans. If one performer dies, 
even if it be a grotesque death, e.g., a lion eats a man, the circus collective keeps on moving, 
order is restored as they pick up new people in the next town. Something similar happens in a 
community of those involved in the practice of barebacking. It must inevitably happen that 
members will die, but the Internet forums do bring in new members, and the community 
continues to thrive; the individual is no longer central to the equation of the circus, and by 
extension of this metaphor, he is not of great importance to postmodern society. The 
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collective is key, and is the collective of barebackers that produces the bitterest reactions 
from the status quo. 
 This crisis of the individual is not new, it is a sentiment expressed in every culture 
and every age, and is epitomized in every grotesque and absurd narrative in every media I 
have discussed in this study. But together with the expression of crisis, there are clear 
instances of catharsis also expressed throughout time, in the solace of being a part of a 
community of freaks, in the outwitting of death through community survival, with 
individuals embracing their inner freak, evading representation, becoming inanimate, 
becoming animal, becoming something other than an individual human subject, taking on the 
guise of the esperpentic radical agent, who wields the philosophical tool of enlightenment, a 
lens of perspective: an absurdist-ethical paradigm—even if the radical cashes in pleasure for 
a chance at an earlier death.  
The end of the individual or the death of the subject is also a postmodern notion, as 
posited by Fredric Jameson. In place of the singular subject emerges a schizophrenic and 
collective representation of identity, which must not necessarily have a negative connotation, 
but in truth may exhibit the exact opposite. Jameson contends that 
[Schizophrenic] disjunction […] as a cultural style, ceases to entertain a necessary 
relationship to the morbid content we associate with terms like schizophrenia and 
becomes available for more joyous intensities, for precisely that euphoria which we 
saw displacing the older affects of anxiety and alienation. (29)  
 
Jameson explains that that which was considered grotesque or freakish have later become the 
most fresh and innovative ideas. Anxiety and alienation are replaced by the affect of humor 
and the creative possibilities of the grotesque: 
Not only are Picasso and Joyce no longer ugly; they now strike us, on the whole, as 
rather ‘realistic,’ and this is the result of a canonization and academic 
institutionalization of the modern movement generally that can be traced to the late 
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1950s. This is surely one of the most plausible explanations for the emergence of 
postmodernism itself (4).  
 
In this paradigm, the role of revolt in the postmodern is that which pushes the boundaries of 
acceptability to the limit because “the most extreme moments of high modernism [… ] no 
longer scandalize anyone and are not only received with the greatest complacency but have 
themselves become institutionalized and are at one with the official or public culture of 
Western society” (4).  
 This explains why one would turn to posters of Hitler to represent HIV in order to 
draw people’s attention, why absurd AIDS films bank on the comical and grotesque to make 
an impact, and why some people might seek high-risk behaviors to glean a viable sense of 
living. Revolt is perhaps the only means, in the postmodern, of making people feel and intuit 
that which is life, which remains otherwise imperceptible, invisible, or absent. An absurdist-
ethics prescribes that one must risk death, in order to live. Better yet, perhaps, one must 
muster the strength to die in order to live, ethically.  
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